Where one is employed to obtain a sponsor for a television program and produces one ready, able and willing, and who actually agrees to sponsor the program, his performance of the contract is complete. Hardin v. Stansel, 13 Ga. App. 22 ( 78 S.E. 681); Gilmer v. Carnes, 81 Ga. App. 555, 558 ( 59 S.E.2d 292). 3. There is no ambiguity in the provision of a contract that one employed on a contingent basis to procure a particular result is to be paid, if successful in accomplishing the purpose of his employment, a specified percent of the gross amount received by his employer from the transaction.
Under such a state of the pleadings, the plaintiff would be entitled to recover its commission upon proof that the defendant, during the agency, accepted any one of the various sets of terms offered by purchasers, secured by the plaintiff, who were ready, able, and willing to purchase. Southern Express Co. v. Pope, 5 Ga. App. 689 ( 63 S.E. 809); New Zealand Ins. Co. v. Brewer, 29 Ga. App. 773 ( 116 S.E. 922); Gilmer v. Carnes, 81 Ga. App. 555 ( 59 S.E.2d 292), and citations. While the testimony of a party in his own behalf must be construed most strongly against him, if self-contradictory or equivocal, and, without other evidence of right to recover, he is not entitled to a finding if his testimony, so construed, shows that the verdict should be against him ( Long Cigar Grocery Co. v. Harvey, 33 Ga. App. 236 (2), 125 S.E. 870, and citations), and this rule is applicable against a corporate party, upon the testimony of its president, it has never been extended beyond the president to other officers.
As against the general demurrer, the petition shows a contract between the plaintiff and the defendant for the sale of this cafe, and that the plaintiff completed his part of the contract, and that as a result thereof the defendant sold the cafe and received $11,000, and he received $1000 in addition, which he had agreed to pay the plaintiff. See generally Gilmer v. Carnes, 81 Ga. App. 555 ( 59 S.E.2d 292). The fact that the plaintiff, after procuring the purchaser and securing an understanding as to the price to be paid by the buyer, left the buyer with the seller, evidently to talk over the trade and work out any little details thereof, indicates that the plaintiff had fully performed his contract, and if the sale was completed, he would become entitled to the sum of $1000. The principle of law as laid down in Mutual Benefit Health c. Assn. v. Hulme, 57 Ga. App. 876 ( 197 S.E. 85), and in Nutting v. Wilson, 75 Ga. App. 148, 152 ( 42 S.E.2d 575), and citations therein, that "When a plaintiff's right to recover on a contract depends upon a condition precedent to be performed by him, he must allege and prove the performance of such condition precedent, or allege a sufficient legal excuse for its non-performance," is not contrary to what we here hold.
And this being a question of fact for the jury, under proper instructions from the court, its finding as it did, being equally authorized by the evidence, will not be reversed by this court. For a statement of the law governing this case, see Doonan v. Ives Krouse, 73 Ga. 295; Gresham v. Lee, 152 Ga. 829 ( 111 S.E. 404); Gilmer v. Carnes, 81 Ga. App. 555 ( 59 S.E.2d, 292). 2.