. After hearing arguments, the Supreme Court directed the parties to file supplemental briefs addressing whether Gladych v New Family Homes, Inc, 468 Mich. 594, 600 (2003), correctly held that statutes of limitations are substantive in nature and, if not, whether Gladych should be overturned. 513 Mich. 1006 (2024)
Phelps, supra; Frisch, supra. Although Michigan courts have long held that statutes of limitation are procedural in nature, Czewski asserts that the Michigan Supreme Court dramatically changed the landscape in Gladych v. New Family Homes, Inc., 468 Mich. 594, 664 N.W.2d 705 (2003). Czewski contends that, in Gladych, the Michigan Supreme Court ruled that statutes of limitations are substantive for all purposes, including choice-of-law determinations.
Id. at 484 n 98. See Gladych v. New Family Homes, Inc, 468 Mich 594, 606 n 6; 664 NW2d 705 (2003). As we reaffirmed recently in Hathcock, prospective-only application of our decisions is generally "'limited to decisions which overrule clear and uncontradicted case law.'"Lewis is an anomaly that, for the first time, engrafted onto the text of § 3145(1) a tolling clause that has absolutely no basis in the text of the statute.
Second, the filing of a complaint alone does not toll the statute of limitations. See MCL 600.5856; Gladych v New Family Homes, Inc, 468 Mich 594, 605; 664 NW2d 705 (2003). After filing the complaint, one must look at MCL 600.5856, which indicates what is required to toll the statute of limitations.
The Supreme Court has generally recognized and applied equitable principles to avoid injustice in circumstances such as these. Bryant v. Oakpointe Villa Nursing Ctr, Inc, 471 Mich 411, 432; 684 NW2d 864 (2004); Gladych v. New Family Homes, Inc, 468 Mich 594, 606; 664 NW2d 705 (2003); Pohutski v. City of Allen Park, 465 Mich 675, 698-699; 641 NW2d 219 (2002). We conclude that the application of principles of equity is similarly warranted in this case to reinstate plaintiff's action.
"`[A] more flexible approach is warranted where injustice might result from full retroactivity.'" Gladych v. New Family Homes, Inc, 468 Mich 594, 606; 664 NW2d 705 (2003), quoting Pohutski, supra at 696, citing Lindsey v. Harper Hosp, 455 Mich 56, 68; 564 NW2d 861 (1997). Complete prospective application has been deemed appropriate for a decision that "decides an `"issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed.
On July 14, 2004, the Court heard oral argument on the motions, and the Court directed the parties to file a supplemental brief regarding the relevance of the Michigan Legislature's response to the Michigan Supreme Court decision in Gladych v. New Family Homes, Inc., 468 Mich. 594 (2003). On July 21, 2004, the parties filed their supplemental briefs.
Plaintiff is incorrect. Plaintiff relies on Buscaino v Rhodes, 385 Mich 474, 482; 189 NW2d 202 (1971), overruled by Gladych v New Family Homes, Inc, 468 Mich 594 (2003). Buscaino concerned a matter where a complaint was filed with the trial court before the applicable statute of limitations expired, but was not served on any defendant until after the expiration of the statutory period.
Plaintiffs filed their complaint and their motion to extend the time for filing an AOM on February 4, 2013, and their AOM on February 26, 2013. The dissent relies on our Supreme Court's analysis in Gladych v. New Family Homes, Inc., 468 Mich. 594, 603–604, 664 N.W.2d 705 (2003), for the proposition that the limitations period was not tolled because the order granting plaintiff's request for a 28–day extension was not entered until March 8, 2013. This ignores the fact that by statute, MCL 600.2912d(2) provides for an extension of the period within which to file and for what is effectively the “perfection” of a complaint initially filed without an AOM with a later filing of the AOM.
Failure to perform any actions specified by MCL 600.5856 results in the statute of limitations not being tolled, and "the period of limitations continues to run after the complaint has been filed." Gladych v New Family Homes, Inc, 468 Mich 594, 599; 664 NW2d 705 (2003). Because plaintiff did not effectuate service of a copy of the summons and complaint on defendant within 91 days of filing her previously dismissed complaint and a second summons was not issued allowing for an additional period of time to effectuate service, as allowed under MCR 2.102(D), plaintiff's original complaint did not operate to toll the statute of limitations.