Ginsberg v. Selbest Dress

5 Citing cases

  1. Duval Cty Ranch v. Alamo Lumber

    663 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. App. 1984)   Cited 50 times
    Holding privilege should be narrowly construed

    The trial court could well have considered the telegram as being in the nature of an ultimatum rather than an overture for peaceful settlement. See Ginsberg v. Selbest Dress, 238 S.W.2d 621, 623 (Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas 1951, writ ref'd n.r.e.). We find no abuse of the trial court's discretion.

  2. Hood v. State

    638 S.W.2d 622 (Tex. App. 1982)   Cited 1 times

    In order to invoke the rule against admitting offers of compromise into evidence, there must be a dispute as to the validity or amount of the claim in controversy. Smith v. Smith, 460 S.W.2d 204, 205-06 (Tex.Civ.App.-Dallas 1970, no writ); Ginsberg v. Selbest Dress, Inc., 238 S.W.2d 621, 623 (Tex.Civ.App. — Dallas 1951, writ ref'd n.r.e.); R. Ray, 1A Texas Practice, § 1142, at 289 (3d ed. 1980). Appellant's counsel made no attempt to show the existence of such a dispute by examining the witness in the absence of the jury, as he could have done notwithstanding the court's instruction.

  3. Bohon v. Travelers Ins. Co.

    509 S.W.2d 905 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974)   Cited 1 times

    It is within the discretion of the trial court to determine from the surrounding facts and circumstances whether or not the offer was an independent admission or an offer in compromise. Ditto v. Piper, 244 S.W.2d 547 (Tex.Civ.App., Fort Worth, 1951, writ ref., n.r.e.); Ginsberg v. Selbest Dress, Inc., 238 S.W.2d 621 (Tex.Civ.App., Dallas, 1951, writ ref., n.r.e.); McCormick and Ray, Texas Law of Evidence, 2d Ed. sec. 1142. By admitting the check in evidence, the trial court impliedly ruled that the check constituted an independent admission. Defendant's second cross point contending the court erred in admitting the check in evidence is overruled.

  4. Coe v. Koltz

    300 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. Civ. App. 1957)   Cited 1 times

    The two named questions being controlling of controverted issues of fact for the trier of the facts, the summary judgment must be set aside and the cause remanded to the District Court for a new trial. Ginsberg v. Selbest Dress, Inc., Tex.Civ.App., 238 S.W.2d 621 (n. r. e.). Reversed and remanded.

  5. Vaughn v. Vaughn

    279 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955)   Cited 21 times
    Holding that in an action by widow to require husband's executor to set aside three tracts of land for her use as homestead, the widow had the burden of showing that the forty-eight-acre tract was a homestead even though it was not contiguous to land on which widow's residence was located and had never been farmed by husband

    See Stone v. City of Wylie, Tex.Com.App., 34 S.W.2d 842, 845; Krueger v. Bankers Lloyds, Tex.Civ.App., 45 S.W.2d 363; Wade v. First Nat. Bank, Tex.Civ.App., 263 S.W. 654, 656, writ dismissed.' Also see Autry v. Reasor, supra; Funderburk v. Dofflemeyer, Tex.Civ.App., 234 S.W.2d 889, error ref.; Kamp v. Hargris Building Co., Tex.Civ.App., 238 S.W.2d 277, ref., n. r. e.; Ginsberg v. Selbest Dress, Inc., Tex.Civ.App., 238 S.W.2d 621, ref., n. r. e. (Italics supplied.) The case of Johnson v. Russell, Tex.Civ.App., 220 S.W. 352, also holds that where a party states that a tract of land is his homestead it only amounts to a conclusion, and the burden is not met unless there is other evidence showing actual use for homestead purposes.