Opinion
Civil Action 20-1947
09-21-2022
MICHAEL GINYARD, JR, Plaintiff, v. LOUIS DEL-PRETE, Medical Manager at the Allegheny County Jail; and LAURA K. WILLIAMS, Chief Deputy Warden of Health Care at the Allegheny County Jail, Defendants.
District Judge W. Scott Hardy
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
Re: ECF No. 59
MAUREEN P. KELLY, MAGISTRATE JUDGE
I. RECOMMENDATION
Pending before the Court is a Motion for Summary Judgment filed on behalf of Defendants Louis Del-Prete, Medical Manager at the Allegheny County Jail (“Del-Prete”), and Laura K. Williams, Chief Deputy Warden of Health Care at the Allegheny County Jail (“Williams”) (collectively, “Defendants”). ECF No. 59. For the following reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the motion be granted.
II. REPORT
A. FACTUAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Michael Ginyard (“Plaintiff”) is an inmate currently incarcerated at the Northeast Ohio Correctional Center (“NEOCC”). He presents a federal civil rights complaint asserting claims against medical care administrators at the Allegheny County Jail. ECF No. 6. Plaintiff alleges that Defendants violated his federal constitutional rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments by failing to secure a diagnosis and failing to treat persistent foot pain despite his ongoing complaints and requests for blood work to confirm the cause. Id. Plaintiff relates the cause of his pain to pre-diabetes and describes a delay of five months to obtain blood tests to determine whether he suffered acute diabetes.
Plaintiff's verified Complaint alleges that he began to experience foot pain in June 2020. Id. at 6. Plaintiff has provided a copy of his medical records, which show that on June 8, 2020, he submitted a sick call request to be seen. ECF No. 64-3 at 19. Plaintiff declined an encounter stating, “I already saw a nurse.” Id. at 18. Plaintiff alleges that despite being told he would be scheduled for an appointment, one was not arranged. Plaintiff requested emergency assistance on June 10, 2020. ECF No. 6 at 6. On June 11, Plaintiff spoke with a doctor on his pod. Plaintiff states he complained about foot pain, which he believed was diabetic neuropathy or nerve pain. Plaintiff's medical records show he expressed concerns related to intermittent hyperglycemia, high blood pressure, and the possibility of diabetes. ECF No. 64-3 at 18. The physician noted that Plaintiff had undergone a basic metabolic panel six months earlier, and all results were within normal limits. Id. New blood work was ordered, and the physician educated Plaintiff regarding both conditions, and provided reassurance. Id. Plaintiff alleges the physician represented that lab work would be scheduled. ECF No. 6 at 7.
Plaintiff's medical records reflect that he was next seen by medical staff on June 22, 2020. ECF No. 64-3 at 17. Plaintiff expressed concerns about stinging pain in his left foot and his blood sugar. His glucose was noted to be within normal limits when last tested, but the nurse indicated she would check his alc levels. Id. Plaintiff alleges that lab work was not conducted as promised and that on July 6, 2020, he submitted a grievance and requested assistance. ECF No. 6 at 6. Medical records reflect that he was seen on July 9, 2020, during medicine distribution on his pod. He again complained of foot pain. Staff notes show he was to be scheduled for an evaluation. On July 13, 2020, Plaintiff was seen by a physician assistant (“PA”), who noted that Plaintiff's foot pain did not result from trauma. The PA indicated she would check Plaintiff's Vitamin D levels, and provided a prescription for ibuprofen. Id. Plaintiff's earlier grievance was denied as invalid, and Plaintiff submitted an appeal on July 22, 2020. He also continued to submit sick call requests. ECF No. 6 at 7. On August 11, 2020, Plaintiff spoke with medical staff during medication rounds and stated his a1c levels were ordered to be checked but arrangements had not yet been made for testing. ECF No. 64-3 at 16-17.
On August 12, 2020, Plaintiff was seen by a certified registered nurse practitioner (“CRNP”), who reviewed Plaintiff's complaints of stinging pain in his feet and his concerns related to a family history of Type-2 Diabetes. Id. at 16. Plaintiff's exam showed no edema or abnormalities, and he demonstrated a steady gait. The CRNP noted “new onset neuropathic pain.” Id. Medical records reflect a plan to check Plaintiff's a1c levels and to speak with Plaintiff's mental health provider to determine whether his pain could be related to Plaintiff's mental health medication. Id.
Plaintiff alleges that he spoke with Defendant Del-Prete on August 19, 2020, regarding the failure to schedule testing. ECF No. 6 at 7. Plaintiff states Del-Prete gave Plaintiff a signed request slip to submit if he was not seen within the next week. Id. Plaintiff was not seen and on August 30, 2020, he submitted the signed sick call request. Plaintiff's copy of his medical records reflects that he was seen at sick call on September 1, 2020, and again requested a1c levels testing. ECF No. 64-3 at 16. The CRNP noted that Plaintiff had no history of prediabetes or diabetes, and no history of requiring insulin or other diabetic medication. His last results were normal. Id.
Plaintiff alleges he submitted another sick call request addressed to Defendant Del-Prete on September 3, 2020. Plaintiff followed with additional sick call requests directed to Defendant Williams on September 6, 2020, and September 20, 2020. ECF No. 6 at 8. Plaintiff was seen by a CRNP and a PA on September 24, 2020, and reiterated his frustration at not having his blood work completed. ECF No. 64-3 at 16. The CRNP noted that blood work was ordered and that she would follow up once the results were obtained. The PA discontinued an unrelated medication at Plaintiff's request. Id. Plaintiff was next seen on September 30, 2020, and was “becoming hostile” due to his frustration with not being treated for his foot pain. He was assured he was “on the list to see the provider.” Id. at 15. On October 6, 2020, Defendant Williams received a letter from Plaintiff reporting that he was awaiting lab results to ensure that treatment recommendations could be developed. Williams' notes reflect that she emailed the provider organization to prioritize Plaintiff. Id. Plaintiff's a1c levels were obtained on October 13, 2020, and the results showing he was pre-diabetic were reviewed by medical staff on October 14, 2020. ECF No. 64-3 at 1, 15. A CRNP prescribed Vitamin D supplements and ordered a recheck of blood work in two months. Id.
Plaintiff was next seen by medical staff on October 27, 2020, to request that the timing of his Vitamin D supplement be changed. On November 9, 2020, Plaintiff spoke with medical staff during medication distribution to request his lab results. He again complained of pain in both feet. Id.; ECF No. 60-5 at 6. He was scheduled to see a provider, and the next day, November 10, 2020, a nurse practitioner informed Plaintiff that his lab results reflected an a1c of 6.2%, and that he had pre-diabetes. ECF No. 64-3 at 14. She provided Plaintiff counseling regarding lifestyle modification counseling, and a retest was ordered. Id. at 14-15. Plaintiff was seen on November 12, 2020, for additional counseling, and told that his bloodwork would be rechecked in 6 weeks. Plaintiff submitted a request to be seen on November 23, 2020, stating that he was told he had diabetes and would be placed on medication. He wanted to discuss the diagnosis with a physician. ECF No. 60-5 at 6. Plaintiff states he was seen on November 24, 2020, to discuss his symptoms, and a treatment plan was entered in his records. ECF No. 64 at 2; see also ECF No. 64-3 at 14 (reflecting that a CRNP discussed Plaintiff's concerns regarding diabetes on November 25, 2020).
The treatment plan is redacted from copies of records provided to the Court by both parties. See ECF No. 64-3 at 14; ECF No. 60-3 at 3.
Plaintiff continued to complain of nerve pain and sought relief over the next three months. His sick call requests reflect that he had previously been offered Cymbalta for his pain. In February 2021, Plaintiff reported to medical staff that he was interested in learning about the potential side effects and starting this medication. ECF No. 60-5 at 7. The medical records supplied to the Court contain no further reference to continued pain.
B. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Plaintiff commenced this action on December 15, 2020, naming Allegheny Health Network (“AHN”) along with Defendants Del-Prete and Williams. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff was granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis ECF Nos. 1, 4. By Order dated August 6, 2021, AHN's Motion to Dismiss was granted based on Plaintiff's failure to state a claim for relief due to the absence of allegations that AHN was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's medical condition, ECF No. 40, adopting report and recommendation at ECF No. 38. A Motion to Dismiss filed on behalf of Del-Prete and Williams was denied because the allegations in the Complaint adequately stated a plausible claim against both Defendants for deliberate indifference to his ongoing complaints of long-term pain that allegedly remained uninvestigated and untreated. Id.
The parties engaged in fact discovery and in accordance with the scheduling order entered in this action, Defendants Del-Prete and Williams have filed the pending Motion for Summary Judgment, a Concise Statement of Material Facts, and a brief in support of the motion. ECF Nos. 59-61. Defendants contend that the evidence fails to establish that either Defendant was deliberately indifferent to Plaintiff's medical condition. Thus, Plaintiff cannot sustain his claims under the Eighth or Fourteenth Amendments, nor establish that Defendant Williams, in her supervisory capacity, knew or acquiesced to an allegedly unconstitutional policy. ECF No. 61. Defendants also contend that qualified immunity bars Plaintiff's claims. Id.
Plaintiff has filed a responsive Concise Statement of Material Facts and a brief in opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF Nos. 63, 64. The motion is ripe for consideration.
C. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that: “[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). An issue of material fact is in genuine dispute if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986); see also Doe v. Abington Friends Sch., 480 F.3d 252, 256 (3d Cir. 2007) (“A genuine issue is present when a reasonable trier of fact, viewing all of the record evidence, could rationally find in favor of the non-moving party in light of his burden of proof”). Thus, summary judgment is warranted where, “after adequate time for discovery and upon motion ... a party ... fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.” Marten v. Godwin, 499 F.3d 290, 295 (3d Cir. 2007) (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986)).
The moving party bears the initial burden of demonstrating to the Court that there is an absence of evidence to support the non-moving party's case. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322; see also Conoshenti v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 364 F.3d 135, 140 (3d Cir. 2004). “[W]hen the moving party has carried its burden under Rule 56(c), its opponent must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.... Where the record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue for trial.” Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 380 (2007) (quoting Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586-87 (1986)) (internal quotations omitted).
Plaintiff is proceeding pro se and thus his filings are to be construed liberally. If the Court can reasonably read the pleadings together with his summary judgment submissions to show an entitlement to relief, the Court should do so despite any failure to cite proper legal authority, confusion of legal theories, poor syntax, and sentence construction, or the litigant's unfamiliarity with pleading requirements. Boag v. MacDougall, 454 U.S. 364 (1982); United States ex rel. Montgomery v. Bierley, 414 F.2d 552, 555 (3d Cir. 1969) (although a filing prepared by a prisoner may be inartfully drawn, it should be read “with a measure of tolerance”). In examining the record, and in consideration of Plaintiff's status, the factual allegations set forth in his verified Complaint will be considered as evidence to the extent they are based on his personal knowledge. Jackson v. Armel, No. 17-1237, 2020 WL 2104748, at *5 (W.D. Pa. May 1, 2020) (citing Reese v. Sparks, 760 F.2d 64, 67 (3d Cir. 1985) (treating verified complaint as an affidavit on summary judgment motion)). See also Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102, 108 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2000) (noting that an affidavit is “about the best that can be expected from [a pro se prisoner] at the summary judgment phase of the proceedings”).
Nonetheless, at the summary judgment stage of the proceedings, the Court need not credit any bald assertions or legal conclusions unaccompanied by evidentiary support. Jones v. UPS, 214 F.3d 402, 407 (3d Cir. 2000). “[A] pro se plaintiff is not relieved of his obligation under [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 56 to point to competent evidence in the record that is capable of refuting a defendant's motion for summary judgment.” Dawson v. Cook, 238 F.Supp.3d 712, 717 (E.D. Pa. 2017) (citation omitted). See also Boykins v. Lucent Techs., Inc., 78 F.Supp.2d 402, 408 (E.D. Pa. 2000); Winfield v. Mazurkiewicz, No. 11-584, 2012 WL 4343176, at *1 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 21, 2012).
D. DISCUSSION
1. Personal Capacity Claims
Plaintiff brings claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (“Section 1983”), which provides that: Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress....42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 provides remedies for deprivations of rights established in the Constitution or federal laws. It does not, by its own terms, create substantive rights.” Kaucher v. Cnty. of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 423 (3d Cir. 2006) (citing Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 145 n.3 (1979) (footnote omitted)). Thus, to state a claim for relief under Section 1983, the plaintiff must allege facts from which it could be inferred that “the defendant, acting under color of state law, deprived him or her of a right secured by the Constitution or the laws of the United States.” Id. at 423.
Plaintiff alleges that Del-Prete and Williams violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. During his incarceration at ACJ, Plaintiff was subject to a conviction but not yet sentenced. ECF No. 6 at 1. The United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that “the Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishments Clause does not apply until ‘after sentence and conviction.'” Hubbard v. Taylor, 399 F.3d 150, 164 (3d Cir. 2005) (“Hubbard I”) (footnote omitted) (quoting Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 392 n.6 (1989)). See also Murray v. Keen, 763 Fed.Appx. 253, 255 (3d Cir. 2019) (“sentenced prisoners are protected from only punishment that is ‘cruel and unusual' while pretrial detainees are protected from any punishment”) (citing Hubbard I, 399 F.3d at 166-67). Thus, Plaintiff's rights arise under the Fourteenth Amendment and “the relevant inquiry is whether the alleged denial was ‘imposed for the purpose of punishment or whether it [was] but an incident of some other legitimate governmental purpose.'” Mattern v. City of Sea Isle, 657 Fed.Appx. 134, 138 (3d Cir. 2016) (quoting Hubbard, 399 F.3d at 158).
In this case, the distinction makes little difference because constitutional medical care claims brought by pretrial detainees are analyzed “under the standard used to evaluate similar claims brought under the Eighth Amendment.” Id. n.5 (quoting Natale v. Camden Cty. Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 582 (3d Cir. 2003)).
The Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment requires prison authorities to provide medical care to inmates who must rely on them for treatment. Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 103-04 (1976). Because the denial of medical care may result in pain and suffering that does not serve any penological interest, the law has long recognized that “deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of prisoners constitutes the ‘unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain' proscribed by the Eighth Amendment. This is true whether the indifference is manifested by prison doctors in their response to the prisoner's needs or by prison guards in intentionally denying or delaying access to medical care or intentionally interfering with the treatment once prescribed.” Id. at 104-05 (citations and footnotes omitted).
That said, not “every claim by a prisoner that he has not received adequate medical treatment states a violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Id.
It is well-settled that claims of negligence or medical malpractice, without some more culpable state of mind, do not constitute “deliberate indifference.” As the Estelle Court noted: “[I]n the medical context, an inadvertent failure to provide adequate medical care cannot be said to constitute ‘an unnecessary and wanton
infliction of pain' or to be ‘repugnant to the conscience of mankind.'” Id. at 105, 97 S.Ct. 285; see also Durmer v. O'Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 67 (3d Cir. 1993) (“[T]he law is clear that simple medical malpractice is insufficient to present a constitutional violation.”); White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 110 (3d Cir. 1990) (“[C]ertainly no claim is stated when a doctor disagrees with the professional judgment of another doctor. There may, for example, be several acceptable ways to treat an illness.”)(emphasis omitted). “Deliberate indifference,” therefore, requires “obduracy and wantonness,” Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986), which has been likened to conduct that includes recklessness or a conscious disregard of a serious risk. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 842, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 128 L.Ed.2d 811 (1994) (stating that “it is enough that the official acted or failed to act despite his knowledge of a substantial risk of serious harm”).Rouse v. Plantier, 182 F.3d 192, 197 (3d Cir. 1999)
Thus, to establish an Eighth Amendment violation, a plaintiff must establish: (1) a serious medical need; and (2) that the defendants were deliberately indifferent to that need. Id. See also Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). A serious medical need is “one that has been diagnosed by a physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay person would easily recognize the necessity for a doctor's attention.” Monmouth Cty. Corr. Institutional Inmates v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987). A serious medical need may also be found to exist where the denial or delay of treatment causes “unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain.” Id.
To establish deliberate indifference, a “plaintiff must make an ‘objective' showing that the deprivation was ‘sufficiently serious,' or that the result of defendant's denial was sufficiently serious. Additionally, the plaintiff must make a ‘subjective' showing that defendant acted with a ‘sufficiently culpable state of mind.'” Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 F.3d 492, 499 (3d Cir. 2002), citing Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991). “[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Wilson v. Burks, 423 F. App'x. 169, 173 (3d Cir. 2011), quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. at 837.
Relevant to Plaintiff's claims here, “[a]bsent a reason to believe (or actual knowledge) that prison doctors or their assistants are mistreating (or not treating) a prisoner, a non-medical prison official ... will not be chargeable with the Eighth Amendment scienter requirement of deliberate indifference.” Spruill v. Gillis, 372 F.3d at 236.
a. Del-Prete
Through his verified Complaint, Plaintiff alleges that he spoke with Del-Prete on August 19, 2020, after about two months of pain “to discuss his grievance and medical issues.” ECF No. 6 ¶ 11. See also ECF No. 64-3 at 6 (Del-Prete's response to grievance acknowledging confusion as to how sick call requests were being delivered and received, and assuring Plaintiff that he was working hard to address Plaintiff's concerns). According to Plaintiff, Del-Prete instructed Plaintiff to submit another sick call request with Del-Prete's name on the slip, and assured Plaintiff he would be seen. Despite these representations, Plaintiff alleges that Del-Prete failed to secure an appointment for Plaintiff. Id. ¶ 12.
Plaintiff presents medical and grievance records that confirm he spoke to Del-Prete only once, and that upon submitting the signed slip, he was seen by AHN's CRNP. The CRNP reviewed Plaintiff's medical records that reflected he had been examined two weeks earlier, and noted that Plaintiff had no history of diabetes, and that his test results within the past year were within normal limits. ECF No. 64-3 at 16. Plaintiff does not allege, and the record does not support, any further contact between Plaintiff and Del-Prete to give rise to an inference that Del-Prete knew of and intentionally disregarded a continued failure by ACJ's medical providers to assess and provide necessary medical care. Under these circumstances, and giving Plaintiff the benefit of all inferences that can be drawn from the record, a reasonable jury could not find the requisite subjective awareness to support Plaintiff's claims of deliberate indifference against Del-Prete. See Davis v. Superintendent Somerset SCI, 597 Fed.Appx. 42, 45-46 (3d Cir. 2015) (citing Spruill, 372 F.3d at 236 (“As nonmedical personnel, [a prison health care administrator] is entitled to presume the competence of medical staff in treating a prisoner, meaning that his conduct cannot, without much more, amount to “deliberate indifference.”)).
b. Williams
Plaintiff also alleges he sent two request slips to Defendant Williams, ACJ's Chief Deputy Warden of Health Care, requesting medical treatment for severe pain and explaining that he had submitted several sick call requests but had not received testing to determine the cause. Despite his request for assistance, Plaintiff alleges Williams failed to respond. Id. ¶ 13, ECF No. 6-3. The evidence submitted by Plaintiff shows, to the contrary, that Williams received Plaintiff's letter on October 6, 2020, and directed that the provider prioritize Plaintiff's requests for care. ECF No. 643 at 15. Within a week, Plaintiff's a1c testing was completed and the results showed that he suffered pre-diabetes and not, as alleged, diabetes. ECF No. 64-3 at 1. Plaintiff was prescribed Vitamin D to treat his neuropathy. Id. at 15. Taking all inferences from the record in Plaintiff's favor, a factfinder could not find that Williams intentionally refused to provide needed treatment, delayed necessary treatment for a non-medical reason, prevented Plaintiff from receiving required treatment, or persisted in a particular course of treatment “in the face of resultant pain and risk of permanent injury.” Rouse, 182 F.3d at 197 (quoting White, 897 F.2d at 109-11).
2. Supervisory Liability Claims
Plaintiff also alleges claims against Defendants Del-Prete and Williams for the promulgation and maintenance of a COVID mitigation policy that he claims resulted in the denial of care. ECF No. 6 at 9-10. Plaintiff classifies his pre-diabetes as a medical emergency and complains that this policy rendered adequate testing and treatment inaccessible. Id. Plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief requiring ACJ to develop a new sick call policy that requires “an actual doctor” to see any patient with a serious medical condition within 48 hours. Id. at 11.
As an initial matter, Plaintiff's claims for prospective relief are moot. He was transferred to a different facility in 2021, and thus demands for injunctive relief related to ACJ policies are not properly before the Court. See Sutton v. Rasheed, 323 F.3d 236, 248 (3d Cir. 2003), as amended (May 29, 2003). This is because “a federal court has neither the power to render advisory opinions nor to decide questions that cannot affect the rights of litigants in the case before them.” Id. (quoting Preiser v. Newkirk, 422 U.S. 395, 401 (1975), and citing Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 4 F.3d 195, 206 (3d Cir. 1993)).
In Abdul-Akbar, the Third Circuit vacated an order providing injunctive relief because from the date Abdul-Akbar left the facility, “it [was] plain that [Abdul-Akbar could] have no interest [in the policies or conditions at issue],” and thus the district court could not provide him with meaningful relief. Id., 4 F.3d at 206; see also Banks v. Sec'y Pennsylvania Dep't of Corr., 601 Fed.Appx. 101, 103 (3d Cir. 2015) (plaintiff “no longer presents a live case or controversy for injunctive relief regarding the policies or practices at SCI-Retreat because an injunction where he is no longer imprisoned would not provide him meaningful relief); Griffin v. Beard, 401 Fed.Appx. 715, 717 (3d Cir. 2010) (finding moot all claims for prospective relief that require prison defendants to correct allegedly unconstitutional conditions).
An exception to mootness is presented when a plaintiff alleges conditions capable of repetition. Abdul-Akbar, 4 F.3d at 206. Yet in this action, there is no evidence that Plaintiff will be transferred back to ACJ. Thus, judgment is properly entered in favor of Defendants as to Plaintiff's claims for injunctive relief.
Judgment also is properly entered in Defendants' favor as to Plaintiff's claim for compensatory damages arising out of Defendants' promulgation and maintenance of COVID mitigation policies. Following identification of a policy or practice that a supervisor employed or failed to employ, Plaintiff must prove that: (1) the policy or procedures in effect at the time of the alleged injury created an unreasonable risk of a constitutional violation; (2) the defendant-official was aware that the policy created an unreasonable risk; (3) the defendant was indifferent to that risk; and (4) the constitutional injury was caused by the failure to implement the supervisory practice or procedure. Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1118 (3d Cir. 1989).
Plaintiff has provided a copy of ACJ's “Continuing of Operations Plan: COVID (Updated)”, promulgated pursuant to a Consent Order entered in Graham v. Allegheny Cnty., No. 20-496 (W.D. Pa. May 27, 2020) (ECF No. 71). ECF No. 64-3 at 21, 41. In accordance with the plan, and to reduce movement and the potential for COVID to spread, inmates were housed in cohorts and healthcare staff were deployed to housing units to respond to non-emergency inmate healthcare requests. Id. Plaintiff complains that because of this policy, he received inadequate health care to treat his “medical emergency.”
Plaintiff's medical records belie the existence of any claimed deficiency arising from ACJ's COVID mitigation policy, or a causal connection to an unreasonable risk of constitutional harm. In the period June 2020 through October 2020, Plaintiff was seen by medical personnel no fewer than fifteen times, and was examined or assessed each time. Each provider independently determined that Plaintiff's subjective complaints of pain were sufficiently addressed by ibuprofen or dietary supplements, or that testing for Plaintiff's a1c was a non-emergent need based on his medical history. Without objective evidence that the policy impeded the provision of medical care,
Plaintiff does not present a basis for the imposition of supervisory liability on ACJ's healthcare administrators.
In addition, Plaintiff points to no evidence that either Williams, in her capacity as the Chief Deputy Warden of Health Care at the Allegheny County Jail, or Del-Prete, in his capacity as Medical Clinic Manager at the Allegheny County Jail, knew that the COVID mitigation policy created an unreasonable risk of a constitutional injury, nor to evidence that either Defendant was indifferent to any known risk. Thus, Plaintiff fails to present evidence of Defendants' subjective awareness of harm that is required to support a claim of deliberate indifference. Accordingly, it is recommended that the Court enter judgment for Defendants as to Plaintiff's claims for supervisory liability.
In light of the Court's recommended disposition of Plaintiff's claims, it is not necessary to address Defendants' assertion that qualified immunity bars Plaintiff's claims.
E. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 59, be granted.
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Local Rule 72.D.2, the parties are permitted to file written objections in accordance with the schedule established in the docket entry reflecting the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Objections are to be submitted to the Clerk of Court, United States District Court, 700 Grant Street, Room 3110, Pittsburgh, PA 15219. Failure to timely file objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011). Any party opposing objections may file their response to the objections within fourteen (14) days thereafter in accordance with Local Civil Rule 72.D.2.
All counsel of record by Notice of Electronic Filing