Opinion
No. 12-1446
11-07-2012
Richard E. Gardiner, Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellant. Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney, Mark A. Exley, Assistant United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee.
UNPUBLISHED
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, at Norfolk. Raymond A. Jackson, District Judge. (2:11-cv-00378-RAJ-TEM) Before NIEMEYER, KEENAN, and WYNN, Circuit Judges. Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Richard E. Gardiner, Fairfax, Virginia, for Appellant. Neil H. MacBride, United States Attorney, Mark A. Exley, Assistant United States Attorney, Norfolk, Virginia, for Appellee. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM:
Norman Gladden appeals the district court's memorandum opinion and order granting summary judgment to Gary Bangs and dismissing his petition for review from an order of the Department of Justice, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives, finding that he willfully violated the requirements of the Federal firearms laws and denying his license under 18 U.S.C. § 923 (2006). We affirm.
This court reviews a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, "viewing the facts and the reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Emmett v. Johnson, 532 F.3d 291, 297 (4th Cir. 2008); see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). Summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). If the moving party sufficiently supports its motion for summary judgment, the nonmoving party must demonstrate "that there are genuine issues of material fact." Emmett, 532 F.3d at 297.
We have reviewed the record and the district court's memorandum opinion and find no error. Accordingly, we affirm on the reasoning of the district court. See Gladden v. Bangs, ___ F. Supp. 2d ___, 2012 WL 604027 (E.D. Va. Feb. 23, 2012). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before the court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED