reasoning that “it is permissible to request documentation during a legitimate traffic stop” and “a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 fails to state a claim as a matter of law when the allegations related to an objectively valid basis for a traffic stop.” (ECF No. 35 at 2 (citing Glasscock v. Mt. Orab, No. 1:15-cv-454, 2016 WL 7971731, at *3 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 22, 2016)).

This Court has stated that where a driver is taken into custody and no one remained who lawfully could drive the vehicle, an officer may tow the vehicle. Glasscock v. Vill. of Mt. Orab, No. 1:15-cv-454, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 182635, at *18-19 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 22, 2016). In analyzing whether the seizure of a vehicle was proper under the Fourth Amendment, a court must determine whether the “decision to impound was reasonable under the circumstances.”

These checks serve the same objective as enforcement of the traffic code: ensuring that vehicles on the road are operated safely and responsibly.Rodriguez v United States, ___U.S. ___, 135 S.Ct. 1609, 1615 (2015); see also, United States v. Lash, ___ F'App'x ___, 2016 WL 7093990, at *2 (6th Cir. Dec. 6, 2016) (affirming that "checking a driver's license, registration, or proof of insurance, falls within th[e] category of routine incidental requests); Glasscock v. Vill. of Mt. Orab, Ohio, No. 1:15-cv-454, 2016 WL 7971731, at *5 (S.D. Ohio Dec. 22, 2016), report and recommendation adopted sub nom. John R. Glasscock, v. Village of Mt. Orab, et al. (S.D. Ohio Jan. 23, 2017) (holding that the plaintiff's claim that a police officer's request for his identification during a legitimate traffic stop violated his Fourth Amendment right was legally frivolous). Thus, the plaintiff fails to allege facts to suggest that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated.