Summary
In Grinstead v. Purvis, 101 Ga. App. 625 (115 S.E.2d 212), an appeal involving the revocation of a license under the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act, this court entertained a bill of exceptions to the ruling of the appeals court wherein the identical officer, though a different person, was named plaintiff in error.
Summary of this case from Armstrong v. LambOpinion
38118.
DECIDED MAY 10, 1960.
Petition to reinstate driver's license. Wheeler Superior Court. Before Judge Whaley. October 30, 1959.
Eugene Cook, Attorney-General, Ariel V. Conlin, Deputy Assistant Attorney-General, Sheldon Cook Dorough, for plaintiff in error.
W. O. Purser, contra.
On conviction or plea of guilty of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquors, it is mandatory on the Director of Public Safety to revoke such person's driver's license for a period of three years. The Director may reinstate the license only after compliance with the financial responsibility requirements of the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act.
DECIDED MAY 10, 1960.
Julius Caesar Purvis, licensee, was convicted by a jury in the Superior Court of Wheeler County of the offense of operating an automobile under the influence of intoxicants, as a result of which his driver's license was surrendered to the Supervisor of the Bureau of Safety, Responsibility and Revocation Suspension Unit of the Department of Public Safety of the State of Georgia. Thereafter, as provided by law, he filed a petition to have his driver's license reinstated. The hearing was had at the sheriff's office and at the conclusion of the hearing for reinstatement, his application was denied because no proof of financial responsibility had been filed by him as required by the Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act (Ga. L. 1951, p. 565 as amended). See Code (Ann.) § 92A-608. Following this decision, the licensee appealed the matter to the Superior Court of Wheeler County pursuant to Ga. L. 1951, p. 565. See Code (Ann.) § 92A-602. The judge without the intervention of a jury and after presentation of evidence and argument, entered a judgment in favor of the licensee allowing him to drive and operate an automobile for business purposes only.
To this ruling and judgment Captain W. P. Grinstead, as Supervisor of the Bureau of Safety, Responsibility and Revocation Suspension Unit, excepted on the grounds that the court erred in construing the applicable law; that the court erred in application of the evidence to the law in question and erred in giving the judgment named; that the judgment is contrary to law in that the evidence contained in the appeal is insufficient to support it; that the judgment is contrary to law in that there is no provision in the law allowing a driver's license to be issued for business purposes only; and that the judgment is contrary to law in that it requires the returning of a driver's license under circumstances prohibited by Georgia law. On these assignments of error the bill of exceptions is brought to this court.
The Motor Vehicle Safety Responsibility Act (Ga. L. 1951, p. 565 as amended, and contained in Code, Ann., § 92A-608) covers the matter here at issue and provides, as to matters relevant to this problem, the following: On conviction or plea of guilty of the offense of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquors, it shall be mandatory on the Director to revoke said operator's license for a period of three years. The section further provides that the Director may reinstate the license of an operator whose license has been revoked under the above provisions only in event said operator has qualified as a self-insurer, produces evidence to to the Director that he has obtained a policy of liability insurance, produces evidence that he has obtained a surety bond, on proof of financial responsibility by an employer on behalf of an employee, or proof of financial responsibility given by the owner of a motor vehicle on behalf of a member of the family.
This section in substance, then makes revocation of a driver's license mandatory on the conviction of driving a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquors, and provides that the revocation may be revoked and the license reinstated only on certain required arrangements under which the licensee will be financially responsible through insurance, surety bond, self-insurance, employer responsibility, or car owner's responsibility.
The evidence introduced in the superior court establishes without question that the licensee was convicted in a superior court for driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor and this was admitted by the licensee. There was little evidence introduced other than the statement of the licensee in which he presents the importance to him, in his work and possible future work, of having a driver's license. However, no evidence shows that the licensee had qualified as a self-insurer or that he obtained a policy of liability insurance, that he had obtained a surety bond, or complied with any of the financial responsibility requirements of the law, as these are the only grounds upon which a license may be reinstated after conviction of the offense of driving under the influence of intoxicating liquor. There was no basis for reinstating the license even to the limited extent of being permitted to drive and operate an automobile for business purposes only. The proper exercise of judicial discretion in a case such as this necessarily is dependent on the licensee's having first complied with the conditions precedent as expressed in the statute.
The order of the judge of the superior court reinstating the driver's license of Julius Caesar Purvis for the purpose of driving and operating an automobile for business purposes only is hereby
Reversed. Felton, C. J., and Nichols, J., concur.