Glanz v. Taken

6 Citing cases

  1. City Nat. Bank Trust Co. v. O'Keefe

    13 N.E.2d 293 (Ill. App. Ct. 1938)   Cited 1 times
    In City Nat. Bank Trust Co. v. O'Keefe, 294 Ill. App. 56, this court pointed out the lack of uniformity in the decisions prior to Straus v. Anderson, 366 Ill. 426; Levy v. Broadway-Carmen Bldg. Corp., 366 Ill. 279, and First Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Bryn Mawr Beach Bldg. Corp., 365 Ill. 409. These cases recognize a distinction between executed and unexecuted sales and hold that in the cases where the sales are unexecuted the court may in its discretion refuse to approve a sale merely because of inadequate price.

    It is contended on behalf of O'Keefe that the chancellor acted arbitrarily in refusing to approve the master's report of sale, in setting it aside and in directing that another sale be made. It is argued that the record discloses no legal objections sufficient to justify the disapproval of a judicial sale; that there was no fraud, mistake or irregularity; that none of the parties was under disability; and that the court was therefore bound to approve the report of sale and erred in setting it aside. The cases relied upon are Chicago Title Trust Co. v. Robin, 361 Ill. 261, and Glanz v. Taken, 293 Ill. App. 74. The decisions upon the questions presented by this record have not been altogether uniform. In recent cases the Supreme Court has clarified the law applicable.

  2. Koncaur Capital Corp. v. Bennett

    2019 Ill. App. 181780 (Ill. App. Ct. 2019)

    (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Holtzman, 248 Ill. App. 3d at 114 (citing Glanz v. Taken, 293 Ill. App. 74 (1937) (affirming the approval of a judicial sale where the property was sold at less than 33% of its appraised value)). ¶ 38 When a borrower challenges a judicial sale on grounds of unconscionability, an evidentiary hearing is not always required. This court has explained:

  3. Resolution Trust Corp. v. Holtzman

    248 Ill. App. 3d 105 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993)   Cited 134 times
    Concluding defendant was entitled to an evidentiary hearing regarding whether the sales price of the property was unconscionable under section 15–1508(b) of the Foreclosure Law

    Before the 1987 statute, but on authority of Levy, this court declined to disturb a judicial sale which generated a best bid amounting to less than 33% of an appraised value of the property. Glanz v. Taken (1937), 293 Ill. App. 74, 11 N.E.2d 634. Our courts can probably look forward to a plethora of mortgage foreclosures on many parcels which were the subject matter of loans predicated upon inflated or suspect real estate appraisals submitted by borrowers to financial institutions whose assets are now operated by the Resolution Trust Corporation.

  4. Bankers Trust Co. v. Chicago Title Trust

    89 Ill. App. 3d 1014 (Ill. App. Ct. 1980)   Cited 23 times
    Holding that a personal guarantee undertaken by a business owner and his wife, who was not part of the company, is not an unusual situation for a small business and does not demonstrate the unity of interest required to pierce the corporate veil

    In using the value of the land as sold in 1980 as the value of the land at a point in time three years earlier, the trial court erred. The adequacy of a price received at a sheriff's sale is properly focused upon the value on the date of the sale ( Straus v. Anderson (1937), 366 Ill. 426, 9 N.E.2d 205; In re Marathon Foundry Machine Co. (7th Cir. 1956), 239 F.2d 122, cert. denied (1957), 353 U.S. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 665, 77 S.Ct. 669), not the value of offers made to the purchaser subsequent to the sheriff's sale ( Glanz v. Taken (1937), 293 Ill. App. 74, 78, 11 N.E.2d 634), or a value based on a resale after the sheriff's sale. Consolidated Loans, Inc. v. Guercio (La. App. 1966), 200 So.2d 717.

  5. Davison v. Krejci

    30 N.E.2d 758 (Ill. App. Ct. 1940)   Cited 1 times

    It is contended by the Corporation in the first place that judicial sales, even before approval thereof by the court, cannot be set aside in the absence of a showing of inadequacy of price. To this proposition defendant cites Chicago City Bank Trust Co. v. Johnson, 293 Ill. App. 564; Rader v. Bussey, 313 Ill. 226, 231; Glanz v. Taken, 293 Ill. App. 74. In City Nat. Bank Trust Co. v. O'Keefe, 294 Ill. App. 56, this court pointed out the lack of uniformity in the decisions prior to Straus v. Anderson, 366 Ill. 426; Levy v. Broadway-Carmen Bldg. Corp., 366 Ill. 279, and First Nat. Bank of Chicago v. Bryn Mawr Beach Bldg. Corp., 365 Ill. 409. These cases recognize a distinction between executed and unexecuted sales and hold that in the cases where the sales are unexecuted the court may in its discretion refuse to approve a sale merely because of inadequate price.

  6. Chicago City Bank Tr. Co. v. Johnson

    13 N.E.2d 191 (Ill. App. Ct. 1938)   Cited 5 times

    " We take this to mean that in the case of executed sales there is no discretion in the chancellor to set the sale aside except upon some well recognized equitable ground, such as fraud or irregularity, and the discretion which counsel for the bondholders' committee say the chancellor had exists only in that class of cases where opposition is made to the approval of the sale, and cannot arbitrarily be exercised except for good cause in the case of executed sales. During the pendency of this appeal Hannah M. Smith's counsel cited by way of additional authority the recent case of Glanz v. Taken, 293 Ill. App. 74, in which the third division of this court reversed an order of the chancellor setting aside a master's sale. That case is not applicable to the circumstances of this proceeding, however, because the master's sale in that case had not previously been confirmed. The sale to Hannah M. Smith was in every sense an executed sale. It had been approved.