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Giuliani v. Minnesota Vikings Football Club

United States District Court, D. Minnesota
Jun 11, 2001
Civil No. 99-CV-1811 DDA/FLN (D. Minn. Jun. 11, 2001)

Opinion

Civil No. 99-CV-1811 DDA/FLN

June 11, 2001

Mansfield, Tanick Cohen, P.A., by MARSHALL H. TANICK and PHILLIP J. TROBAUGH, Minneapolis, Minnesota, appeared on behalf of Plaintiff.

Faegre Benson, LLP, by JACQUES T. COWAN, Minneapolis, Minnesota, appeared on behalf of Defendant.


ORDER ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT


This is an employment discrimination case. Plaintiff Michael Giuliani ("Giuliani") claims that his former employer, Defendant Minnesota Vikings Football Club, L.L.C. ("the Vikings"), terminated him in violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act ("FMLA"), 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D), and of the disability and age discrimination provisions of the Minnesota Human Rights Act ("MHRA"), Minn.Stat. § 363.03 Subd. 1(2). Giuliani also claims that the Vikings breached a contract regarding short-term disability benefits as stated in the Vikings' personnel manual. The Vikings have moved for summary judgment on all issues. Summary judgment shall be granted if no genuine issue of material fact exists and if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). For the reasons stated in this Order, the Court will grant the Vikings' motion with respect to Giuliani's age discrimination and breach of contract claims only. Material issues of fact preclude summary judgment with respect to Giuliani's FMLA and disability discrimination claims.

I.

Giuliani began working in the Vikings' sales and marketing department in 1961 and eventually became the manager of the novelty sales division. The Vikings seem to have had no significant problems with Giuliani before 1998, when ownership and management of the Vikings changed. The parties differ markedly in their assessment of Giuliani's work performance in 1998 and after. According to the Vikings, Giuliani had difficulty adjusting to his changed role under new management and refused to act in accordance with directives from his supervisors. During this time, the Vikings assert that Giuliani was absent excessively, did not communicate with management, and generally did not meet the Vikings' expectations for him. Giuliani, on the other hand, asserts that he performed his assigned duties well and that he did not know the Vikings thought his work performance was deficient.

Giuliani's claims turn upon a series of events in July and August 1999. Giuliani consulted with his legal counsel sometime in July, and following counsel's recommendation Giuliani made an appointment with a licensed clinical psychologist, Brockman Schumacher. Giuliani's first meeting with Schumacher was on August 9. On August 11, Giuliani had a confrontational meeting with one of his supervisors, Terri Huml, concerning an error Giuliani made at work. Later the same day, Huml met with the Vikings' general manager, Tim Connolly, and the two of them discussed Giuliani. Connolly claims that he made a decision to terminate Giuliani at that meeting based on Giuliani's recent history of performance problems. Connolly instructed Huml to bring Giuliani to Connolly's office the next day, and Huml left a message for Giuliani to that effect.

Giuliani in the meantime had a second appointment with Schumacher on August 11. Late that afternoon, Schumacher faxed a letter to the Vikings in which he stated:

I am recommending that Mr. Giuliani go on immediate medical leave from his work based on findings that he is experiencing symptoms of depression and anxiety. . . . I will be consulting with this gentleman and suggest that his condition be reviewed in one month with respect to medical leave.

(Trobaugh Affidavit Exhibit 7). Huml responded by leaving messages for Schumacher in which she questioned the timing of Schumacher's letter and indicated that the Vikings would not grant medical leave to Giuliani without a letter from a licensed psychiatrist rather than a psychologist. Following his meeting with Schumacher, Giuliani returned to his office to perform what he characterizes as minor housekeeping tasks in preparation for his medical leave. Huml sent a Vikings security officer to Giuliani's home on the evening of August 11 to collect Giuliani's keys and security card. No Vikings representative, however, informed Giuliani on August 11 that Giuliani's employment was terminated. Giuliani believed he was not required to work the next day based on Schumacher's letter, and Giuliani did not attend the meeting with Connolly scheduled for August 12. Giuliani, however, did see his physician, Dr. Sheldon Burns, on August 12, August 13, and August 16 to seek treatment for anxiety and depression. Giuliani also continued periodic treatments with Schumacher for the next several months.

On August 17 or 18, the Vikings sent Giuliani a letter notifying Giuliani in writing of his termination. Huml testified at her deposition that the Vikings waited to send the termination letter in order to give Giuliani a chance to provide additional documentation supporting his request for medical leave. Although Giuliani apparently requested such documentation from Dr. Burns at some point, Dr. Burns did not send the Vikings any information prior to Giuliani's termination. After Giuliani's termination, two employees temporarily took over Giuliani's duties. Neither of these two employees presently works for the Vikings, and the record is unclear concerning who, if anyone, now performs Giuliani's former function.

II.

The FMLA entitles an eligible employee to up to twelve weeks of unpaid leave during a twelve-month period if, inter alia, the employee shows that he has "a serious health condition that makes the employee unable to perform the functions of the position of such employee." 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D). The Vikings make three arguments in support of their motion for summary judgment on Giuliani's FMLA claim. The Vikings argue, first, that Giuliani cannot prove that he suffered from a "serious health condition" within the meaning of the FMLA. The Vikings also suggest that Giuliani failed to provide sufficient proof of his medical condition in response to the Vikings' request for additional information. The Vikings finally argue that Giuliani has no FMLA claim because the Vikings decided to terminate Giuliani prior to receiving Giuliani's request for FMLA leave. None of these arguments is supported by the record.

As the Eighth Circuit recently noted, determining whether a plaintiff suffers from a "serious health condition" involves an objective factual inquiry. Rankin v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 246 F.3d 1145, 1148 (8th Cir. 2001). Giuliani can survive summary judgment on that issue if he presents evidence that he had a period of incapacity requiring absence from work, that the period of incapacity exceeded three days, and that he received continuing treatment from a health care provider within that period. Id.; see also 29 C.F.R. § 825.114(a)(2) (defining "serious health condition" in this context). The Vikings do not dispute that Giuliani received continuing treatment for his mental condition. Although the Vikings have submitted evidence that Giuliani was able to perform the functions of his job despite his mental condition, Schumacher's note to the Vikings indicates that Giuliani could not work and should be placed on medical leave for a month. That note, along with Schumacher's records and report, supports an inference that Giuliani was incapacitated and unable to work for at least three days. Thorson v. Gemini, Inc., 205 F.3d 370, 381 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 121 S.Ct. 172 (2000).

When an employee requests FMLA leave, the FMLA allows an employer to seek formal certification of a leave claimant's medical condition along with additional medical opinions. 29 U.S.C. § 2613. Huml told Giuliani that the Vikings required a note from a psychiatrist before granting medical leave, and the Vikings suggest that Giuliani's failure to provide certification from a psychiatrist in response to Huml's demand invalidates his claim for FMLA leave. Huml's opinion concerning the requirements for a leave request was erroneous, at least with respect to FMLA leave, because Schumacher qualifies as a "health care provider" under the FMLA and thus can certify an employee's medical condition to an employer. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.118(b)(1) (extending definition of "health care provider" to clinical psychologists). Even if Huml's statement charitably could be construed as a request for certification of Giuliani's condition, the applicable regulations provide that an employer must allow at least fifteen days to respond to such a request and must allow the employee a reasonable opportunity to cure any defects in the certification. 29 C.F.R. § 825.305(b), (d). The Vikings terminated Giuliani only a few days after Giuliani's leave request without further communication with Giuliani on this subject. The Vikings cannot legitimately claim that Giuliani failed to certify his medical condition when the Vikings organization itself did not comply with the FMLA's certification procedure.

The Vikings also have not shown unequivocally that the decision to terminate Giuliani was made before Giuliani's leave request. Unlike Carrillo v. Nat'l Council of the Churches of Jesus Christ in the U.S.A., 976 F. Supp. 254, 256 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), in which the employer and employee in advance of the employee's FMLA leave had agreed that the employee would resign by a certain date, the record here shows no indication that Giuliani's termination was set in stone prior to the Vikings' receiving the leave request from Schumacher. The Vikings in fact delayed informing Giuliani of the termination decision after receiving Schumacher's letter, which suggests that the Vikings would not have terminated Giuliani if Giuliani had supported his leave request in the manner the Vikings wanted. Because the motivation and timing of the Vikings' decision are not clear, the issue of causation between Giuliani's FMLA leave request and the Vikings' termination decision is for the finder of fact. Cf. Haschmann v. Time Warner Entm't Co., L.P., 151 F.3d 591, 604-05 (7th Cir. 1998) (affirming jury verdict for FMLA plaintiff on facts similar to those in this case).

III.

To establish a claim for disability discrimination under the MHRA, Giuliani must show that he was a disabled person within the meaning of the statute, that he was otherwise qualified to perform the essential functions of his job, and that he was discharged under circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. Hayes v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Minn., Inc., 21 F. Supp.2d 960, 971 (D.Minn. 1998). The Vikings' primary argument on this issue is that Giuliani's diagnosis of depression does not amount to a "disability" in this context. The Vikings characterize Giuliani's depression as a temporary condition with no lasting effects and note, correctly, that a such a condition is not a disability subject to statutory protection. Bey v. Brooklyn Center Hotel, Ltd., No. CIV 00-458, 2001 WL 567825 (D.Minn. May 23, 2001). The short duration of Giuliani's mental condition, however, must be apparent from the record before summary judgment on that ground is appropriate. Sanders v. Arneson Prods., Inc., 91 F.3d 1351, 1355 (9th Cir. 1996) (Rymer, J., dissenting). The record here shows that Giuliani received treatment for depression for several months following his termination, and Schumacher's report states that as of January 2001 Giuliani "could still benefit from" additional care. (Trobaugh Affidavit Exhibit 5). The duration of Giuliani's mental condition, then, is not obvious. Schumacher states as well that Giuliani's condition "significantly impaired functioning in the domains of personal relationships, social activities, and substantial gainful employment." Id. A recent Minnesota case has held that statements from a treating medical provider showing a limitation in the plaintiff's ability to work create a material issue of fact concerning the existence of a disability under the MHRA. Hoover v. Norwest Private Mortgage Banking, Inc., 605 N.W.2d 757, 763 (Minn.Ct.App.), review granted (Minn. Apr. 25, 2000). The Court accordingly holds that the evidence of Giuliani's mental condition coupled with the circumstances of Giuliani's termination is sufficient to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination.

The Court notes that, depending upon the duration of Giuliani's condition, Giuliani also may not have been qualified to perform the essential functions of his position with the Vikings at the time of his termination, which would preclude a claim of disability discrimination. See Graham v. Rosemount, Inc., 40 F. Supp.2d 1093, 1100 (D.Minn. 1999) (holding that the disability discrimination provision of the MHRA did not protect an employee who could not perform her job for an indefinite period of time), aff'd, 221 F.3d 1342 (8th Cir. 2000) (unpublished table decision). The issue of Giuliani's qualification for his position, however, is not amenable to summary disposition because, again, the duration and effect of Giuliani's mental condition is not apparent at this point in the litigation.

MHRA disability discrimination claims are subject to the familiar McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis, Hoover, 605 N.W.2d at 761, and the Vikings argue in the alternative that Giuliani has not presented evidence that the reason the Vikings offered for Giuliani's termination was pretextual even assuming Giuliani has a prima facie case. Giuliani's performance problems, according to the Vikings, were a legitimate basis for Giuliani's termination. This is true as far as it goes; however, the problem with the Vikings' position is that Giuliani in his sworn testimony disputes that his work performance was substandard. The Court must credit Giuliani's version of the facts at the summary judgment stage, and if Giuliani's testimony is accurate it follows that the Vikings' explanation for Giuliani's termination is false. The U.S. Supreme Court has held under federal law that a plaintiff must show only that the employer's explanation may be false in order to survive summary judgment on the issue of pretext. Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 148 (2000). Since Reeves, other decisions in this District and the Minnesota Court of Appeals have assumed that Reeves states the standard under the MHRA as well. Bey, 2001 WL 567825 at *3; Potter v. Ernst Young, LLP, 622 N.W.2d 141, 146 (Minn.Ct.App. 2001). Because Giuliani has offered competent evidence that the Vikings' asserted reason for his termination is pretextual, Giuliani has satisfied his evidentiary burden and may proceed with his disability discrimination claim.

IV.

The record, however, does not support the same result with respect to Giuliani's claim of age discrimination under the MHRA. As part of his prima facie case, Giuliani must show that younger employees took over his duties. Elliott v. Montgomery Ward Co., 967 F.2d 1258, 1261 (8th Cir. 1992). The Vikings assert that two employees temporarily assumed Giuliani's duties after Giuliani's termination and that Giuliani's position since was eliminated. Giuliani does not dispute that his position no longer exists in the Vikings organization. The record is devoid of any direct evidence of age discrimination, and Giuliani has offered no evidence other than his own belief that the employees who replaced him temporarily were younger than he was. Giuliani's speculation on this question cannot support his position in response to a motion for summary judgment. Kneibert v. Thomson Newspapers, Mich., Inc., 129 F.3d 444, 455 (8th Cir. 1997). The Vikings' motion accordingly will be granted on the age discrimination issue because Giuliani has not established a prima facie case.

V.

Lastly, Giuliani claims that the Vikings breached a term of a contract providing short-term disability leave to Vikings employees. The Vikings' personnel policy manual, upon which Giuliani relies, states that the Vikings "shall grant employees paid short-term disability leave if an eligible employee's illness or injury exceeds 5 consecutive days." (Giuliani Depo. Exhibit 11, attached to Cowan Affidavit Exhibit B.) The Vikings require written "physician verification of the need" for short-term leave. Id. The introductory section of the policy manual includes a general disclaimer stating that the personnel policies "are not an employment contract and should not be interpreted as creating an employment contract." Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court has recognized that a personnel policy manual of this kind may constitute a contract if the requirements for a unilateral contract are met. Pine River State Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983). When the employee relies entirely upon the language of a policy manual, the interpretation of the document presents a question of law for the court. Martens v. Minnesota Min. Mfg. Co., 616 N.W.2d 732, 740 (Minn. 2000).

Giuliani focuses his argument upon the mandatory language of the short-term leave policy, claiming that the Vikings did not give Giuliani leave that, according to the manual, the Vikings "shall" provide. This argument loses much of its force, however, in the face of the disclaimer in the policy manual. A number of Minnesota decisions have held that disclaimers substantively identical to the disclaimer at issue here precluded the formation of a contract. See Michaelson v. Minnesota Min. Mfg. Co., 474 N.W.2d 174, 180 (Minn.Ct.App. 1991) (citing cases), aff'd without opinion, 479 N.W.2d 58 (Minn. 1992). Given that authority, no contract existed between the Vikings and Giuliani as a matter of law. Furthermore, even if a contract did exist, Giuliani did not meet the conditions for invoking short-term leave. Giuliani did not provide the Vikings with physician verification of his need for leave, and Schumacher's letter does not satisfy the requirement that a physician certify Giuliani's condition. Giuliani insists that he could not perform his part of such an agreement because the Vikings refused to provide him with a copy of the personnel manual. But Huml's statement concerning the need for a physician's certification, although not accurate with respect to FMLA leave, adequately put Giuliani on notice of the requirements of the short-term leave policy. Giuliani's breach of contract claim accordingly will be dismissed for those reasons.

Therefore, upon review of the files, record, and proceedings herein, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that:

1. Defendant Minnesota Vikings Football Club, L.L.C.,'s motion for summary judgment is GRANTED in part. Plaintiff Michael Giuliani's claims for age discrimination under the Minnesota Human Rights Act as stated in Count III of the complaint and for breach of contract as stated in Count IV of the complaint are DISMISSED with prejudice.

2. Defendant Minnesota Vikings Football Club, LLC,'s motion for summary judgment is DENIED in all other respects.

3. Giuliani's claims for violation of the Family and Medical Leave Act as stated in Count I of the complaint and for disability discrimination under the Minnesota Human Rights Act as stated in Count II of the complaint shall be set for trial.


Summaries of

Giuliani v. Minnesota Vikings Football Club

United States District Court, D. Minnesota
Jun 11, 2001
Civil No. 99-CV-1811 DDA/FLN (D. Minn. Jun. 11, 2001)
Case details for

Giuliani v. Minnesota Vikings Football Club

Case Details

Full title:MICHAEL ("MICKEY") GIULIANI, Plaintiff, vs. MINNESOTA VIKINGS FOOTBALL…

Court:United States District Court, D. Minnesota

Date published: Jun 11, 2001

Citations

Civil No. 99-CV-1811 DDA/FLN (D. Minn. Jun. 11, 2001)