Opinion
2:21-cv-01770-DAD-DB
03-06-2023
GERALD GLAZER, et al., Plaintiffs, v. THE PRIVATE RESIDENCES AT ONTARIO PLACE CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, et al., Defendants.
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (DOC. NO. 45)
This matter is before the court on a plaintiffs' motion to amend the court's judgment, which the court construes as a motion for reconsideration of the court's February 3, 2023 order granting defendants' motion to dismiss. (Doc. No. 45.) For the reasons set forth below, the court will deny plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration.
The court determines that it need not await a response from defendants to plaintiffs' pending motion for reconsideration because, for the reasons set forth herein, reconsideration of the court's February 3, 2023 order is not warranted.
The court will not summarize the background of this case in this order and instead incorporates by reference the background section in the court's February 3, 2023 order. (Doc. No. 43 at 2-3.) In that order, the court dismissed this action without leave to amend due to this court's lack of personal jurisdiction over defendants. (Id. at 15.) On March 2, 2023, plaintiffs filed the pending motion, which they captioned as a “motion to amend the judgment,” purportedly Brought pursuant to both Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 59(e) and 60(b). (See Doc. No. 45 at 3-4.) However, because plaintiffs seek reconsideration of the court's February 3, 2023 order dismissing this action (see id. at 6), Rule 60(b) provides the only basis for possible reconsideration of that final order.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) governs the reconsideration of final orders of the district court. Rule 60(b) permits a district court to relieve a party from a final order or judgment on grounds of: “(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence . . .; (3) fraud . . . of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has been satisfied . . . or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). “A motion for reconsideration should not be granted, absent highly unusual circumstances, unless the district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the controlling law,” and it “may not be used to raise arguments or present evidence for the first time when they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation.” Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc. v. Mucos Pharma GmbH & Co., 571 F.3d 873, 880 (9th Cir. 2009) (emphasis in original) (internal quotations marks and citations omitted).
Here, plaintiffs do not seek reconsideration of the court's conclusion that this court lacks personal jurisdiction over defendants. Rather, plaintiffs seek reconsideration of the court's decision to dismiss this action and close this case, now requesting for the first time that the court instead transfer this action to the Northern District of Illinois, which plaintiffs refer to as the “correct forum” for this action. (Doc. No. 45 at 5.) Plaintiffs argue that such a transfer is required by 28 U.S.C. § 1631. (Id. at 4-5.)
That statute provides that if a “court finds that there is want of jurisdiction, the court shall, if it is in the interest of justice, transfer such action or appeal to any other such court in which the action or appeal could have been brought at the time it was filed . . ..” 28 U.S.C. § 1631. “Transfer is appropriate under § 1631 if three conditions are met: (1) the transferring court lacks jurisdiction; (2) the transferee court could have exercised jurisdiction at the time the action was filed; and (3) the transfer is in the interest of justice.” Cruz-Aguilera v. I.N.S., 245 F.3d 1070, 1074 (9th Cir. 2001).
Having found that this court lacks personal jurisdiction over the defendants, and assuming arguendo that the Northern District of Illinois could have exercised jurisdiction at the time this action was filed, the only remaining question is whether a transfer in lieu of dismissal would be in the interest of justice. See id. “When determining whether transfer is in the interest of justice, courts have considered whether the failure to transfer would prejudice the litigant, whether the litigant filed the original action in good faith, and other equitable factors.” Id. Generally, “transfer will be in the interest of justice because normally dismissal of an action that could have been brought elsewhere is ‘time-consuming and justice-defeating.'” Miller v. Hambrick, 905 F.2d 259, 262 (9th Cir. 1990) (quoting Goldlawr, Inc. v. Heiman, 369 U.S. 463, 467 (1962)).
In the pending motion, plaintiffs argue that the interests of justice require that this action be transferred because plaintiffs allege that defendants committed tortious acts, and “[i]f plaintiffs may not litigate their claims in California they should be permitted to litigate their claims in Illinois.” (Doc. No. 45 at 5.) Notably, in their opposition to defendants' motion to dismiss, plaintiffs did not request that the court transfer this action in the event the court found that it lacked personal jurisdiction over defendants. Instead, plaintiffs make this request for the first time in their pending motion for reconsideration. See Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc., 571 F.3d at 880 (explaining that a motion for reconsideration “may not be used to raise arguments . . . for the first time when they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation”) (emphasis in original) (citing Kona Enters., Inc. v. Est. of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000)).
In addition, the parties do not dispute that they have engaged in prior litigation in Illinois state court relating to the sale of the condominiums at issue in this action, nor that plaintiffs were unsuccessful in that state court action. (See Doc. Nos. 15 at 11; 32 at 12-13; 43 at 14-15; 45 at 5.) As defendants argued in their motion to dismiss, plaintiffs' decision to file this lawsuit in the Eastern District of California “is obvious forum shopping-seeking to avoid the Illinois court, which has rejected [p]laintiffs' theories.” (Doc. No. 15 at 24); cf. Ogdon v. Grand Canyon Univ., No. 1:20-cv-00709-DAD-SKO, 2022 WL 846973, at *17 (E.D. Cal. March 22, 2022) (finding that transfer of action would be in the interest of justice where, inter alia, plaintiff filed the action “in good faith”).
Finally, plaintiffs do not assert in their pending motion that they are now barred from filing an action in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois due to any applicable the statute of limitations; rather, they merely assert that “Illinois is the only forum now available to plaintiffs.” (Doc. No. 45 at 5); see Medley v. Allison, No. 5:21-cv-00937-DOC-MAR, 2021 WL 2580507, at *2 (C.D. Cal. June 23, 2021) (describing “whether the failure to transfer would prejudice the litigant” as a “[f]actor[] to consider when deciding whether transferring a case is in the interest of justice”) (citing Cruz-Aguilera, 245 F.3d at 1074). Therefore, the court is not persuaded by plaintiffs' conclusory argument that transferring this action is in the interests of justice or that “highly unusual” circumstances exist here warranting reconsideration of this court's February 3, 2023 order. See Marlyn Nutraceuticals, Inc., 571 F.3d at 880. Accordingly, the court finds that there is no basis upon which to reconsider its February 3, 2023 order granting defendants' motion to dismiss this action.
For the reasons set forth above, plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration of the court's February 3, 2023 order (Doc. No. 45) is denied.
IT IS SO ORDERED.