In order to establish proximate cause, there must be sufficient evidence that the crash and resulting deaths were the natural and probable consequence of Appellant's wrongful act of driving under the influence to a degree which rendered him incapable of safely operating a vehicle. See Edwards v. State, 2007 WY 146, 110, 167 P.3d 636, 639 (Wyo. 2007); Glazier v. State, 843 P.2d 1200, 1204 (Wyo. 1992); Hodgins v. State, 706 P.2d 655, 657 (Wyo. 1985). [¶ 38] Appellant argues that the State did not establish proximate cause because it failed to show what caused the truck to leave the road.
[¶ 10] Similarly, under the facts and circumstances of the instant case, we find the proffered testimony of Demel was improperly excluded. Edwards was charged with aggravated vehicular homicide, which required a finding that his wrongful conduct (driving while under the influence or recklessness) proximately caused Southworth's death. § 6-2-106(b)(i) and (ii); Glazier v. State, 843 P.2d 1200, 1204 (Wyo. 1992); Buckles v. State, 830 P.2d 702, 706 (Wyo. 1992). To be the proximate cause, the accident or injury must be the natural and probable consequence of the defendant's wrongful conduct; a substantial factor in bringing about the injuries or death. Bloomquist v. State, 914 P.2d 812, 820 (Wyo. 1996); Glazier, 843 P.2d at 1204.
To be the "proximate cause," the accident or injury must be the natural and probable consequence of the defendant's wrongful conduct; a "substantial factor" in bringing about the injuries or death. Bloomquist, 914 P.2d at 820 ( quoting Glazier v. State, 843 P.2d 1200, 1204 (Wyo. 1992) and McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408, 414 (Wyo. 1983)). The contributory negligence of a victim is not a defense in a criminal prosecution, but a victim's actions may be considered whenever those actions have a bearing upon the defendant's alleged wrongful conduct or in determining whether the defendant's wrongful conduct was the proximate cause of a victim's death.
In reviewing sufficiency of the evidence claims, we determine whether the evidence is adequate to support a reasonable inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state. Glazier v. State, 843 P.2d 1200, 1203 (Wyo. 1992) ( quoting Longstreth v. State, 832 P.2d 560, 562 (Wyo. 1992)). IV. DISCUSSION
"`Proximate cause means that the accident or injury must be the natural and probable consequence of the act of negligence.'" Glazier v. State, 843 P.2d 1200, 1204 (Wyo. 1992) (quoting McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408, 414 (Wyo. 1983)). "A defendant is usually relieved of liability by an unforeseeable intervening cause.
“To be the ‘proximate cause,’ the ... injury must be the natural and probable consequence of the defendant's wrongful conduct; a ‘substantial factor’ in bringing about the injuries or death.” Id., citing Bloomquist v. State, 914 P.2d 812, 820 (Wyo.1996), which quoted Glazier v. State, 843 P.2d 1200, 1204 (Wyo.1992) and McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408, 414 (Wyo.1983). [¶ 11] As we stated earlier, our standard of review requires that we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and give it the benefit of all reasonable inferences.
"[T]he Eagan rule applies only if three conditions are fulfilled: 1 defendant is the sole witness, 2 defendant's testimony is accepted if not improbable or inconsistent with the facts and circumstances shown, and 3 defendant's credibility has not been impeached." Glazier v. State, 843 P.2d 1200, 1203 (Wyo. 1992). We find Eagan inapplicable for two reasons: AO was not the defendant, and AO, TM and Griswold testified and therefore he was not the sole witness.
Small v. McKennan Hosp., 437 N.W.2d 194, 199 (S.D. 1989). It takes no extraordinary foresight to envision the potentially deadly effects of combining alcohol and motorcycles; nor does it take an extraordinary amount of research to find a reported case of a fatality on a poker run. See Glazier v. State, 843 P.2d 1200 (Wyo. 1992) (upholding motorcyclist's conviction for aggravated vehicular homicide for death occurring during poker run). In Glazier, a passenger on a motorcycle was killed shortly after the second stop of a poker run.
Roose v. State, 759 P.2d 478, 487 (Wyo. 1988). See also Glazier v. State, 843 P.2d 1200, 1203 (Wyo. 1992). The record demonstrates the agreement between Smith and Rhoden that Rhoden would assault Minick for the agreed consideration; the actual assault upon Minick by Rhoden; and Minick's status as a witness.
Roose v. State, 759 P.2d 478, 487 (Wyo. 1988). See also Glazier v. State, 843 P.2d 1200, 1203 (Wyo. 1992). This rule is reiterated in Bouwkamp.