" (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Ginsberg v. Fusaro, 225 Conn. 420, 430-31, 623 A.2d 1014 (1993); accord Skrzypiec v. Noonan, supra, 228 Conn. 10-11; Malmberg v. Lopez, 208 Conn. 675, 679-80, 546 A.2d 264 (1988). "If, on the evidence, the jury could reasonably have decided as they did, [the reviewing court] will not find error in the trial court's acceptance of the verdict . . . . However, it is the court's duty to set aside the verdict when it finds that it does manifest injustice, and is . . . palpably against the evidence.

This right is an `obviously immovable limitation on the legal discretion of the court to set aside a verdict . . . .' Camp v. Booth, 160 Conn. 10, 13, 273 A.2d 714 (1970)." Ginsberg v. Fusaro, 225 Conn. 420, 425, 623 A.2d 1014 (1993); Jackson v. R. G. Whipple, Inc., 225 Conn. 705, 722-29, 627 A.2d 374 (1993). Although we have no case law that directly discusses whether a party may wait seventeen months to disaffirm, on the ground of duress, a severance agreement the benefits of which he has retained, the Restatement (Second) of Contracts (1981) contains the applicable principles.

We disagree. In support of her argument, the plaintiff cites Hall v. Bergman, 296 Conn. 169, 994 A.2d 666 (2010), Ginsberg v. Fusaro, 225 Conn. 420, 623 A.2d 1014 (1993), and Malmberg v. Lopez, 208 Conn. 675, 546 A.2d 264 (1988). In each of these cases, our Supreme Court held that a verdict in favor of the party seeking damages, but failing to award damages, was inherently ambiguous.

The Johnson per se rule prevailed for more than fifty years, but doctrinal cracks became evident in the 1990s, and, in 2000, its holding was expressly overruled in Wichers v. Hatch , supra, at 176, 745 A.2d 789, in which we held that an award of economic damages and zero noneconomic damages is not per se inadequate as a matter of law. See Childs v. Bainer , supra, 235 Conn. at 116, 663 A.2d 398 (upholding trial court's refusal to order additur or new trial when jury awarded plaintiff approximately one fifth of claimed economic damages and zero noneconomic damages because "the cause, nature, and extent of the plaintiff's injuries were ‘hotly contested’ "); Ginsberg v. Fusaro , 225 Conn. 420, 430, 432, 623 A.2d 1014 (1993) (upholding trial court's refusal to order additur or new trial after jury awarded only small portion of plaintiff's claimed economic damages and zero noneconomic damages because issue of causation "was hotly contested"). In Wichers , the plaintiff brought an action to recover for personal injuries sustained in an automobile collision caused by the defendant driver's negligence.

Because of the important constitutional due process implications of legally inconsistent guilty verdicts, however, we conclude that, even if the defendant and the state have failed to object to the verdicts before the jury is discharged, that failure does not bar the defendant from raising the claim in a motion for a new trial. See State v. King , supra, 321 Conn. at 139, 136 A.3d 1210 (defendant raised claim of legally inconsistent verdicts by filing motion for new trial); cf. Ginsberg v. Fusaro , 225 Conn. 420, 426, 623 A.2d 1014 (1993) ("we have never held that a party is obliged to request reconsideration [of the verdict by the jury pursuant to § 52–223 ] as a prerequisite to challenging the validity of the verdict on a motion to set aside the verdict" in civil case). We conclude, therefore, that the defendant's failure to request a jury instruction that the jury could not find him guilty of both the charge of manslaughter in the first degree and the charge of murder did not bar him from raising the claim in his motion for a new trial.

" (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ginsberg v. Fusaro, 225 Conn. 420, 429, 623 A.2d 1014 (1993); see also Practice Book § 16-34 ("[u]pon an inquiry into the validity of a verdict, no evidence shall be received to show the effect of any statement, conduct, event or condition upon the mind of a juror nor any evidence concerning mental processes by which the verdict was determined"). Thus, to the extent that the rebuttal argument may have caused the jury to reflect upon events surrounding exclusion of the reports, their reflections were part of the deliberative process and may not be considered by this court.

. . ." (Citations omitted.) Howard v. MacDonald, 270 Conn. 111, 127, 851 A.2d 1142 (2004); accord Labbe v. Pension Commission, 239 Conn. 168, 192, 682 A.2d 490 (1996); Ginsberg v. Fusaro, 225 Conn. 420, 425, 623 A.2d 1014 (1993); Palomba v. Gray, 208 Conn. 21, 24, 543 A.2d 1331 (1988); O'Brien v. Seyer, 183 Conn. 199, 208, 439 A.2d 292 (1981); Jacobs v. Goodspeed, 180 Conn. 415, 416, 429 A.2d 915 (1980). Moreover, I agree with the majority that we apply this familiar and deferential scope of review in light of the equally familiar principle that "damages must be proved with reasonable certainty. . . . Although we recognize that damages for lost profits may be difficult to prove with exactitude . . . such damages are recoverable only to the extent that the evidence affords a sufficient basis for estimating their amount with reasonable certainty."

As we repeatedly have emphasized, the trial court is uniquely situated to entertain a motion to set aside a verdict as against the weight of the evidence because, unlike an appellate court, the "trial [court] has had the same opportunity as the jury to view the witnesses, to assess their credibility and to determine the weight that should be given to their evidence." Palomba v. Gray, supra, 208 Conn. 24-25; accord Ginsberg v. Fusaro, 225 Conn. 420, 431, 623 A.2d 1014 (1993); see also American National Fire Ins. Co. v. Schuss, supra, 221 Conn. 775. Indeed, we have observed that, "[i]n passing upon a motion to set aside a verdict, the trial judge must do just what every juror ought to do in arriving at a verdict." (Internal quotation marks omitted.)

(Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ginsberg v. Fusaro, 225 Conn. 420, 425, 623 A.2d 1014 (1993); Palomba v. Gray, 208 Conn. 21, 24, 543 A.2d 1331 (1988); O'Brien v. Seyer, 183 Conn. 199, 208, 439 A.2d 292 (1981). In determining whether to set aside the verdict, the trial court walks a thin line. "The trial court should not set a verdict aside where there was some evidence upon which the jury could reasonably have based its verdict, but should not refuse to set it aside where the manifest injustice of the verdict is so plain and palpable as clearly to denote that some mistake was made by the jury in the application of legal principles, or as to justify the suspicion that [the jurors] or some of them were influenced by prejudice, corruption or partiality. . . . Within these parameters, furthermore, the trial court may set a verdict aside even if the evidence was conflicting and there was direct evidence in favor of the party who prevailed with the jury. . . . Ultimately, [t]he decision to set aside a verdict entails the exercise of a broad legal discretion. . . ."

Under the first approach, and the one we usually take, we have disposed of the appeal by summarily affirming the decision of the trial court. See, e.g., Ginsberg v. Fusaro, 225 Conn. 420, 431-32, 623 A.2d 1014 (1993) (trial court, in denying motion to set aside verdict, had failed to file memorandum of decision). Reasoning that it is ultimately the responsibility of the appellant to secure an adequate appellate record, we have refused to entertain claims of error brought by a party who has failed to undertake this obligation.