The Restatement definitions of public and private nuisance are consistent with Illinois law. See Wheat v.Freeman Coal Mining Corp., 23 Ill. App. 3d 14, 18 (1974) (citing Illinois cases from 1901 to support conclusion that Illinois courts have adopted the Restatement definition of nuisance); Gilmore v. Stanmar, Inc., 261 Ill. App. 3d 651, 660 (1994) (summarizing cases). See also Donaldson, 199 Ill. 2d at 101 (adopting language contained in the then-draft of section 821B of the Restatement (Second) of Torts), quoting Commonwealth Edison, 24 Ill. App. 3d at 631.

"Pleadings are to be liberally construed and a pleader is not required to set out his evidence but only the ultimate facts to be proved." Gilmore v. Stanmar, Inc., 261 Ill. App.3d 651, 654, 633 N.E.2d 985 (1994). The court must determine whether the allegations of the complaint, when considered in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, are sufficient to state a cause of action upon which relief can be granted.

At the time plaintiffs' filed their complaint, their cause of action was authorized by section 221 of "An Act to revise the law in relation to criminal jurisprudence" (the Public Nuisance Act) (Ill. Rev. Stat. 1989, ch. 100 ½, par. 26)-a declaration of common law. See Gilmore v. Stanmar, Inc., 261 Ill. App.3d 651, 661 (1994); see also Village of Wilsonville v. SCA Services, Inc., 86 Ill.2d 1, 21-22 (1981). However, the Public Nuisance Act did not displace common law rights: plaintiffs were free to plead and prove either common law nuisance or statutory nuisance.

However, neither Ziemba nor Pyne applies unless the obstruction was on land owned or lawfully occupied by the defendant. See Gilmore v. Stanmar, Inc., 261 Ill. App.3d 651, 655-62, 633 N.E.2d 985, 989-93 (1994). More fundamentally, the parked truck not only obstructed Galman's vision, but also limited her ability to swerve right in response to Philippart.

¶ 48 A. Gibsons Awning ¶ 49 Plaintiff claims that Gibsons has appropriated the sidewalk for its own use by maintaining an awning over a portion of the sidewalk, citing Gilmore v. Stanmore, Inc., 261 Ill. App. 3d 651 (1994). The evidence in the instant case shows that Gibsons constructed an awning over its ingress and egress, beginning at the restaurant door and ending at the curb where the valets were located when plaintiff's injury occurred.

The pleading requirements are not arduous because the concept of common law public nuisance eludes precise definition. Gilmore v. Stanmar, Inc., 261 Ill.App.3d 651, 661, 199 Ill.Dec. 189, 633 N.E.2d 985, 993 (1994). The allegations necessary to plead a public nuisance may be based partly on allegations of negligence. Gilmore, 261 Ill.App.3d at 661, 199 Ill.Dec. 189, 633 N.E.2d at 993.

It is well settled that, on review of an order of dismissal under section 2-615 of the Code, this court must determine the legal sufficiency of the complaint taking as true all well-pleaded facts. Gilmore v. Stanmar, Inc., 261 Ill. App.3d 651, 654, 633 N.E.2d 985 (1994). Pleadings are to be liberally construed, and we must draw all reasonable inferences from those facts that are favorable to the plaintiff.

Railroad Defendants argue that Andrew's status as an invitee means Hermes Defendants owed Andrew the duty to provide a safe means of ingress and egress from Peter's farm, and that such duty extended to property they did not own-specifically the Crossing and right of way- because the Crossing was the only means of access to and from the different parts of Peter's farm. Resp. Mot. Summ. J. 10-14 (citing Cooley v. Makse, 196 N.E.2d 396 (Ill.App.Ct. 1964); McDonald v. Frontier Lanes, Inc., 272 N.E.2d 369 (Ill.App.Ct. 1971); Gilmore v. Stanmar, 633 N.E.2d 985 (Ill.App.Ct. 1994)). The plaintiff in Cooley was injured by a defect-from which a foreseeable risk of injury was “

Traditionally, public nuisance has covered a broad range of subjects including the public inconvenience of “obstructing a highway or a navigable stream, or creating a condition which makes travel unsafe or highly disagreeable[.]” Michigan v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, 667 F.3d 765, 771 (7th Cir. 2011). The pleading requirements for a public nuisance are not strenuous because the “concept of common law public nuisance eludes precise definition.” In re StarLink Corn Prod. Liab. Litig., 212 F.Supp.2d 828, 848 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (quoting Gilmore v. Stanmar, Inc., 633 N.E.2d 985, 993 (Ill.App.Ct. 1994)); Mercury Skyline Yacht Charters v. Dave Matthews Band, Inc., No. 05 C 1698, 2005 WL 3159680, at *11 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 22, 2005).

We held in City of Chicago that when a commercial enterprise is highly regulated by state or federal law, the operators of the enterprise may not be held liable in public nuisance for a resulting interference with a public right unless: (1) the defendant's conduct is not in compliance with the law; (2) the defendant was otherwise negligent; or (3) the law permitting the conduct is itself invalid for allowing a nuisance. City of Chicago, 213 Ill. 2d at 389, citing Gilmore v. Stanmar, Inc., 261 Ill. App. 3d 651, 661 (1994). In addition, it is implicit in our adoption of the Gilmore rule that intentional conduct, if non-negligent and allowed by the statutes and regulations governing a highly regulated industry, cannot give rise to liability for public nuisance.