Although these issues are generally factual ones for the jury, they may be resolved as a matter of law at the summary judgment stage. See Girardi v. Gabriel, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 553, 558-559 (1995); Minkina v. Frankl, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 282, 287-289 (2014). The judge accepted, as do we, the truth of the plaintiff's allegation that the defendant's representation was for the broader purpose of challenging the divorce judgment and was not limited to the two grounds for modification specified in the plaintiff's pro se complaint.
Although these issues are generally factual ones for the jury, they may be resolved as a matter of law at the summary judgment stage. See Girardi v. Gabriel, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 553, 558–559 (1995) ; Minkina v. Frankl, 86 Mass. App. Ct. 282, 287–289 (2014). The judge accepted, as do we, the truth of the plaintiff's allegation that the defendant's representation was for the broader purpose of challenging the divorce judgment and was not limited to the two grounds for modification specified in the plaintiff's pro se complaint.
When reviewing a case involving legal malpractice, we consider whether there was sufficient evidence to warrant a jury's findings with respect to negligence, causation, apportionment of liability, and support for the damages awarded. See Girardi v. Gabriel, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 553, 557 (1995) (principles of proof and causation in a legal malpractice action do not differ from those governing an ordinary negligence action). As the plaintiff is a corporate entity, we also consider general principles of agency, to determine whether notice to an agent in this instance required a finding that the bank was put on notice of the facts and circumstances surrounding the loans, thus obviating any claim that the bank was unaware of the defendants' actions.
Accordingly, "[w]e summarize the facts in the light most favorable to the plaintiff to determine whether the defendants have shown that no genuine issue of material fact exists and that they were entitled to judgment as matter of law." Girardi v. Gabriel, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 553, 554 (1995). Even if we were to treat the judge's ruling as a directed verdict in favor of the defendant, our analysis would be the same.
Proximate cause is an essential element of that proof. See Jernigan v. Giard, 398 Mass. 721, 723 (1986); Meyer v. Wagner, 429 Mass. 410, 424 (1999); Girardi v. Gabriel, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 553, 560 (1995)."
And, " [t]he mere possibility that the [defendant’s] negligence caused the [plaintiff’s] harm is not sufficient to take the issue to the jury." Girardi v. Gabriel, 38 Mass.App.Ct. 553, 560 (1995). Proximate cause is an essential element of a claim for legal malpractice.
To establish a prima facie claim of legal malpractice, "[t]he principles and proof of causation . . . do not differ from those governing an ordinary negligence case." Girardi v. Gabriel, 38 Mass.App.Ct. 553, 557 (1995), quoting RONALD E. MALLEN JEFFREY M. SMITH, LEGAL MALPRACTICE § 8.3, at 411 (3d ed. 1989); accord Frullo v. Landenberger, 61 Mass.App.Ct. 814, 817 (2004). A plaintiff must show that in addition to the attorney-client relationship, the defendant failed to exercise reasonable care and skill in handling the plaintiff's case, that the plaintiff incurred a loss, and that the defendant's malpractice was the proximate cause of the loss.
Id. Courts often determine whether causation existed "as matter of law at the summary judgment stage." Girardi v. Gabriel , 38 Mass.App.Ct. 553, 559, 649 N.E.2d 805 (1995). Proximate cause requires more than mere "conjecture or speculation."
Thus, the failure of the law firm to seek State Farm's consent before settling with Galvez, if it was negligence — one would think it was — could not have been the legal cause of any injury to Spencer. As is the case with negligence generally, to sustain a legal malpractice action, a plaintiff must show more than a breach of a duty of care; he must also show that the defendant's act or omission was a substantial factor in causing him harm. Girardi v. Gabriel, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 553, 557 (1995). This is a showing that Spencer, through no particular fault of his own, cannot make.
However, the issue of proximate cause may be resolved as a matter of law at the summary judgment stage. Girardi v. Gabriel, 38 Mass. App. Ct. 553, 558-59 (1995) (citations omitted); see also Luis v. Walsh, 51 Mass. App. Ct. 1104, *1 (2001). While the plaintiff — in order to show proximate cause — need not show with absolute certainty that he would have succeeded in the underlying action absent the attorney's negligence, he must demonstrate that "he probably would have obtained a better result had the attorney exercised adequate skill and care."