It is the trustee's burden to prove that she did not do so. See Glasser v. Kashinsky, 237 A.D.2d 252, 655 N.Y.S.2d 400 (2d Dep't 1997); American Inv. Bank v. Marine Midland Bank, 191 A.D.2d 690, 691-92, 595 N.Y.S.2d 537, 538 (2d Dep't 1993). Under New York law

We also agree with the Supreme Court's denial of the plaintiff's motion, in the alternative, for summary judgment on the second, fourth, and fifteenth causes of action. In opposition to the plaintiff's prima facie showing (seeWilliam J. Jenack Estate Appraisers & Auctioneers, Inc. v. Rabizadeh, 131 A.D.3d 960, 963, 16 N.Y.S.3d 581 ), the Kamali defendants raised a triable issue of fact as to whether fair consideration was given for the challenged conveyances (see Debtor and Creditor Law § 272[a] ; Glasser v. Kashinsky, 237 A.D.2d 252, 252, 655 N.Y.S.2d 400 ; Matter of American Inv. Bank v. Marine Midland Bank, 191 A.D.2d 690, 692, 595 N.Y.S.2d 537 ). The parties' remaining contentions are either improperly raised for the first time on appeal or without merit.

defendants' opposition papers, the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was properly denied. Gino, Ruth, and Gramercy failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law because their evidentiary submissions failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether they exercised complete domination and control over CCC, if so, whether they exercised such domination and control to commit a wrong or injustice against the plaintiff, and whether they were alter egos of the corporation ( see Commissioners of the State Ins. Fund v. Ramos, 80 A.D.3d 447, 915 N.Y.S.2d 241; Ledy v. Wilson, 38 A.D.3d 214, 215, 831 N.Y.S.2d 61). Gino, Ruth, and Gramercy additionally failed to eliminate all triable issues of fact as to whether the challenged transfers were fraudulent conveyances pursuant to Debtor and Creditor Law article 10 ( see Liberty Co. v. Boyle, 272 A.D.2d 380, 382, 708 N.Y.S.2d 122; Rebh v. Rotterdam Ventures, 252 A.D.2d 609, 611, 675 N.Y.S.2d 234; Glasser v. Kashinsky, 237 A.D.2d 252, 655 N.Y.S.2d 400). Thus, the Supreme Court properly denied those branches of the defendants' cross motion which were for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against Gino, Ruth, and Gramercy, regardless of the sufficiency of the plaintiff's opposition papers.

While an antecedent debt may provide fair consideration for a conveyance of property (see, Debtor and Creditor Law — 272[a]), the evidence here was not sufficient to establish the existence of the antecedent debt (see, Century 21, Constr. Corp v. Rabolt, 143 A.D.2d 873). Moreover, the defendants' stipulation that at the time of the transfer an action for a money judgment was pending against the debtor husband, and he was rendered insolvent by the transfer was sufficient to prove that the conveyance was fraudulent under Debtor and Creditor Law — 273 and — 273-a (see, Glasser v. Kashinsky, 237 A.D.2d 252; North Fork Bank v. Schmidt, 265 A.D.2d 466). In addition, the circumstances surrounding this transfer, i.e., the transfer between spouses, the timing of the transfer, and the lack of consideration, demonstrate that the transfer was effected with an intent to hinder, delay, and defraud the plaintiff creditor (see, Debtor and Creditor Law — 276).

ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs. The Supreme Court properly denied the defendants' motions for summary judgment as there are triable issues of fact (see, CPLR 3212[b]; Liberty Co. v. Boyle, 272 A.D.2d 380; Glasser v. Kashinsky, 237 A.D.2d 252; Grumman Aerospace Corp. v. Rice, 199 A.D.2d 365).

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs. To prove that a conveyance is fraudulent as a matter of law under Debtor and Creditor Law § 273, the party challenging the conveyance has the burden of proving both insolvency and the lack of fair consideration ( see, Glasser v. Kashinsky, 237 A.D.2d 252; see also, Matter of American Inv. Bank v. Marine Midland Bank, 191 A.D.2d 690). The determination of insolvency and what constitutes fair consideration are generally questions of fact ( see, Glasser v. Kashinsky, supra). In the present case, the plaintiff failed to prove as a matter of law that fair consideration was not given for the conveyance ( see, Debtor and Creditor Law § 272; Zuckerman v. City of New York, 49 N.Y.2d 557). Accordingly, the Supreme Court properly denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment.

A person is deemed insolvent when 'the present fair salable value of his assets is less than the amount that will be required to pay his probable liability on his existing debts as they become absolute and matured', and 'fair consideration requires that the exchange not only be for equivalent value, but also that the conveyance be made in good faith'" (Murin v. Estate of Schwalen, 31 A.D.3d 1031, 1032 (N.Y. App. Div. 3d Dep't 2006); see also Ede v. Ede, 193 A.D.2d 940 (NY App Div 3d Dept 1993); Debtor and Creditor Law § 272). "The determination of insolvency and what constitutes fair consideration are generally questions of fact" (Epstein v. Nieves, 258 A.D.2d 436 (NY App Div 2d Dept 1999); Glasser v. Kashinsky, 237 A.D.2d 252 (NY App Div 2d Dept 1997)).