Under the facts set out above, the plaintiffs are proper parties to the action. Gionfriddo v. Windsor, 137 Conn. 701, 703. The question here is, has the town of Canterbury the power to pass the ordinance?
Thus, the police power properly may be used to promote "the economic welfare of the community." Gionfriddo v. Windsor, 137 Conn. 701, 706, 81 A.2d 266 (1951). Furthermore, "[t]hat the [s]tate may under the police power regulate travel upon the public highways cannot be doubted."
" The plaintiffs argue that the Norwich ordinance constitutes "vague aesthetic legislation," and point to our statement in DeMaria v. Planning Zoning Commission, 159 Conn. 534, 541, 271 A.2d 105, that "vague and undefined aesthetic considerations alone are insufficient to support the invocation of the police power," and our dictum to the same effect. Gionfriddo v. Windsor, 137 Conn. 701, 704, 81 A.2d 266. The "aesthetic considerations" involved in the Norwich ordinance are not, however, "vague and undefined"; 7-147f of the General Statutes, incorporated by reference into the ordinance, sets out with some specificity the factors to be considered by the commission in passing upon an application for a certificate of appropriateness. Nor, as we pointed out in the preceding discussion, do "aesthetic considerations alone" provide the basis for the ordinance.
The plaintiff attacks both the statute and the regulation adopted under it on the ground that they constitute an arbitrary abuse of police power and amount to a taking of private property for public use without the payment of just compensation. To constitute a valid exercise of police power, both the legislation and the regulation must, of course, have a rational relation to the public welfare and must be reasonable and impartial. Teuscher v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 154 Conn. 650, 658, 228 A.2d 518; Clark v. Town Council, 145 Conn. 476, 482, 144 A.2d 327; Calve Bros. Co. v. Norwalk, 143 Conn. 609, 616, 124 A.2d 881; Jennings v. Connecticut Light Power Co., 140 Conn. 650, 671, 103 A.2d 535; Corthouts v. Newington, 140 Conn. 284, 288, 99 A.2d 112; Gionfriddo v. Windsor, 137 Conn. 701, 704, 81 A.2d 266. The fact that the exercise of the police power prevents the enjoyment of certain individual rights in property without providing compensation therefor does not necessarily constitute a taking of the property without just compensation. Troiano v. Zoning Commission, 155 Conn. 265, 267, 231 A.2d 536; DePalma v. Town Plan Commission, 123 Conn. 257, 267, 193 A. 868; State v. Kievman, 116 Conn. 458, 466, 165 A. 601; State v. Hillman, 110 Conn. 92, 104, 105, 147 A. 294; Windsor v. Whitney, 95 Conn. 357, 367, 111 A. 354.
Certainly, vague and undefined aesthetic considerations alone are insufficient to support the invocation of the police power, which is the source of all zoning authority. See Faubel v. Zoning Commission, 154 Conn. 202, 210, 224 A.2d 538; Gionfriddo v. Windsor, 137 Conn. 701, 705, 81 A.2d 266; Murphy, Inc. v. Westport, 131 Conn. 292, 296, 300, 40 A.2d 177. The memorandum of decision discloses that the court looked behind the formal vote and the reasons stated by the commission for its action and inferred that the commission had found DeMaria's plans deficient or objectable in respects other than those recited in its vote to deny the application. As we have already indicated, where a zoning commission has formally stated the reasons for its decision the court should not go behind that official collective statement of the commission.
The claim of the plaintiffs that a "factory" might suddenly be located nearby one's dwelling without notice, through some clandestine process, is clearly without merit, and they have failed to meet their burden of showing that the ordinance is unconstitutional. See Gionfriddo v. Windsor, 137 Conn. 701, 706, 81 A.2d 266. The instant situation is clearly not one in which the provisions are arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public health, safety, morals, or general welfare., See St. John's Roman Catholic Church Corporation v. Darien, 149 Conn. 712, 722, 184 A.2d 42.
`If this ordinance is otherwise a valid exercise of the town's police powers, the fact that it deprives the property of its most beneficial use does not render it unconstitutional.' . . . [Goldblatt v. Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592, 82 S.Ct. 987, 8 L.Ed.2d 130.]" Teuscher v. Zoning Board of Appeals, 154 Conn. 650, 657, 228 A.2d 518. However, "any regulation, under the police power, for the use of property must have a reasonable relation to the public health, safety and welfare and must operate in a manner which is not arbitrary, destructive or confiscatory. Corthouts v. Newington, 140 Conn. 284, 288, 99 A.2d 112; Jennings v. Connecticut Light Power Co., 140 Conn. 650, 671, 103 A.2d 535; Len-Lew Realty Co. v. Falsey, 141 Conn. 524, 529, 107 A.2d 403; Gionfriddo v. Windsor, 137 Conn. 701, 704, 81 A.2d 266." Calve Bros. Co. v. Norwalk, 143 Conn. 609, 616, 124 A.2d 881.
The operation had been conducted without regard to the regulation of truck traffic. "It is unquestionably true that any regulation, under the police power, for the use of property must have a reasonable relation to the public health, safety and welfare and must operate in a manner which is not arbitrary, destructive or confiscatory. Corthouts v. Newington, 140 Conn. 284, 288, 99 A.2d 112; Jennings v. Connecticut Light Power Co., 140 Conn. 650, 671, 103 A.2d 535; Len-Lew Realty Co. v. Falsey, 141 Conn. 524, 529, 107 A.2d 403; Gionfriddo v. Windsor, 137 Conn. 701, 704, 81 A.2d 266." Calve Bros. Co. v. Norwalk, 143 Conn. 609, 616, 124 A.2d 881.
Nevertheless, it is held that aesthetic conditions alone are insufficient to support the invocation of the police power, although if a regulation finds a reasonable justification in serving a generally recognized ground for the exercise of that power, the fact that aesthetic considerations play a part in its adoption does not affect in validity." 16 C.J.S., Constitutional Law, section 195, page 939, et seq.; Gionfriddo v. Town of Windsor, 137 Conn. 701, 81 A.2d 266; Federal Elec. Co. v. Zoning Bd. of Appeals of Village of Mt. Prospect. 398 Ill. 142, 75 N.E.2d 359; City of Watseka v. Blatt, 320 Ill. App. 191, 50 N.E.2d 589; Merced Dredging Co. v. Merced County, (D.C. Cal.), 67 F. Supp. 598. In our opinion, the statute is unconstitutional and we so hold.
In each case the plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment and coercive equitable relief, and the court found the issues for the defendants and rendered judgment in their favor. The mere fact that the plaintiffs in each case saw fit to institute an action for a declaratory judgment in no way operates to alter or shift the ordinary rules as to the burden of proof in civil actions. Murphy, Inc. v. Westport, 131 Conn. 292, 302, 40 A.2d 177; Gionfriddo v. Windsor, 137 Conn. 701, 706, 81 A.2d 266. The rule as to the burden of proof is implemented and made effective by our rule that the "prayer for relief shall state with precision the declaratory judgment desired." Practice Book 278(b).