Opinion
No. 1608 C.D. 2014
06-01-2015
Ross Gilson, Appellant v. City of Philadelphia Bureau of Administrative Adjudication
BEFORE: HONORABLE DAN PELLEGRINI, President Judge HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge HONORABLE ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge
OPINION NOT REPORTED
MEMORANDUM OPINION BY SENIOR JUDGE FRIEDMAN
Ross Gilson appeals, pro se, from the August 21, 2014, order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County (trial court) that denied Gilson's appeal from the final decision of the City of Philadelphia Bureau of Administrative Adjudication (BAA) upholding the validity of a parking ticket issued to Gilson by a City of Philadelphia (City) police officer. We affirm.
On September 19, 2013, at 11:01 a.m., a City police officer ticketed Gilson's vehicle at 1232 Johnston Street because Gilson was parked within 20 feet of a corner. The officer noted on the ticket that the vehicle was hanging over the corner into the 2800 block of Iseminger Street.
On September 28, 2013, Gilson submitted testimony through the BAA's website and presented testimony to a BAA hearing examiner ex parte. Gilson testified that there is no painted crosswalk at the intersection where he was parked, no signs were posted prohibiting parking, and the officer did not properly reference Gilson's license plate number on the ticket. Gilson submitted photographs of the intersection, including a photograph of his vehicle parked at the intersection.
On November 6, 2013, the BAA hearing examiner found Gilson liable for the ticket. On November 14, 2013, Gilson appealed and requested the presence of the ticketing officer, which request the BAA denied.
On December 18, 2013, the BAA held a hearing at which Gilson appeared and raised the same arguments. Gilson also argued that his fine was assessed inaccurately. On December 19, 2013, the BAA issued a final decision, finding Gilson liable for the violation and sustaining the hearing examiner's determination. The BAA found that Gilson failed to present adequate evidence to support the dismissal of the ticket. The BAA determined that even though the crosswalk was not painted, it was still a crosswalk; street signs are not required to establish a violation; the license plate was recorded correctly; and the fine was assessed accurately. Gilson appealed to the trial court, which heard oral argument on the merits and, thereafter, denied Gilson's appeal. Gilson now appeals to this court.
Where the trial court does not take additional evidence, we review the BAA's decision to determine whether constitutional rights were violated, whether an error of law was committed, whether the procedure before the local agency was contrary to statute, and whether the necessary findings of fact were supported by substantial evidence. Section 754(b) of the Local Agency Law, 2 Pa. C.S. §754(b).
Initially, Gilson contends that the trial court erred in denying his appeal because he did not violate section 12-913(1)(b)(iii) of The Traffic Code (Traffic Code), which is part of the Philadelphia Code. Section 12-913(1)(b)(iii) of the Traffic Code states:
Except when necessary to avoid conflict with other traffic or to protect the safety of any person or vehicle or in compliance with law or the directions of a police officer or official traffic-control device, no person shall . . . [s]tand or park a vehicle . . . [w]ithin twenty (20) feet of a crosswalk at an intersection.Gilson specifically argues that there is no painted crosswalk across Johnston Street at its intersection with Iseminger Street.
An "Intersection" is defined in section 102 of the Vehicle Code as:
The terms "Intersection" and "Crosswalk" are not defined in the Traffic Code. Thus, to ascertain the meaning of the words, we turn to the Vehicle Code, which the City uses in conjunction with the Traffic Code to enforce and adjudicate parking violations. See Traffic Code, §12-2801(3).
(1) The area embraced within the prolongation or connection of the lateral curb lines, or, if none, then the lateral boundary lines of the roadways of two highways which join one another at, or approximately at, right angles, or the area within which vehicles traveling upon different highways joining at any other angle may come in conflict.75 Pa. C.S. §102. A "Crosswalk" is defined in the Vehicle Code as:
(1) That part of a roadway at an intersection included within the connections of the lateral lines of the sidewalks on opposite sides of the highway, measured from the curbs or, in the absence of curbs, from the edges of the traversable roadway; and, in the absence of a sidewalk on one side of the roadway, that part of a roadway included within the extension of the lateral lines of the existing sidewalk.75 Pa. C.S. §102. The Vehicle Code does not require that the "lateral lines" be visible on the roadway. The record reveals that Gilson was parked within 20 feet of a crosswalk at an intersection. The trial court did not err in determining such.
Further, the definition of "Crosswalk" also provides that a crosswalk is "[a]ny portion of a roadway at an intersection or elsewhere distinctly indicated for pedestrian crossing by lines or other markings on the surface." 75 Pa. C.S. §102. Thus, the Vehicle Code defines a crosswalk as being either marked or unmarked.
Next, Gilson contends that the trial court erred in denying his appeal because a sign posted on the street specifically allowed parking; there were no signs prohibiting parking; and if there were a sign, it was missing or improperly placed, thus requiring dismissal of the violation.
A sign permitting parking on a street does not allow a person to park illegally on that street. See Thorpe v. Bureau of Administrative Adjudication, (Pa. Cmwlth., No. 951 C.D. 2013, filed January 23, 2014), slip op. at 5 (stating that a motorist's inability to park legally at a specific time did not provide him with an unlimited right to park illegally). The Traffic Code does not require a sign informing a person not to park within 20 feet of a crosswalk at an intersection. See Traffic Code, § 12-913(1)(b)(iii). The officer did not err in citing Gilson when there was no sign prohibiting parking within 20 feet of a crosswalk at an intersection.
An unreported opinion of this court may be cited for its persuasive value, but not as binding precedent. Internal Operating Procedures of the Commonwealth Court §414(a), 210 Pa. Code §69.414(a). --------
Next, Gilson contends that the trial court erred in denying his appeal because the ticket did not reference the alleged violation as required in section 12-2804(3) of the Traffic Code, which provides:
A parking ticket may be served upon the owner of the vehicle by affixing the ticket to the vehicle in a conspicuous place . . . . The parking ticket shall also contain other sufficient information to identify the vehicle and to inform the person of the nature, date, time and location of the violation alleged.
Here, Gilson's parking ticket states that on September 19, 2013, at 11:01 a.m., he parked his vehicle with license plate number FULAWTO at 1232 Johnston Street "within 20 [feet] of corner." (Parking Citation at 1.) The comments line of the ticket reads, "Hanging over corner into 2800 bk Iseminger." (Id.) This information notified Gilson of the nature, date, time, and location of the violation alleged. Therefore, the trial court did not err in determining that the ticket correctly referenced the alleged violation.
Next, Gilson contends that the trial court erred in denying his appeal because the BAA assessed an extra $1 for the alleged offense. Pursuant to section 12-2809(2)(a) of the Traffic Code, a person who violates section 12-913(1)(b)(iii) of the Traffic Code is subject to a $50 civil penalty. Further, section 6507 of the Vehicle Code provides for the imposition of fees:
In addition to any fines, fees or penalties levied or imposed as provided by law, under any statute or local ordinance, and upon finding or admission of liability, a surcharge shall be levied on any parking violation notice or citation issued in a city of the first class pursuant to the enforcement and administration of a system of on-street parking in the amount of $1 for disposition to an account created pursuant to 53 Pa. C.S. §5708(a) (relating to fund) for purposes of funding costs of a parking authority of a city of the first class associated with 53 Pa. C.S. Ch. 57 (relating to taxicabs and limousines in first class cities).75 Pa. C.S. §6507.
Here, the City issued Gilson a parking ticket, which carried a $50 civil penalty, pursuant to the Traffic Code. The City also levied a $1 surcharge against Gilson pursuant to the Vehicle Code. The trial court did not err in finding that the surcharge was properly assessed.
Finally, Gilson contends that the trial court erred in denying his appeal because the BAA violated his due process rights when it denied his request to cross-examine the ticketing officer.
Section 5.02.(f) of the BAA's regulations provides:
The Respondent shall have the right to present witnesses, to conduct examinations and to introduce documentary
evidence. The Parking Hearing Examiner may issue a subpoena to compel the production at the hearing of any document, paper or record relevant to the violation charged. The participation in the hearing of the issuing officer shall not be required except as follows:
(i) The Respondent may request examination of the issuing officer, provided that the Respondent first presents all issues and defenses at the initial scheduled hearing. Such request shall set forth all of the following:
(.1) The facts the Respondent expects the testimony of the issuing officer would provide.
(.2) The reasons why such facts are material to the adjudication of the violation charged.
(.3) The reasons why the most reasonable means of establishing such facts is through testimony of the issuing officer.
(BAA Regulations, Chapter V, Hearings, §5.02.(f).)
(ii) If the Parking Hearing Examiner finds that the most reasonable means of establishing facts necessary to adjudication of the violation charged is through testimony of the issuing officer, the hearing may be continued to a date when the issuing officer will be present.
In Kovler v. Bureau of Administrative Adjudication, 6 A.3d 1060, 1064 (Pa. Cmwlth. 2010), this court held that "the ticket writer's absence from [the] hearing did not constitute a violation of due process." Here, the BAA hearing examiner, acting within his discretion, determined that the officer's testimony was not necessary based on the evidence presented. We agree with the trial court that the BAA's decision is supported by substantial evidence and Gilson's due process rights were not violated.
Accordingly, we affirm.
/s/_________
ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge
ORDER
AND NOW, this 1st day of June, 2015, we hereby affirm the August 21, 2014, order of the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County.
/s/_________
ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Senior Judge