Likewise, we have held that the term "accident" in an automobile tort action includes negligent as well as faultless conduct. Camaras v. Moran, 100 R.I. 717, 219 A.2d 487 (1966); cf. Gillis v. Transit Corporation of Norfolk, 193 N.C. 346, 137 S.E. 153 (1927). Thus, the term "accident" is a generic concept requiring examination of its environs in order to define it.

" (Italics added.) The cardinal requirement of this statute, as emphasized in numerous decisions of this Court, is that the facts constituting a cause of action rather than the conclusions of the pleader must be set forth in the complaint so as to disclose the issuable facts determinative of the plaintiff's right to relief. Shives v. Sample, 238 N.C. 724, 79 S.E.2d 193; Griggs v. Griggs, 213 N.C. 624, 197 S.E. 165; Gillis v. Transit Corp., 193 N.C. 346, 137 S.E. 153; Lassiter v. Roper, 114 N.C. 17, 18 S.E. 946; Moore v. Hobbs, 79 N.C. 535. It is hornbook law that on a demurrer a pleading will be liberally construed with a view to substantial justice between the parties giving the pleader the benefit of every reasonable intendment in his favor; and a demurrer admits, for the purpose of testing the legal sufficiency of the pleading, the truth of factual averments well stated and relevant inferences of fact reasonably deducible therefrom, but legal inferences and conclusions of the pleader will be disregarded. 3 Strong, N.C. Index, Pleadings, 12.

The Court said in Whitehead v. Telephone Co., 190 N.C. 197, 129 S.E. 602: "The bare statement, then, that the defendant's negligence was the proximate cause of the plaintiff's loss, unsupported by allegations of sufficient particularity to enable us to discover a causal relation between the negligent act and the loss is not sufficient. It is therefore essential that we ascertain from the complaint whether such causal relation is proximate or too remote to support the action." The Court said in Gillis v. Transit Corporation, 193 N.C. 346, 137 S.E. 153: "An allegation of negligence must be sufficiently specific to give information of the particular acts complained of; a general allegation without such particularity does not set out the nature of plaintiff's demand sufficiently to enable the defendant to prepare his defense." The complaint must show that the particular facts charged as negligence were the efficient and proximate cause, or one of such causes, of the injury of which the plaintiff complains.

Plaintiff is entitled to recover if defendant's loss of control of the Ford car and the resulting damage would not have occurred but for his own negligent act or omission. Ferebee v. R. R., 163 N.C. 351, 79 S.E. 685; Luttrell v. Hardin, 193 N.C. 266, 136 S.E. 726; Gillis v. Transit Corp., 193 N.C. 346, 137 S.E. 153. It is noted that the errors in the charge go directly to the crux of the case, not to a subordinate or incidental feature thereof.

In case of injury to an infant by wrongful act, a cause of action in behalf of the parent (the mother if the father is dead) arises, permitting recovery for (1) the loss of earnings of the child during its minority if unemancipated, and (2) expenses incurred for necessary medical treatment. Smith v. Hewett and O'Brien v. Hewett, 235 N.C. 615, 70 S.E.2d 825; Gillis v. Transit Company, 193 N.C. 346, 137 S.E. 153; Shipp v. Stage Lines, 192 N.C. 475, 135 S.E. 339. Likewise, another cause of action arises on behalf of the child to recover damages for pain and suffering, for permanent injury, and for impairment of earning capacity after attaining majority. White v. Holding, 217 N.C. 329, 7 S.E.2d 825. The two causes of action are different. The parties are different. And to combine the two in one action would be a misjoinder.

But the trend of our decisions since the advent of the automobile has been to treat the breach of a criminal law as an act of negligence per se unless otherwise provided in the statute. Godfrey v. Coach Company, 201 N.C. 264, 159 S.E. 412; James v. Coach Company, 207 N.C. 742, 178 S.E. 607; Whitaker v. Car Company, 197 N.C. 83, 147 S.E. 729; and Albritton v. Hill 90 N.C. 429, 130 S.E. 5 (exceeding speed limit); King v. Pope, 202 N.C. 554, 163 S.E. 447, and Norfleet v. Hall, 204 N.C. 573, 169 S.E. 143 (reckless driving and speeding); Hoke v. Greyhound Corporation, 226 N.C. 692, 40 S.E.2d 345, and Gillis v. Transit Corporation, 193 N.C. 346, 137 S.E. 153 (failure to keep to the right); Burke v. Coach Company, 198, N.C. 8, 150 S.E. 636 (parking on highway); Holland v. Strader, 216 N.C. 436, 5 S.E.2d 311 (failure to give hand signal). "All of the decisions of this State since Ledbetter v. English, 166 N.C. 125, 81 S.E. 1066, concur in the view that the violation of an ordinance or of a statute designed for the protection of life and limb is negligence per se. Notwithstanding, the same decisions do not permit recovery for the mere violation of the statute, unless there was a causal relation between the violation and the injury."

" (Italics added.) The cardinal requirement of this statute, as emphasized by numerous authoritative decisions of this Court, is that the facts constituting a cause of action, rather than the conclusions of the pleader, must be set out in the complaint, so as to disclose the issuable facts determinative of the plaintiff's right to relief. Gillis v. Transit Corporation, 193 N.C. 346, 137 S.E. 153; Griggs v. Griggs, 213 N.C. 624, 197 S.E. 165; Lassiter v. Roper, 114 N.C. 17, 18 S.E. 946; Moore v. Hobbs, 79 N.C. 535. It is fundamental that on demurrer only facts properly pleaded are to be considered, with legal inferences and conclusions of the pleader to be disregarded.

As stated in McIntosh on Prac. Pro., sec. 388, "In negligence cases, a general allegation of negligence is insufficient the facts constituting negligence must be given and that it was the cause of plaintiff's injury." Conley v. R. R., 109 N.C. 692, 14 S.E. 303; Gillis v. Transit Corp., 193 N.C. 346 (348), 137 S.E. 153; Whitehead v. Tel. Co., 190 N.C. 197, 129 S.E. 602; McIntosh, sec. 359. It is necessary "that the negligent acts or omissions be specifically stated in order that the court may see whether there has been a breach of duty."

The evidence seems to be sufficient to carry the cross-actions to the jury, and we so hold under the authority of Barlow v. Bus Lines, supra; Cummins v. Fruit Co., 225 N.C. 625, 36 S.E., (2) 11; Williams v. Express Lines, supra, and other decisions in the second line of decisions cited in Tyson, v. Ford, 228 N.C. 778, 47 S.E., (2) 251. This defendant also excepts and assigns as error the failure of his Honor to charge the jury that an unemancipated minor is not entitled to recover for loss of time or diminished earning capacity during his minority, citing Gillis v. Transit Corp., 193 N.C. 346, 137 S.E. 153, and Shipp v. Stage Lines, 192 N.C. 475, 135 S.E. 339. This exception is directed only to the charge in the Pascal case. At the time this action was instituted. Renaldo Pascal was 20 years of age, and his father, J. H. Pascal, was duly appointed next friend to prosecute the action.

Murphy v. Ludowici Gas and Oil Co., 96 Kan. 321, 150 P. 581; Cincinnati, etc. Ry. Co. v. Troxwell, 143 Ky. 765, 137 S.W. 543." Gillis v. Transit Corp., 193 N.C. 346, 137 S.E. 153; Winchester-Simmons Co. v. Cutler, 194 N.C. 698, 140 S.E. 622. In the case of Cedric Toler, the jury was instructed that he claimed no permanent damages and asked only for reasonable compensation for a scar on his forehead and for the pain and suffering resulting from his injuries.