Moreover, it is the intent of the parties that determines whether the written contract was the final repository of the oral agreements and, if so, the oral agreement is not considered when determining the obligations of the parties. See id. at 528 (quoting Damora, 441 A.2d at 64-65); see also Giorgio v. Nukem, Inc., 624 A.2d 896, 899 (Conn. App. 1993). Whether the parties intended a writing to be an integration of their oral agreement presents a question of fact.
Here, based upon the pleadings, affidavits and the other evidence submitted, the court finds that the employment contract is an integrated writing, containing all the terms of the defendant's employment. SeeGiorgio v. Nukem, Inc., 31 Conn. App. 169, 175, 624 A.2d 896 (1993). Indeed, although parol evidence is admissible to prove misrepresentation, the plaintiff has not submitted any extrinsic evidence either to vary or contradict the terms of the employment contract.
See e.g. Williams v. State Farm Mutual Ins. Co., supra, 229 Conn. 364-69 (Wherein the Supreme Court did not apply the "most significant relationship" test when analyzing a contract choice of law issue.) Thus, despite the Supreme Court's departure from strict adherence to the lex loci delicti rule in tort actions, this court is nonetheless bound to follow the lex loci contractus test as it presently exists in contract actions. Giorgio v. Nukem, Inc., 31 Conn. App. 169, 173-74 n. 3, 624 A.2d 896 (1993); Reichhold Chemicals, Inc. v. Hartford Accident Indemnity Co., Superior Court, judicial district of Hartford/New Britain at Hartford, Docket No. 35 1982 (June 27, 1994, Sullivan, L., J.). Here, the plaintiff applied for the instant insurance policy in Newport, Rhode Island. The plaintiff's application for insurance and original insurance policy stated the plaintiff's address as 267 Wolf Rocks Road, Exeter, Rhode Island, 02822.
He claims that it was an oral promise, but the law does not support an oral promise when there is a complete written agreement. See Giorgio v. Nukem, Inc., 624 A.2d 896, 899 (Conn. App. 1993) (holding that prior negotiations and agreements may not add to a fully integrated written agreement); accord Riley v. St. Germain, 723 A.2d 1120, 1122 (R.I. 1999) (holding thatcontemporaneous oral modifications may not add to an integrated written agreement).
Given that Associated Construction's allegations of an oral agreement with Adams would directly contradict the language of the Performance Bonds, I conclude that the parol evidence rule bars me from considering them to interpret the Bonds. See Giorgio v. Nukem, Inc., 31 Conn. App. 169, 175 (1993) (noting that "the parol evidence rule renders inoperative prior written agreements as well as prior oral agreements" (internal quotation marks omitted)); Gibilisco v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 3:14-CV-00294 JAM, 2015 WL 2383746, at *1 (D. Conn. May 19, 2015) ("The parol evidence rule generally forbids proof of an oral agreement when used to vary or contradict the terms of a later agreement that has been set forth by the parties in writing.").
The record before the trial court was, therefore, identical with the record before this court. In these circumstances, the legal inferences properly to be drawn from the parties' definitive stipulation of facts raise questions of law rather than of fact."); Giorgio v. Nukem, Inc., 31 Conn. App. 169, 175, 624 A.2d 896 (1993) ("[i]f . . . [t]he trial court's conclusions as to intent were based not on such factors as the credibility of witnesses, or on the testimony of live witnesses as to the meaning of documents or as to circumstances surrounding the execution of those documents . . . but were instead based on the intent expressed in the contract itself and the affidavits submitted with the motion for summary judgment considered in the light of their surrounding circumstances . . . [t]hen the legal inferences to be drawn from the documents raise questions of law rather than of fact" [citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted]). Accordingly, because the trial court in the present case made its decision based on pleadings and other documents that were not uncontested, rather than on the live testimony of witnesses, we review the ruling of the trial court in this case as though it made legal determinations, not factual findings.
The trial court concluded, as a matter of law, that the modification agreement was integrated on this point. See Giorgio v. Nukem, Inc., 31 Conn. App. 169, 175, 624 A.2d 896 (1993) (if trial court draws conclusions on summary judgment as to parties’ intent to integrate, "based on the intent expressed in the contract itself and the affidavits submitted with the motion for summary judgment considered in light of their surrounding circumstances [then] the legal inferences to be drawn from the documents raise questions of law rather than of fact" (internal quotation marks omitted)). [17] Exercising our plenary review, we find little to quarrel with in this conclusion, as the modification agreement 486expressly addresses the question of further extensions—the very subject matter of the plaintiff's alleged misrepresentations.
In these circumstances, the legal inferences properly to be drawn from the parties' definitive stipulation of facts raise questions of law rather than of fact.); Giorgio v. Nukem, Inc. , 31 Conn. App. 169, 175, 624 A.2d 896 (1993) ( [i]f ... [t]he trial court's conclusions as to intent were based not on such factors as the credibility of witnesses, or on the testimony of live witnesses as to the meaning of documents or as to circumstances surrounding the execution of those documents ... but were instead based on the intent expressed in the contract itself and the affidavits submitted with the motion for summary judgment considered in the light of their surrounding circumstances ... [t]hen the legal inferences to be drawn from the documents raise questions of law rather than of fact ...)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
"The parol evidence rule prohibits the use of extrinsic evidence to vary or contradict the terms of an integrated written contract. Giorgio v. Nukem, Inc., 31 Conn. App. 169, 173-74, 624 A.2d 896 (1993); see also 2 Restatement (Second), Contracts § 213 (1981)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
" "The parol evidence rule prohibits the use of extrinsic evidence to vary or contradict the terms of an integrated written contract. Giorgio v. Nukem, Inc., 31 Conn. App. 169, 173-74, 624 A.2d 896 (1993); see also 2 Restatement (Second), Contracts § 213 (1981). . . . Foley v. Huntington Co., 42 Conn. App. 712, 733, 682 A.2d 1026, cert. denied, 239 Conn. 931, 683 A.2d 397 (1996).