Opinion
No. 2 CA-CV 2019-0100-FC
01-15-2020
MELODY GLASSBROOK, Petitioner/Appellant, v. AIMEE CLEARY AND ROCKY GLASSBROOK, Respondents/Appellees.
Melody Glassbrook, Tucson In Propria Persona
THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES.
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 28(a)(1), (f). Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County
No. DC20140005
The Honorable Paul E. Tang, Judge
AFFIRMED
Melody Glassbrook, Tucson
In Propria Persona
MEMORANDUM DECISION
Chief Judge Vásquez authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Staring and Judge Brearcliffe concurred. VÁSQUEZ, Chief Judge:
¶1 Appellant Melody Glassbrook challenges the denial of her petition to modify her court-ordered visitation with her grandchildren who live with their biological parents, appellees Aimee Cleary and Rocky Glassbrook. For the reasons stated below, we affirm.
Aimee and Rocky did not file an answering brief with this court, which we may treat as a confession of error. See In re Marriage of Diezsi, 201 Ariz. 524, ¶ 2 (App. 2002). However, we decline to do so here because the children's best interests are involved. See Reid v. Reid, 222 Ariz. 204, ¶ 18 (App. 2009).
Factual and Procedural Background
¶2 In January 2014, Melody filed a petition for the trial court to order grandparent visitation with her minor grandchildren. Aimee and Rocky opposed the petition, asserting that they had "made concessions in allowing [Melody] to spend time with the children" but she "is never satisfied with the time she gets." About five months later, in June 2014, the court held an evidentiary hearing, after which it granted Melody "a minimum of two (2) supervised visitation hours with the minor children, once per month." At a review hearing in August 2014, the court affirmed its prior order.
¶3 In March 2019, Melody filed a petition to modify grandparent visitation, arguing that the prior order for at least two hours per month "isn't enough time for visits" and that the children "want to see [her] more often." She requested additional visitation time, including holidays and birthdays. The next month, the trial court held an evidentiary hearing at which each of the parties testified. The court then affirmed its June 2014 order, finding there had not been "a substantial and continuing change in circumstance warranting modification of the current grandparent visitation order," and reaffirmed Melody's "visitation for at least a two hour period once per month." This appeal followed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21(A)(1) and 12-2101(A)(2).
Although there were only two minor grandchildren at the time Melody filed her original petition for grandparent visitation in 2014, Aimee and Rocky had a third child in 2016. Melody included all three children in her petition to modify.
Although the trial court's order does not contain finality language pursuant to Rule 78(c), Ariz. R. Fam. Law P., the order, which arises from a petition to modify visitation, is nonetheless appealable pursuant to § 12-2101(A)(2) as a "special order made after final judgment." See Brumett v. MGA Home Healthcare, L.L.C., 240 Ariz. 420, ¶ 15 (App. 2016) (special order after final judgment does not require finality language under civil rule equivalent to Rule 78(c)); see also Sheehan v. Flower, 217 Ariz. 39, n.3 (App. 2007) (order modifying visitation appealable as special order after final judgment). --------
Discussion
¶4 Melody argues that "[t]he issues presented in the case highly show the need for a change" to the original visitation order because that order has not "allow[ed her] grandkids to even get to know [her]." She further asserts that a minimum of two hours per month is not "sufficient time to visit . . . or bond." We review an order concerning grandparent visitation for an abuse of discretion. See McGovern v. McGovern, 201 Ariz. 172, ¶ 6 (App. 2001); Graville v. Dodge, 195 Ariz. 119, ¶ 38 (App. 1999).
¶5 As a preliminary matter, Melody has failed to cite any legal authority to support her position on appeal. Because opening briefs must contain the issues presented for review, "with supporting reasons for each contention, and with citations of legal authorities and appropriate references to the portions of the record on which the appellant relies," Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 13(a)(7)(A), we could deem her argument waived, see Cruz v. City of Tucson, 243 Ariz. 69, ¶ 23 (App. 2017) (failure to cite legal authority waives issue for review). However, even assuming the argument were not waived, the trial court did not err.
¶6 As we understand her argument, Melody seems to be challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to support the trial court's order. In its order, the court considered the relevant statutory factors for grandparent visitation and properly gave special weight to Aimee and Rocky's opinion of what serves their children's best interests. See A.R.S. § 25-409(E); see also McGovern, 201 Ariz. 172, ¶¶ 8-9, 18. Notably, Melody has not provided this court with a transcript of the evidentiary hearing. See Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 11(c) (appellant's duty to order relevant transcripts). Accordingly, we must presume the missing transcript supports the court's findings and conclusions. See Baker v. Baker, 183 Ariz. 70, 73 (App. 1995). As such, we cannot say the court abused its discretion. See McGovern, 201 Ariz. 172, ¶ 6; Graville, 195 Ariz. 119, ¶ 38.
¶7 Melody additionally argues that she was discriminated against because of her disability. But based on our review of the record, Melody did not raise this argument below. Because an argument not raised below is not preserved for appeal, we do not address it further. See Marquette Venture Partners II, L.P. v. Leonesio, 227 Ariz. 179, ¶ 21 (App. 2011); see also Englert v. Carondelet Health Network, 199 Ariz. 21, ¶ 13 (App. 2000) (even constitutional issues not raised below may not be raised for the first time on appeal).
Disposition
¶8 For the reasons stated above, we affirm.