Opinion
No. 4303.
March 23, 1933. Rehearing Denied March 30, 1933.
Appeal from District Court, Gregg County; Reuben A. Hall, Judge.
Action by the Gladewater County Line Independent School District against A. L. Hughes and others, wherein the defendants tiled a cross-action. From a judgment in favor of the defendants on their cross-action, the plaintiff appeals.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
The action was in trespass to try title brought by the trustees of the Gladewater County Line Independent School District, a body corporate, against A. L. Hughes, the Rio Oil Corporation, and the Humble Oil and Refining Company, affecting the title to 1 acre of land in Gregg county. The plaintiff pleaded title and specially the statute of limitations of three, five, and ten years. The defendants answered by plea of not guilty, and the statutes of limitations of three, five, and ten years, and by way of cross-action in trespass to try title to 91 acres of land, more or less. The defendants further specially asked for an injunction against the plaintiff from trespassing upon the premises, claiming that "the one acre tract of land described in the plaintiff's petition is a part of and is included in the tract of land hereinabove described in this cross-action."
The trial was had before the court without a jury and the judgment entered was in denial of a recovery by the plaintiff of the land sued for and the adjudication in favor of defendants on their cross-action against the plaintiff for the land sued for. The judgment further perpetually enjoined the plaintiff and trustees from entering on the land sued for by it and from drilling or causing to be drilled any oil well thereon and from leasing the same to any person or corporation for the purpose of producing oil therefrom.
The facts are not challenged on appeal. The facts appear substantially as stated here. The Gladewater School District No. 3 prior to 1923 was a school district under the general laws of the state situated wholly in Gregg county, Tex. By Act of 1923, the Legislature (Loc. Sp. Laws 1923, 2d Called Sess., c. 7) specially created and established, as a body corporate, the Gladewater County Line Independent School District lying partly in Gregg county and partly in Upshur county. By that act the board of trustees of the district was given the management and control of the public free schools within the district created and such authority and powers as are conferred upon and held by school districts incorporated under the general laws of the state. It was not proven that there was inclusion within this district of the territory of the Gladewater School District No. 3.
A. L. Hughes was the owner in fee simple of 91 acres of land, more or less, situated partly in the George Hampton and partly in the W. C. Wakeland surveys in Gregg county. On July 22, 1911, he executed and delivered the deed reading:
"The State of Texas, County of Gregg.
"Know All Men by These Presents:
"That I, A. L. Hughes of the County of Gregg, State of Texas, for and in consideration of the sum of Twenty Five Dollars to me in hand paid by A. J. Holloway and Norman Wilson, the receipt of which is hereby acknowledged, have granted, sold and conveyed and by these presents do grant, sell and convey unto C. L. Bray, J. F. Phillips and E. W. Clements, Trustees of the Gladewater School District No. 3, for School purposes only for the Colored children of the County of Gregg, State of Texas, all that certain tract or parcel of land situated in Gregg County, Texas, and described as follows, to-wit:
"Beginning at the Southeast corner of A. L. Hughes land; Thence West 72 yards; Thence East 72 yards; Thence South 72 yards to place of beginning, containing one acre of land.
"It is understood that the land is deeded to the Trustees for School purposes only for the Colored children of District No. 3 of Gregg County, Texas.
"To have and to hold the above described premises together with all and singular the rights and appurtenances thereto in anywise belonging unto the said C. L. Bray and others as Trustees of the Gladewater Schools, heirs and assigns forever; and I do hereby bind myself, heirs, executors and administrators, to warrant and forever defend, all and singular the said premises unto the said C. L. Bray and others, heirs and assigns, against every person whomsoever lawfully claiming, or to claim the same or any part thereof.
"Witness my hand at Gladewater, Texas, this 22nd day of July, A.D. 1911."
By reference to other instruments in the evidence the 1-acre tract above mentioned is a tract 72 yards square out of and located in the southeast corner of the 91-acre tract owned by A. L. Hughes at the time. A cash consideration of $10 was actually paid for the acre of land by A. J. Holloway and Norman Wilson.
On December 1, 1931, A. L. Hughes executed an oil and gas lease on the 91 acres of land, more or less, specially describing it, to the Humble Oil Refining Company. A. L. Hughes retained a one-eighth royalty interest in the mineral estate in the land and the Rio Oil Corporation holds an assignment from A. L. Hughes of an interest out of his one-eighth oil royalty.
It was proven that after the execution and delivery of the deed of July 22, 1911, to the trustees of school district No. 3, the people living within the district at their own expense erected a school house on the land. The school house and the acre of land were used for school purposes continuously until the year 1922 when a new school house site was acquired on a different tract of land, and a new school house was erected on the new site acquired. Upon the completion of the new school house in 1922 this new building and the new school site were then used for school purposes of the district. After the building of the new school building on the new site, the old school building located on the acre of ground conveyed by A. L. Hughes was torn down and moved away during the fall of the year of 1922. The acre of land on which the school building was located has not at any time since the tearing down of the school building in 1922 been used for any purpose by the trustees of the Gladewater School District No. 3 or by the patrons of the school district or by the Gladewater County Line Independent School District. The facts established an abandonment of the land by the school district.
It was shown that the 1-acre tract was located adjacent to a woodland of some 5 or 6 acres in the southeast corner of the A. L. Hughes 91-acre tract, and that in the early part of the year 1931 A. L. Hughes built a fence around the woodland tract and including the 1-acre tract upon which the school house had been located.
The 1-acre tract of land involved in the suit is located in proven oil-producing territory. The Humble Oil Refining Company has six producing oil wells on the 91-acre tract.
Banks McLemore, of Longview, for appellant.
Rufus S. Garrett, of Fort Worth, R. E. Seagler, of Houston, and Edwin M. Fulton and C. E. Florence, both of Gilmer, for appellees.
There is presented for decision the point in view, in effect, of whether or not the title to the acre of land in suit revested in the original grantor on the abandonment of its use for school purposes. It is the rule that in the absence of a statute or provision in the grant there is no right of reversion where land, acquired in fee simple for public school purposes, is no longer used or is abandoned for such use. 56 C.J. § 461, p. 461. In this state there is no statutory provision for reversion of the title to the grantor where the property is not used or is abandoned for school purposes. The statutory provision reads: "The trustees of any school district, upon the order of the county trustees prescribing the terms thereof, when deemed advisable, may make sale of any property belonging to said school district, and apply the proceeds to the purchase of necessary grounds, or to the building or repairing of schoolhouses, or place the proceeds to the credit of the available school fund of the district." Article 2753, R.S., also article 2756.
The question must then turn upon the proper construction of the deed from A. L. Hughes to the trustees of the school district. The rule is too well established to admit of debate that a deed must be construed most favorably to the grantee so as to confer the largest estate which a fair interpretation of its terms will admit. Hancock v. Butler, 21 Tex. 804; Hunt v. Evans (Tex.Civ.App.) 233 S.W. 854; Cartwright v. Trueblood, 90 Tex. 535, 39 S.W. 930, 931; 14 Tex.Jur. § 148, p. 926. By the habendum clause in the deed the land described was to be holden by the trustees of the Gladewater School District No. 3, and their assigns "forever." Those words of themselves indicate the giving of complete dominion and an unrestricted and unlimited power of disposition of the land conveyed, which would be equivalent to a title in absolute fee simple. But in the granting clause appears language which must be considered in determining whether or not the language of the entire instrument points to a different conclusion than that of an estate created in full fee-simple title. The following is the language:
"* * * Have granted, sold and conveyed, and by these presents do grant, sell and convey unto C. L. Bray, J. F. Phillips and E. W. Clements, Trustees of the Gladewater School District No. 3 for school purposes only for the colored children of the County of Gregg, State of Texas, all that certain tract or parcel of land described as follows: * * *
"It is understood that the land is deeded to the Trustees for school purposes only for the colored children of District No. 3 of Gregg County, Texas."
The language of the deed is emphatic in the declaration of the purpose for which the granted premises shall be used, which is the accomplishment of the specific purpose "for school purposes only." The intent of the grantor is too clearly and forcibly expressed to doubt that he intended the land granted should be used for the purpose declared. The land itself was granted and not a mere easement. Stanbery v. Wallace (Tex.Com.App.) 45 S.W.2d 198. The deed, though, in granting the land itself and not its mere use, contains no intimation that it was made on a condition. There are no words to indicate an intention that, if the grantee permitted the land to be used for different purpose or there be abandonment of the use for the specific purpose, the title should thereupon be determined or revert to the grantor or his heirs. There are no words of proviso or condition or apt words to create or raise a condition. 12 Tex.Jur. § 4, p. 8; Warvelle on Vendors (2d Ed.) § 445, p. 526. There is no clause of forfeiture or grant. It is especially the rule applicable to the construction of grants that a deed will not be construed to create an estate on condition or limitation unless language is used which, according to the rules of law, from their own force, imports a condition or limitation or the intent of the grantor to make a conditional estate is otherwise clearly and unequivocally indicated. Article 1291, R.S.; 12 Tex.Jur. § 86, p. 131; 2 Devlin on Real Estate, § 970, p. 1805. Quoting the rule from Ryan v. Porter, 61 Tex. 106: "Implied conditions subsequent in grants, devises, etc., are not the favorites either of the courts of law or equity, but are discouraged by both, as that doctrine is usually invoked for the purpose of securing a forfeiture of the estate. If the instrument will bear any reasonable construction that will defeat the springing of an implied condition subsequent, at law as in equity, that construction will be adopted. Estates upon implied conditions subsequent cannot be created by deed, except where the terms of the grant will not admit of any other reasonable construction."
See rule of construction: Adams v. First Baptist Church, 148 Mich. 140, 111 N.W. 757, 11 L.R.A. (N.S.) page 513, 12 Ann.Cas. 224.
The grant here was not voluntary, but for a consideration which was in all probability the full value of the land. And taking into consideration the whole instrument and the purpose of the grant and the absence of any clause of forfeiture or of re-entry, the fair construction is that the grantor intended the words "for school purposes only" as designating the beneficiaries. Such words in effect are the same as the words "for the benefit of the public schools," which is the statutory language of the purpose of a conveyance of land to district school trustees. Article 2756, R.S., expressly declares that a conveyance of land to district school trustees vests the title in them "for the benefit of the public schools" or for school purposes. It is believed that it is definitely settled, and the conclusion fully warranted, that a deed of land to school trustees for "school purposes," wherein the habendum clause was to have and to hold unto the school trustees and assignees forever, was a conveyance of a fee-simple title, and simply that. Taylor v. County School Trustees (Tex.Civ.App.) 229 S.W. 670; Wilson v. County School Trustees (Tex.Civ.App.) 229 S.W. 669; Olcott v. Gabert, 86 Tex. 121, 23 S.W. 985; Ryan v. Porter, 61 Tex. 106; Long v. Moore, 19 Tex. Civ. App. 363, 48 S.W. 43; T. W. Phillips Gas Oil Co. v. Lingenfelter, 262 Pa. 500, 105 A. 888, 5 A.L.R. 1495; McElroy v. Pope, 153 Ky. 108, 154 S.W. 903, 44 L.R.A. (N.S.) 1220. Quoting from the case of Lingenfelter, supra, "The insertion in a deed of a parcel of land to a school district * * * of the words 'for school purposes only' does not restrict the title of the district. * * *" The mere expression of a purpose will not debase a title.
There was a reverter clause in the cases: Pitts v. Camp County, 120 Tex. 558, 39 S.W.2d 608, 615; Id. (Tex.Civ.App.) 42 S.W.2d 853; Skipper v. Davis (Tex.Civ.App.) 59 S.W.2d 454. The grant was a determinable fee, by its terms to become null and void in the event named, in the cases: Texas Co. v. Davis, 113 Tex. 321, 254 S.W. 304, 255 S.W. 601; Robinson v. Jacobs, 113 Tex. 231, 254 S.W. 309. The case of Martin v. Texas P. Rwy. (Tex.Civ.App.) 53 S.W.2d 514, was a grant of the land itself and not mere use and there could arise at most, though doubted, a covenant only as to use.
Both parties claim title under A. L. Hughes as common source. It is urged, though, on appeal as error, of the finding that the plaintiff has proven title in it as successor to the rights of the Gladewater School District No. 3. There is no evidence showing or agreement admitting that there was inclusion of the territory of the Gladewater School District No. 3 within the boundaries of the incorporated Gladewater County Line Independent School District. In the absence of such proof it may not be said that the County Line Independent School District absorbed the school district No. 3 with legal right of succession to the property of school district No. 3. As far as the record shows, school district No. 3 may be existent.
The judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded.