Glass v. Glass

5 Citing cases

  1. Toussie v. Cnty. of Suffolk

    806 F. Supp. 2d 558 (E.D.N.Y. 2011)   Cited 37 times
    Noting that legislative action is adjudicative when determining facts about parties and their activities or properties

    However, โ€œ[w]ithout a contract there can be no breach,โ€ see Franklin v. Carpinello Oil Co., Inc., 84 A.D.2d 613, 613, 444 N.Y.S.2d 248, 249 (3rd Dep't 1981), and New York courts have consistently held that where, as here, the terms and conditions of a public sale explicitly state that the contract of sale is subject to approval by the Legislature, that โ€œno valid contract to convey title ... could exist without the approval of the County Legislature.โ€ See Kigler v. Cnty. of Rockland, 186 A.D.2d 787, 789, 589 N.Y.S.2d 86, 87 (2d Dep't 1992) (citing Orelli v. Ambro, 41 N.Y.2d 952, 394 N.Y.S.2d 636, 363 N.E.2d 360 (1977); Minโ€“Lee Assocs. v. City of N.Y., 27 N.Y.2d 790, 315 N.Y.S.2d 853, 264 N.E.2d 346 (1970)); see also Toussie v. Cnty. of Suffolk, No. 03โ€“9048 (N.Y. Sup.Ct. Suffolk Cnty. Sept. 23, 2003) (โ€œ[W]here, as here, the terms of notices of sale so provide, no valid contract to convey title to real property can exist without the approval of the municipality.โ€). Since here the Legislature did not approve the sale, there is no valid contract and no breach.

  2. Eickhoff v. Eickhoff

    12 A.D.3d 741 (N.Y. App. Div. 2004)   Cited 2 times

    We affirm. Where a party to a concluded matrimonial action was afforded a full and fair opportunity to contest title and distribution of marital assets, the principles of res judicata, or claim preclusion, will bar subsequent and separate litigation of such issues ( see Boronow v. Boronow, 71 NY2d 284, 286; Jeannotte v. Jeannotte, 235 AD2d 711, 714; Glass v. Glass, 186 AD2d 787). Further, once a claim is brought to conclusion, as in the instant case, the doctrine of res judicata bars "`all other claims arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions . . . even if based upon different theories or if seeking a different remedy'" ( Hydro Invs. v. Trafalgar Power, 6 AD3d 882, 884, quoting O'Brien v. City of Syracuse, 54 NY2d 353, 357). Plaintiff was provided with a full and fair opportunity to contest the distribution of the three properties and is foreclosed from relitigating the exact matters which were previously resolved in the 1998 divorce action.

  3. Sparacio v. Sparacio

    283 A.D.2d 481 (N.Y. App. Div. 2001)   Cited 3 times

    Thus, in the context of the prior Family Court proceeding, the plaintiff did not have a full and fair opportunity to litigate his claim that Marlene was actually emancipated in 1997 (see, D'Arata v. New York Cent. Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 76 N.Y.2d 659; Kaufman v. Lilly Co., 65 N.Y.2d 449). Further, the plaintiff could not have litigated his claims of fraud and breach of contract before the Family Court (see, Gramatan Home Investors Corp. v. Lopez, 46 N.Y.2d 481, 485; Glass v. Glass, 186 A.D.2d 787; Feeney v. Licari, 131 A.D.2d 539). The Family Court is a court of limited jurisdiction and lacks the authority to enforce the terms of a separation agreement not merged into a judgment of divorce (see, Kleila v. Kleila, 50 N.Y.2d 277; Barnett v. Burger, 169 A.D.2d 753; Handa v. Handa, 103 A.D.2d 794).

  4. Silvers v. Silvers

    267 A.D.2d 298 (N.Y. App. Div. 1999)   Cited 1 times

    ORDERED that the order is affirmed, with costs. The Supreme Court properly determined that the appellant is precluded by the doctrine of res judicata from relitigating legal or equitable title to the subject premises (see, Boronow v. Boronow, 71 N.Y.2d 284; Glass v. Glass, 186 A.D.2d 787; Greenley v. Greenley, 175 A.D.2d 824). Accordingly, the relative rights and obligations of the appellant and the defendant, her former spouse, must be determined by reference to their separation agreement.

  5. Ventura v. M.A.F. Estates Inc.

    247 A.D.2d 378 (N.Y. App. Div. 1998)   Cited 4 times

    Thus, when alternative theories are available to recover what is essentially the same relief for harm arising out of the same or related facts such as would constitute a single `factual grouping' (Restatement, Judgments 2d, ยง 61 [Tent Draft No. 5]), the circumstances that the theories involve materially different elements of proof will not justify presenting the claim by two different actions" ( O'Brien v. City of Syracuse, supra, at 357-358). Accordingly, the doctrine bars the subsequent litigation of matters that might have been litigated in a prior proceeding but were not ( see, Glass v. Glass, 186 A.D.2d 787; Feeney v. Licari, 131 A.D.2d 539). Here, because the plaintiffs' claims all arise out of the same factual grouping as the prior 1994 action and either were or could have been raised and determined in that action, the complaint was properly dismissed pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata.