Gillis v. Transit Corporation

18 Citing cases

  1. State v. Smyth

    121 R.I. 188 (R.I. 1979)   Cited 20 times   1 Legal Analyses
    In Smyth, the Supreme Court of Rhode Island considered the meaning of the word “ accident," as used in a statute that requires a driver involved in a highway accident resulting in personal injury to render aid to injured persons, to provide certain information to the other parties to the accident, and to notify the police.

    Likewise, we have held that the term "accident" in an automobile tort action includes negligent as well as faultless conduct. Camaras v. Moran, 100 R.I. 717, 219 A.2d 487 (1966); cf. Gillis v. Transit Corporation of Norfolk, 193 N.C. 346, 137 S.E. 153 (1927). Thus, the term "accident" is a generic concept requiring examination of its environs in order to define it.

  2. Pardue v. Speedway, Inc.

    159 S.E.2d 857 (N.C. 1968)   Cited 5 times
    Holding that plaintiffs' allegations of negligence against a racetrack were insufficient in part because "there are no allegations of fact in the complaint showing that it is the general custom and practice among auto raceway proprietors to maintain guardrails capable of absorbing the shock of cars traveling at speeds of 150 miles per hour"

    " (Italics added.) The cardinal requirement of this statute, as emphasized in numerous decisions of this Court, is that the facts constituting a cause of action rather than the conclusions of the pleader must be set forth in the complaint so as to disclose the issuable facts determinative of the plaintiff's right to relief. Shives v. Sample, 238 N.C. 724, 79 S.E.2d 193; Griggs v. Griggs, 213 N.C. 624, 197 S.E. 165; Gillis v. Transit Corp., 193 N.C. 346, 137 S.E. 153; Lassiter v. Roper, 114 N.C. 17, 18 S.E. 946; Moore v. Hobbs, 79 N.C. 535. It is hornbook law that on a demurrer a pleading will be liberally construed with a view to substantial justice between the parties giving the pleader the benefit of every reasonable intendment in his favor; and a demurrer admits, for the purpose of testing the legal sufficiency of the pleading, the truth of factual averments well stated and relevant inferences of fact reasonably deducible therefrom, but legal inferences and conclusions of the pleader will be disregarded. 3 Strong, N.C. Index, Pleadings, 12.

  3. Stamey v. Membership Corp.

    247 N.C. 640 (N.C. 1958)   Cited 13 times

    The Court said in Whitehead v. Telephone Co., 190 N.C. 197, 129 S.E. 602: "The bare statement, then, that the defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's loss, unsupported by allegations of sufficient particularity to enable us to discover a causal relation between the negligent act and the loss is not sufficient. It is therefore essential that we ascertain from the complaint whether such causal relation is proximate or too remote to support the action." The Court said in Gillis v. Transit Corporation, 193 N.C. 346, 137 S.E. 153: "An allegation of negligence must be sufficiently specific to give information of the particular acts complained of; a general allegation without such particularity does not set out the nature of plaintiff's demand sufficiently to enable the defendant to prepare his defense." The complaint must show that the particular facts charged as negligence were the efficient and proximate cause, or one of such causes, of the injury of which the plaintiff complains.

  4. Baxley v. Cavenaugh

    243 N.C. 677 (N.C. 1956)   Cited 10 times

    Plaintiff is entitled to recover if defendant's loss of control of the Ford car and the resulting damage would not have occurred but for his own negligent act or omission. Ferebee v. R. R., 163 N.C. 351, 79 S.E. 685; Luttrell v. Hardin, 193 N.C. 266, 136 S.E. 726; Gillis v. Transit Corp., 193 N.C. 346, 137 S.E. 153. It is noted that the errors in the charge go directly to the crux of the case, not to a subordinate or incidental feature thereof.

  5. Ellington v. Bradford

    242 N.C. 159 (N.C. 1955)   Cited 33 times

    In case of injury to an infant by wrongful act, a cause of action in behalf of the parent (the mother if the father is dead) arises, permitting recovery for (1) the loss of earnings of the child during its minority if unemancipated, and (2) expenses incurred for necessary medical treatment. Smith v. Hewett and O'Brien v. Hewett, 235 N.C. 615, 70 S.E.2d 825; Gillis v. Transit Company, 193 N.C. 346, 137 S.E. 153; Shipp v. Stage Lines, 192 N.C. 475, 135 S.E. 339. Likewise, another cause of action arises on behalf of the child to recover damages for pain and suffering, for permanent injury, and for impairment of earning capacity after attaining majority. White v. Holding, 217 N.C. 329, 7 S.E.2d 825. The two causes of action are different. The parties are different. And to combine the two in one action would be a misjoinder.

  6. Aldridge v. Hasty

    82 S.E.2d 331 (N.C. 1954)   Cited 65 times
    Holding the defendant violated safety statutes by recklessly turning his vehicle left and proximately caused injuries to the plaintiff pedestrian when a third party swerved his car to avoid collision with the defendant's vehicle and thereby hit the plaintiff pedestrian

    But the trend of our decisions since the advent of the automobile has been to treat the breach of a criminal law as an act of negligence per se unless otherwise provided in the statute. Godfrey v. Coach Company, 201 N.C. 264, 159 S.E. 412; James v. Coach Company, 207 N.C. 742, 178 S.E. 607; Whitaker v. Car Company, 197 N.C. 83, 147 S.E. 729; and Albritton v. Hill 90 N.C. 429, 130 S.E. 5 (exceeding speed limit); King v. Pope, 202 N.C. 554, 163 S.E. 447, and Norfleet v. Hall, 204 N.C. 573, 169 S.E. 143 (reckless driving and speeding); Hoke v. Greyhound Corporation, 226 N.C. 692, 40 S.E.2d 345, and Gillis v. Transit Corporation, 193 N.C. 346, 137 S.E. 153 (failure to keep to the right); Burke v. Coach Company, 198, N.C. 8, 150 S.E. 636 (parking on highway); Holland v. Strader, 216 N.C. 436, 5 S.E.2d 311 (failure to give hand signal). "All of the decisions of this State since Ledbetter v. English, 166 N.C. 125, 81 S.E. 1066, concur in the view that the violation of an ordinance or of a statute designed for the protection of life and limb is negligence per se. Notwithstanding, the same decisions do not permit recovery for the mere violation of the statute, unless there was a causal relation between the violation and the injury."

  7. Shives v. Sample

    79 S.E.2d 193 (N.C. 1953)   Cited 23 times

    " (Italics added.) The cardinal requirement of this statute, as emphasized by numerous authoritative decisions of this Court, is that the facts constituting a cause of action, rather than the conclusions of the pleader, must be set out in the complaint, so as to disclose the issuable facts determinative of the plaintiff's right to relief. Gillis v. Transit Corporation, 193 N.C. 346, 137 S.E. 153; Griggs v. Griggs, 213 N.C. 624, 197 S.E. 165; Lassiter v. Roper, 114 N.C. 17, 18 S.E. 946; Moore v. Hobbs, 79 N.C. 535. It is fundamental that on demurrer only facts properly pleaded are to be considered, with legal inferences and conclusions of the pleader to be disregarded.

  8. Fleming v. Light Co.

    61 S.E.2d 364 (N.C. 1950)   Cited 5 times

    As stated in McIntosh on Prac. Pro., sec. 388, "In negligence cases, a general allegation of negligence is insufficient the facts constituting negligence must be given and that it was the cause of plaintiff's injury." Conley v. R. R., 109 N.C. 692, 14 S.E. 303; Gillis v. Transit Corp., 193 N.C. 346 (348), 137 S.E. 153; Whitehead v. Tel. Co., 190 N.C. 197, 129 S.E. 602; McIntosh, sec. 359. It is necessary "that the negligent acts or omissions be specifically stated in order that the court may see whether there has been a breach of duty."

  9. Pascal v. Transit Co.

    50 S.E.2d 534 (N.C. 1948)   Cited 31 times

    The evidence seems to be sufficient to carry the cross-actions to the jury, and we so hold under the authority of Barlow v. Bus Lines, supra; Cummins v. Fruit Co., 225 N.C. 625, 36 S.E., (2) 11; Williams v. Express Lines, supra, and other decisions in the second line of decisions cited in Tyson, v. Ford, 228 N.C. 778, 47 S.E., (2) 251. This defendant also excepts and assigns as error the failure of his Honor to charge the jury that an unemancipated minor is not entitled to recover for loss of time or diminished earning capacity during his minority, citing Gillis v. Transit Corp., 193 N.C. 346, 137 S.E. 153, and Shipp v. Stage Lines, 192 N.C. 475, 135 S.E. 339. This exception is directed only to the charge in the Pascal case. At the time this action was instituted. Renaldo Pascal was 20 years of age, and his father, J. H. Pascal, was duly appointed next friend to prosecute the action.

  10. Toler v. Savage

    37 S.E.2d 485 (N.C. 1946)   Cited 6 times

    Murphy v. Ludowici Gas and Oil Co., 96 Kan. 321, 150 P. 581; Cincinnati, etc. Ry. Co. v. Troxwell, 143 Ky. 765, 137 S.W. 543." Gillis v. Transit Corp., 193 N.C. 346, 137 S.E. 153; Winchester-Simmons Co. v. Cutler, 194 N.C. 698, 140 S.E. 622. In the case of Cedric Toler, the jury was instructed that he claimed no permanent damages and asked only for reasonable compensation for a scar on his forehead and for the pain and suffering resulting from his injuries.