Glazier v. State

13 Citing cases

  1. Tucker v. State

    2010 WY 162 (Wyo. 2010)   Cited 20 times
    In Tucker, we determined the unit of prosecution in the aggravated vehicular homicide statute is one charge per victim because the legislature used the singular clause, "death of another person."

    In order to establish proximate cause, there must be sufficient evidence that the crash and resulting deaths were the natural and probable consequence of Appellant's wrongful act of driving under the influence to a degree which rendered him incapable of safely operating a vehicle. See Edwards v. State, 2007 WY 146, 110, 167 P.3d 636, 639 (Wyo. 2007); Glazier v. State, 843 P.2d 1200, 1204 (Wyo. 1992); Hodgins v. State, 706 P.2d 655, 657 (Wyo. 1985). [¶ 38] Appellant argues that the State did not establish proximate cause because it failed to show what caused the truck to leave the road.

  2. Edwards v. State

    2007 WY 146 (Wyo. 2007)   Cited 9 times

    [¶ 10] Similarly, under the facts and circumstances of the instant case, we find the proffered testimony of Demel was improperly excluded. Edwards was charged with aggravated vehicular homicide, which required a finding that his wrongful conduct (driving while under the influence or recklessness) proximately caused Southworth's death. § 6-2-106(b)(i) and (ii); Glazier v. State, 843 P.2d 1200, 1204 (Wyo. 1992); Buckles v. State, 830 P.2d 702, 706 (Wyo. 1992). To be the proximate cause, the accident or injury must be the natural and probable consequence of the defendant's wrongful conduct; a substantial factor in bringing about the injuries or death. Bloomquist v. State, 914 P.2d 812, 820 (Wyo. 1996); Glazier, 843 P.2d at 1204.

  3. Allen v. State

    2002 WY 48 (Wyo. 2002)   Cited 41 times

    To be the "proximate cause," the accident or injury must be the natural and probable consequence of the defendant's wrongful conduct; a "substantial factor" in bringing about the injuries or death. Bloomquist, 914 P.2d at 820 ( quoting Glazier v. State, 843 P.2d 1200, 1204 (Wyo. 1992) and McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408, 414 (Wyo. 1983)). The contributory negligence of a victim is not a defense in a criminal prosecution, but a victim's actions may be considered whenever those actions have a bearing upon the defendant's alleged wrongful conduct or in determining whether the defendant's wrongful conduct was the proximate cause of a victim's death.

  4. Rogers v. State

    971 P.2d 599 (Wyo. 1999)   Cited 8 times
    Concluding the evidence showed that defendant's conduct was reckless when he chose to drive his vehicle after being awake for twenty-four hours, smoking marijuana, and drinking alcohol

    In reviewing sufficiency of the evidence claims, we determine whether the evidence is adequate to support a reasonable inference of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the state. Glazier v. State, 843 P.2d 1200, 1203 (Wyo. 1992) ( quoting Longstreth v. State, 832 P.2d 560, 562 (Wyo. 1992)). IV. DISCUSSION

  5. Bloomquist v. State

    914 P.2d 812 (Wyo. 1996)   Cited 63 times
    Holding that defendant was not denied the constitutional right to a unanimous verdict when he was charged with committing a crime in two different ways, the jury returned a general verdict, and there was "sufficient evidence support[ing] each alternative ground" for the conviction

    "`Proximate cause means that the accident or injury must be the natural and probable consequence of the act of negligence.'" Glazier v. State, 843 P.2d 1200, 1204 (Wyo. 1992) (quoting McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408, 414 (Wyo. 1983)). "A defendant is usually relieved of liability by an unforeseeable intervening cause.

  6. Grimes v. State

    304 P.3d 972 (Wyo. 2013)   Cited 7 times

    “To be the ‘proximate cause,’ the ... injury must be the natural and probable consequence of the defendant's wrongful conduct; a ‘substantial factor’ in bringing about the injuries or death.” Id., citing Bloomquist v. State, 914 P.2d 812, 820 (Wyo.1996), which quoted Glazier v. State, 843 P.2d 1200, 1204 (Wyo.1992) and McClellan v. Tottenhoff, 666 P.2d 408, 414 (Wyo.1983). [¶ 11] As we stated earlier, our standard of review requires that we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the State and give it the benefit of all reasonable inferences.

  7. Griswold v. State

    994 P.2d 920 (Wyo. 1999)   Cited 26 times
    In Griswold v. State, 994 P.2d 920, 926 (Wyo.1999), we declined to set an arbitrary ten-year time limit for admissibility of uncharged misconduct evidence under W.R.E. 404(b), and reiterated the Britton [v. State, 845 P.2d 1374 (Wyo.1992) ] emphasis on the trial judge’s discretion.

    "[T]he Eagan rule applies only if three conditions are fulfilled: 1 defendant is the sole witness, 2 defendant's testimony is accepted if not improbable or inconsistent with the facts and circumstances shown, and 3 defendant's credibility has not been impeached." Glazier v. State, 843 P.2d 1200, 1203 (Wyo. 1992). We find Eagan inapplicable for two reasons: AO was not the defendant, and AO, TM and Griswold testified and therefore he was not the sole witness.

  8. Wildeboer v. S.D. Junior Chamber of Comm

    1997 S.D. 33 (S.D. 1997)   Cited 23 times
    Holding that SDCL 35-4-78 and 35-1-11, as amended after Walz, preclude recovery of injured persons against bar for selling alcohol to intoxicated person

    Small v. McKennan Hosp., 437 N.W.2d 194, 199 (S.D. 1989). It takes no extraordinary foresight to envision the potentially deadly effects of combining alcohol and motorcycles; nor does it take an extraordinary amount of research to find a reported case of a fatality on a poker run. See Glazier v. State, 843 P.2d 1200 (Wyo. 1992) (upholding motorcyclist's conviction for aggravated vehicular homicide for death occurring during poker run). In Glazier, a passenger on a motorcycle was killed shortly after the second stop of a poker run.

  9. Smith v. State

    902 P.2d 1271 (Wyo. 1995)   Cited 17 times   1 Legal Analyses
    In Smith v. State, 902 P.2d 1271 (Wyo.1995), we considered what type of agreement was necessary for a conspiracy to exist.

    Roose v. State, 759 P.2d 478, 487 (Wyo. 1988). See also Glazier v. State, 843 P.2d 1200, 1203 (Wyo. 1992). The record demonstrates the agreement between Smith and Rhoden that Rhoden would assault Minick for the agreed consideration; the actual assault upon Minick by Rhoden; and Minick's status as a witness.

  10. Hightower v. State

    901 P.2d 397 (Wyo. 1995)   Cited 11 times
    Rejecting a defendant's claim that adding premeditated first degree murder to original charge of felony murder was in error

    Roose v. State, 759 P.2d 478, 487 (Wyo. 1988). See also Glazier v. State, 843 P.2d 1200, 1203 (Wyo. 1992). This rule is reiterated in Bouwkamp.