Cuyler v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 443n, 101 S.Ct. 703, 66 L.Ed.2d 641 (1981); Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 289, 99 S.Ct. 530, 58 L.Ed.2d 521 (1978).' Narel v. Liburdi, [ 185 Conn. 562, 565, 441 A.2d 177 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 928, 102 S.Ct. 1974, 72 L.Ed.2d 443 (1982)]; see Glavin v. Warden, 163 Conn. 394, 401, 311 A.2d 86 (1972); Reynolds v. Conway, 161 Conn. 329, 336, 288 A.2d 77 (1971)." Wentworth v. Bourbeau, 188 Conn. 364, 368, 449 A.2d 1015 (1982).
The extradition act provides the procedural mechanism for the summary disposition of extradition cases. Glavin v. Warden, 163 Conn. 394, 395 n. 1, 311 A.2d 86 (1972). "The custodial court may not inquire into the merits of the charge or into any claimed procedural infirmities, constitutional or otherwise, lurking in the prosecution.
" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Glavin v. Warden, 163 Conn. 394, 395 n. 1, 311 A.2d 86 (1972). Although the uniform act was predicated largely on existing statutory law and judicial decisions from around the country, several provisions, including ยง 6 of the uniform act, which is codified in this state at ยง 54-162, and the second sentence of ยง 5 of the uniform act, which is codified in this state at ยง 54-161, "originated with the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws and [were] designed to cover cases not clearly reached by existing extradition laws."
The Uniform Criminal Extradition Act was prepared in 1926 to codify the practice of interstate extradition of fugitives, a right created by the United States constitution and a process incompletely regulated by federal law. Commissioners' Prefatory Note, Uniform Criminal Extradition Act, 11 U.L.A. 52-53; see Narel v. Liburdi, 185 Conn. 562, 565, 441 A.2d 177 (1981), cert. denied, 456 U.S. 928, 102 S.Ct. 1974, 72 L.Ed.2d 443 (1982); Glavin v. Warden, 163 Conn. 394, 395n, 311 A.2d 86 (1972). Section 6 of the act, however, was a creation of the National Conference and was intended to reach extradition f one who commits a crime against the laws of a state by acts done outside of that state, a situation not covered by existing law.
The extradition act implements this clause by providing the procedural mechanism for the summary disposition of extradition cases. Glavin v. Warden, 163 Conn. 394, 395n, 311 A.2d 86 (1972). The hearing in such cases is limited to four questions, namely, (a) whether the extradition documents on their face are in order, (b) whether the plaintiff has been charged with a crime in the charging state, (c) whether the plaintiff is the person named in the request for extradition and (d) whether the plaintiff is a fugitive.
They do not restrict the period within which a governor's warrant may be issued or executed to the ninety-day period contained in those statutes. Glavin v. Warden, 163 Conn. 394, 311 A.2d 86 (1972); People ex rel. Vasquez v. Pratt, 24 Ill.App.3d 927, 322 N.E.2d 74 (1975); People ex rel. Gummow v. Larson, 35 Ill.2d 280, 220 N.E.2d 165 (1966); State ex rel. Brown v. Hedman, 280 Minn. 69, 157 N.W.2d 756 (1968); Bell v. Janing, 188 Neb. 690, 199 N.W.2d 24 (1972); In re Colasanti, 104 N.J.Super. 122, 249 A.2d 1 (1969). In this case, petitioner's release after ninety days leaves him in the same position as when he was initially charged, a "fugitive from justice" within the meaning of the federal constitutional provision requiring such persons to be delivered by the governor of one state to the governor of the state whose laws are alleged to have been violated.
South Carolina v. Bailey, 289 U.S. 412, 53 S.Ct. 667, 77 L.Ed. 1292; Munsey v. Clough, . . .] 196 U.S. 364, 375, 25 S.Ct. 282 49 L.Ed. 515]; Brewer v. Goff, 138 F.2d 710, 712 (10th Cir.); Ross v. Hegstrom, 157 Conn. 403, 411, 254 A.2d 556; Moulthrope v. Matus, 139 Conn. 272, 275, 93 A.2d 149, cert. denied, 345 U.S. 926, 73 S.Ct. 785, 97 L.Ed. 1357; 31 Am.Jur.2d, Extradition, ยง 62. Pursuant to the authorities cited above, the plaintiff in order to defeat the prima facie case made by the governor's warrant of extradition must prove conclusively that he is not a fugitive from the demanding state."Glavin v. Warden, 163 Conn. 394, 396-7 (1972). Once a governor's warrant has been executed any claimed prior illegalities on the part of the authorities becomes moot. Parks v. Bourbeau, 193 Conn. 270, 288 (1984).
Every prearrest condition under ยง 4954 appeared to have been met when petitioner crossed the border into Vermont. Prior to his appearance in the Franklin District Court there was no appropriate opportunity for Vermont to consider petitioner's claim that he had been already detained for 90 days without the arrival of a Governor's warrant. Second, there is no doubt that the failure of Rhode Island to act prior to the expiration of the 90-day detention limit in Maine would not have barred extradition either in Maine or in this state based on the valid issuance of a Governor's warrant. Glavin v. Warden, 163 Conn. 394, 398, 311 A.2d 86, 88 (1972); May v. Sexton, 35 Ill.2d 585, 588, 221 N.E.2d 283, 285 (1966); In re Simpson, 2 Kan. App. 2d 713, 714, 586 P.2d 1389, 1390 (1978); State ex rel. Brown v. Hedman, 280 Minn. 69, 71, 157 N.W.2d 756, 757 (1968); People ex rel. Brandolino v. Hastings, 72 A.D.2d 821, 821, 421 N.Y.S.2d 893, 894 (1979). The cases make a clear distinction between the right of an accused to seek the termination of a prerequisition detention and the right of a requisitioning state to perfect extradition through a Governor's warrant any time a person charged with a crime is found in another state, during or after detention.
The fact that the fugitive is released from detention under a fugitive warrant does not destroy the statutory authority to arrest him on the Governor's warrant. This point was addressed in Glavin v. Warden, State Prison, 163 Conn. 394, 398, 311 A.2d 86, 88 (1972), where the accused was served outside the ninety-day period with a Governor's warrant, and the court, quoted from People ex rel. Gummow v. Larson, 35 Ill.2d 280, 282, 220 N.E.2d 165, 167 (1966): "`We believe . . . [that the plaintiff] misapprehends the statutory plan.
The reference to "affidavit" obviously contemplates that an extradition warrant, like other warrants, can be issued on the basis of an affidavit based on hearsay. Glavin v. Warden, 163 Conn. 394, 311 A.2d 86 (1972); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 80 S.Ct. 725, 4 L.Ed.2d 697 (1960). In this case, there was no "affidavit" as such, but a verified complaint sworn before the magistrate who made the finding of probable cause. It is well settled that such a document satisfies the statutory requirement of "an affidavit made before a magistrate."