Opinion
C.A. NP-2019-0213 NC-2012-0261
09-02-2020
MARCIA SALLUM GLASSIE v. PAUL DOUCETTE IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF DONELSON C. GLASSIE,
For Plaintiff: Jeffrey K. Techentin, Esq. Joshua S. Parks, Esq. For Defendant: R. Daniel Prentiss, Esq.
For Plaintiff: Jeffrey K. Techentin, Esq. Joshua S. Parks, Esq.
For Defendant: R. Daniel Prentiss, Esq.
DECISION
VAN COUYGHEN, J.
This probate appeal arises from the denial of a Petition for Leave to File a Claim Out of Time (Petition) pursuant to G.L. 1956 § 33-11-5 filed by Appellant Marcia Sallum Glassie (Ms. Glassie or Plaintiff). The Probate Court for the City of Newport (Newport Probate Court) denied Ms. Glassie's Petition. Paul Doucette, the Executor of the Estate of Donelson C. Glassie (the Executor or Mr. Doucette, the Estate and Decedent, respectively), maintains that Ms. Glassie's Petition was properly denied. Jurisdiction is pursuant to § 33-23-1.
I
Standard of Review
Section 33-23-1 of the Rhode Island General Laws authorizes a person aggrieved by an order or decree of a probate court to appeal to the Superior Court in the county in which the probate court is located. In hearing a probate appeal, '"the superior court is not a court of review of assigned errors of the probate judge, but is rather a court for retrial of the case de novo."' In re Estate of Paroda, 845 A.2d 1012, 1017 (R.I. 2004) (quoting Malinou v. McCarthy, 98 R.I. 189, 192, 200 A.2d 578, 579 (1964)); see also § 33-23-l(d). Further, "[t]he findings of fact and/or decisions of the probate court may be given as much weight and deference as the superior court deems appropriate, [sic] however, the superior court shall not be bound by any such findings or decisions." Sec. 33-23-1(b).
Additionally, the Court's standard of review in a non-jury trial is governed by Rule 52(a) of the Rhode Island Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides that "the court shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon . . . ." In such matters, the "trial justice sits as a trier of fact as well as of law." Hood v. Hawkins, 478 A.2d 181, 184 (R.I. 1984). The Rhode Island Supreme Court has stated that such '"findings of fact by a trial justice sitting without a jury are entitled to great weight and shall not be disturbed on appeal unless the record shows that the findings are clearly wrong or unless the trial justice overlooked or misconceived material evidence on a controlling issue."' In re Dissolution of Anderson, Zangari & Bossian, 888 A.2d 973, 975 (R.I. 2006) (quoting Burke-Tarr Co. v. Ferland Corp., 724 A.2d 1014, 1018 (R.I. 1999)). Further, the Supreme Court has noted that "[t]he trial justice need not engage in extensive analysis to comply with this requirement. Even brief findings will suffice as long as they address and resolve the controlling factual and legal issues." White v. LeClerc, 468 A.2d 289, 290 (R.I. 1983).
II
Facts and Travel
Ms. Glassie and Decedent married in 1986. Trial Tr. at 3:12, Mar. 9, 2020 (Trial Tr.). They had three children over the course of their marriage. Id. at 3:14. In 1993, Plaintiff and Decedent divorced. Id. at 3:20-23. In furtherance of their divorce, Plaintiff and Decedent entered into a Property Settlement Agreement, dated July 1, 1993 (PSA). Ex. A. Paragraph Twentieth of the PSA sets forth Decedent's obligations, in relevant part, as follows:
In consideration of this Agreement and in security for the payments under this Agreement, the Husband [Decedent] agrees to execute a Will within 45 days that will be irrevocable and will provide that all of the obligations under this Agreement of the Husband shall be a claim against any assets in said Estate. In furtherance of said obligation the Husband agrees to specifically bequest to the Wife [Plaintiff] an amount equal to said obligations. The Husband agrees to maintain sufficient assets in his name, and subject to his Probate Estate to satisfy the terms and conditions of this Agreement. The obligation of the Husband to maintain said assets and to bequest said sum to the Wife shall be subject to modification by the Family Court from time-to-time as the obligations of the Husband diminish under this Agreement.Ex. A ¶ Twentieth. Thereafter, Decedent executed a Will dated March 20, 1998 (1998 Will). Ex. 3. The 1998 Will bequest states:
TWELFTH: I give, devise and bequeath to my former spouse, Marcia S. Glassie, . . . the sum of $2,000,000.00, or such other amount as shall be then required to fully satisfy all of my remaining obligations and responsibilities pursuant to the terms and provisions of that certain Property Settlement Agreement dated July 1, 1993, entered into between my former spouse, Marcia S. Glassie, and me. To the extent such obligations and responsibilities remain executory, they shall survive my death, and shall be binding upon and constitute a charge upon my estate.
On August 4, 1998, Plaintiff and Decedent stipulated in the Family Court that the 1998 Will, as amended by the codicil dated June 1998, was in "full compliance" with the PSA. Ex. 6E. The handwritten stipulation, signed by the Family Court justice, further indicated that the obligation of testator to make a specific monetary bequest as required "shall only be subject to modification by the Family Court or by agreement of the parties." Id. A final will was subsequently executed on July 16, 1999 (1999 Will), in which Decedent incorporated the language of the twelfth provision of the 1998 Will bequeathing to plaintiff "$2,000,000.00, or such other amount as shall be then required to fully satisfy all of [his] remaining obligations and responsibilities . . . ." Ex. 2 ¶ Fourteenth. This language was contained in Paragraph Fourteenth of the 1999 Will. Id.
The testamentary intent of this clause is contested and is at issue in the consolidated case NC-2012-0261.
The Decedent passed away on February 3, 2011. Trial Tr. at 21:10. After his death, the 1999 Will was properly admitted to the Newport Probate Court. It is undisputed that Decedent had never returned to Family Court in an attempt to seek permission to alter or otherwise modify the language of the Will during the thirteen years after entry of the 1998 stipulation.
On May 3, 2012, Plaintiff filed a claim against the Estate in the Newport Probate Court, out of time, for $2,000,000 based upon the language of Decedent's Will. Trial Tr. at 23:4-8. Plaintiff's claim in the Newport Probate Court did not include breach of contract as a basis for her claim. Id. at 23:11-12. The Executor disallowed the claim on May 11, 2012. Id. at 33:11-19. On June 15, 2012, the Newport Probate Court determined that the claim would be more efficiently handled in the Superior Court and disallowed the claim pursuant to § 33-11-16.
Plaintiff appealed and litigated her claim against the Estate for several years in the Superior Court. The claim as presented in the Superior Court also did not contain a breach of contract allegation. In 2015, another justice of this Court granted summary judgment in Plaintiff's favor, regarding the bequest in question. See Glassie v. Doucette, 159 A.3d 88, 93 (R.I. 2017). After appeal, the Supreme Court overturned the grant of summary judgment to Plaintiff in May 2017. Id. at 91. The Supreme Court found that Paragraph Fourteenth of the 1999 Will was ambiguous and remanded the matter to the Superior Court for further proceedings to determine the Decedent's testamentary intent. Id. at 94.
Ms. Glassie, the only witness who testified during the trial before this Court, stated that following the issuance of the Supreme Court opinion and the remand to the Superior Court, the parties were referred to mediation with former Supreme Court Chief Justice Williams. Trial Tr. at 51:20-52:7. That mediation occurred throughout the latter part of 2018. Id. at 52:17-23. After the mediation terminated unsuccessfully, Plaintiff brought a motion to amend her complaint on January 15, 2019 to add a conditional claim for breach of contract. Id. That motion was denied by another justice of this Court, who concluded that the Superior Court lacked jurisdiction to consider the claim because it had not initially been brought in the Newport Probate Court. Ex. 8. The order denying the motion also stated that the claim was barred by the statute of limitations for a breach of contract claim. Id.
Accordingly, on February 28, 2019, Plaintiff brought a petition in the Newport Probate Court to assert a claim out of time for breach of contract. Ex. 7. On April 15, 2019, the petition was denied. Ex 8. Plaintiff's appeal to this Court followed and is now referred to as NP-2019-0213. Subsequent to filing Plaintiff's instant appeal, this Court consolidated NP-2019-0213 with C. A. No. NC-2012-0261. The Court also bifurcated the trials to resolve NP-2019-0213 before addressing NC-2012-0261. This Decision resolves NP-2019-0213.
Ms. Glassie contends that her failure to file the breach of contract action is due to excusable neglect. She contends that the first time she could have discovered an action for breach of contract was in 2017, following the issuance of the Supreme Court decision, and that her waiting until the failure of mediation to file a motion to amend was reasonable. The Executor, on the other hand, argues that Ms. Glassie's breach of contract action was properly denied in Newport Probate Court and further challenges Ms. Glassie's claims as barred by the statute of limitations, res judicata, judicial estoppel, and the law of the case.
III
Analysis
The process and timing of filing claims against a decedent's estate is governed by §§ 33-11-1, et seq. Section 33-11-5 states:
(a) Claims shall be presented within six (6) months from the first publication or be forever barred, subject to extensions granted pursuant to subsection 33-1l-5(b).
(b)A creditor who, by reason of accident, mistake, excusable neglect or lack of adequate notice of decedent's estate, failed to present a claim within six (6) months from the first publication, may before distribution of the estate, petition the probate court for leave to present a claim out of time. For purposes of this section, notice of commencement of probate pursuant to § 33-11-5.1 at least sixty (60) days before the expiration of the six (6) months claim period shall be deemed adequate. Upon hearing after notice to the decedent's personal representative, heirs and beneficiaries (if any), the probate court may in its discretion, grant leave to present the claim out of time upon such terms as the court prescribes. Any claim presented out of time, if allowed, shall be paid out of the assets remaining in the personal representative's hands when notice of the petition was received.
The courts are "given a wide, although not unlimited, discretion in the matter of filing claims against estates out of time. . ." McAlpine's Estate v. McAlpine's Estate, 120 R.I. 135, 141, 386 A.2d 179, 182 (1978). In exercising such discretion, this Court must also consider the legislative intent of § 33-11-5, which is to accelerate the settlement of estates. Id. at 143, 386 A.2d at 183; Tillinghast v. Iverson, 50 R.I. 23, 26, 144 A. 673, 674 (1929); Thompson v. Hoxsie, 25 R.I. 377, 55 A. 930, 931 (1903); see In re Spaltholz, No. PC104371, 2014 WL 6724606, at *5 (R.I. Super. Nov. 25, 2014) (Superior Court judge finding that a claim filed "more than two years after receiving the first of two notices that Decedent's Estate had been opened must be denied").
It is well settled that "[t]he existence of excusable neglect (vel non) is a question of fact which must be determined on the basis of the evidence." Duffy v. Estate of Scire, 111 A.3d 358, 366 (R.I. 2015) (citing Pleasant Management, LLC v. Carrasco, 960 A.2d 216, 222 (R.I. 2008)); see also Iddings v. McBurney, 657 A.2d 550, 553 (R.I. 1995). "When determining whether or not the evidence in a particular case indicates that the conduct at issue amounts to excusable neglect, this Court asks whether what transpired was a 'course of conduct that a reasonably prudent person would have taken under similar circumstances."' Duffy, 111 A.3d at 366 (quoting Boranian v. Richer, 983 A.2d 834, 839 (R.I. 2009) (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Supreme Court has considered several factors in this regard which include "the length of the delay, its impact on the proceedings, whether the movant acted in good faith-and, importantly, whether the reason for the delay 'was within the reasonable control of the movant."' Id. (quoting Boranian, 983 A.2d at 839). However, excusable neglect must '"not [be] in consequence of the party's own carelessness, inattention, or willful disregard of the process of the court . . . ."' In re Kyla C., 79 A.3d 846, 848 (R.I. 2013) (mem.) (quoting Small Business Loan Fund Corp. v. Gallant, 795 A.2d 531, 533 (R.I. 2002)).
Ms. Glassie claims that the possibility of Decedent's bequest in the 1999 Will being inconsistent with his contractual obligations under the PSA first arose in 2017 when the Supreme Court issued its Decision. Trial Tr. 23:18-23 However, Ms. Glassie originally filed a claim against Decedent's Estate for the $2,000,000 bequest in May of 2012. Id. at 23:4-8. She acknowledged that she knew in 2012, when the Executor denied her request for the $2,000,000 payment, that he read the 1999 Will provision differently than she did. Id. at 33:16-19. She testified that she was involved in negotiating the language of the PSA from 1993 through 1998 and, in fact, the PSA is referenced in the actual bequest. In addition, the Complaint in NC-2012-0261 references the PSA. The disparity between the reading of the 1999 Will should have led a reasonable person to determine the 1999 Will provision could be ambiguous when read in conjunction with the PSA. See Boranian, 983 A.2d at 840 (finding that "for a party to establish excusable neglect, the party generally must show that the circumstances that caused the party to miss a deadline were out of that party or counsel's control"). It was foreseeable that the disagreement regarding the intent of the bequest would impact the application of the PSA. Two conflicting positions regarding the interpretation of the Will when read in conjunction with the PSA have been argued by Ms. Glassie and the Executor since the beginning of this case and were the central issue in 2015 when the parties each were contending for summary judgment. See Executor Mem. in Opp'n to Summ. J. and in Supp. of Cross Mot. for Summ. J. filed January 20, 2015 at 6-7. This should have alerted her of the potential alleged breach of contract claim. As the Supreme Court noted in its opinion, the Executor had previously argued that the Will provision could be read as being ambiguous. See Glassie, 159 A.3d at 94 ("In the alternative, defendant contends that, in the event the provision is deemed to be ambiguous, accepted rules of will construction and the circumstances attendant to the will's execution mandate a like result."). The Supreme Court's determination that the Marcia bequest was indeed ambiguous could not have come as a surprise to a reasonably prudent person involved in the case given that the ambiguity of the Will had been argued prior to the Supreme Court's Decision. See Duffy, 111 A.3d at 366; Boranian, 983 A.2d at 839. This determination and the ability to seek to add a claim for alleged breach of contract long before the Supreme Court's opinion were both reasonably foreseeable and within Ms. Glassie's control. See Duffy, 111 A.3d at 366; Boranian, 983 A.2d at 839. Therefore, after her claim against the Estate was rejected in 2012, Ms. Glassie should have become aware of her alleged breach of contract claim against Decedent's Estate due to the conflicting interpretations of the 1999 Will. By failing to file her breach of contract claim with the Newport Probate Court until seven years later, Ms. Glassie failed to act as a reasonably prudent person as required under § 33-11-5. See Duffy, 111 A.3d at 366; Boranian, 983 A.2d at 839.
Also, even assuming arguendo that the alleged breach of contract claim first arose in 2017, after the Supreme Court's Decision, Ms. Glassie's delay of almost two years before filing a motion to amend her complaint flies in the face of the intent of § 33-11-5. See McAlpine's Estate, 120 R.I. at 141, 386 A.2d at 182 (holding that the intention of § 33-11-5 is to accelerate the settlement of estates). Although the parties to this litigation were involved in mediation throughout the end of 2018, active litigation in the case was ongoing before that time. Trial Tr. 52:17-20. Ms. Glassie moved to assign the case to the trial calendar on May 11, 2018. The Executor then moved on July 18, 2018 to amend the counterclaim. That motion was granted, and the amended counterclaim was filed and answered. Ms. Glassie filed a renewed motion to assign the case to the trial calendar on September 11, 2018. Even if mediation occurred at the end of 2018 as Ms. Glassie recounted in her testimony, it created a gap of more than eighteen months during which Ms. Glassie did nothing after learning of the Supreme Court's determination that the 1999 Will provision was ambiguous. Trial Tr. 52:17-20.
Furthermore, the fact that the parties were engaged in mediation during a portion of 2018 is of no moment to Ms. Glassie's argument for excusable neglect. Although the Supreme Court has recognized that "in exceptional circumstances, settlement negotiations can estop a party from invoking the statute of limitations if accompanied 'by certain statements or conduct calculated to lull the claimant into a reasonable belief that his claim will be settled without a suit"' McAdam v. Grzelczyk, 911 A.2d 255, 259 (R.I. 2006) (quoting Gagner v. Strekouras, 423 A.2d 1168, 1169 (R.I. 1980), nevertheless, it has explained that '"[m]ere negotiations between [parties] cannot alone justify the application of estoppel."' Id. (quoting Greater Providence Trust Co. v. Nationwide Mutual Fire Insurance Co., 116 R.I. 268, 272, 355 A.2d 718, 720 (1976)). '"If so, settlement negotiations would be frustrated and impeded."' Id. (quoting Greater Providence Trust Co., 116 R.I. at 272, 355 A.2d at 720). Ms. Glassie made it clear during her testimony that the Executor made no promises to her. Therefore, Ms. Glassie's further delay from May 2017 to January 2019 in attempting to add a claim for breach of contract does not constitute excusable neglect, and her claim must be denied.
The following exchange took place:
Mr. Prentiss Q. Did Mr. Doucette make any promises to you regarding mediation that you relied on as a reason not to make a claim for breach of contract?
Ms. Sallum Glassie A. Mr. Doucette has never made any promises to me. Trial Tr. 51:24-52:2.
Due to the Court's finding that there was no excusable neglect, the Court need not discuss the Executor's arguments based upon the statute of limitations, res judicata, judicial estoppel, and the law of the case.
IV
Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, this Court concludes that Plaintiff's Petition for Leave to File Claim Out of Time, filed seven years beyond the six-month statute of limitations and triggered by actual notice to Plaintiff that Decedent's Estate had commenced, must be denied. Therefore, NC-2012-0261 will proceed to trial to determine the testamentary intent of the Decedent only as it relates to Clause Fourteenth of his 1999 Will.
Counsel shall submit an appropriate order for entry.