Opinion
Case No. 02-23236-CIV-KING
January 23, 2003
ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
THIS CAUSE is before the Court upon Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Counts I and IV of Plaintiff's Complaint filed January 3, 2003. Plaintiff has not filed a Response and the time to do so has passed.
Defendant employed Plaintiff as an Assistant Superintendent of Management/Operations. (Compl. at 2.) On or about February 13, 2002, Plaintiff was demoted to the position of Principal and suffered a reduction in pay and status. (Compl. at 3.) Plaintiff alleges that she was not given notice or an opportunity to be heard prior to the demotion, and that her March 13, 2002, request for an administrative hearing was denied. (Compl. at 3.) Moreover, Plaintiff claims that on or about February 19, 2002, she entered into an oral employment contract with Defendant's Chief of Business Operations in which she was offered and accepted employment in her previous position as Assistant Superintendent. (Compl. at 3.) Subsequently, on February 20, 2002, Defendant again demoted Plaintiff to the position of Principal. (Compl. at 3.) On November 4, 2002, Plaintiff filed a four-count Complaint alleging claims for breach of contract and violations of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.
On January 3, 2003, Defendant filed its current Motion to Dismiss. Defendant argues that Count I, which asserts a claim for violation of due process, "should be dismissed because Plaintiff failed to avail herself of the administrative and judicial remedies available to her by the School Board Rules and Florida Statutes." (Def.'s Mot. at 1.) Moreover, Defendant also argues that Count II for breach of contract should be dismissed because the Complaint fails to allege that Defendant ratified the contract allegedly entered into between Plaintiff and one of Defendant's employees. (Def.'s Mot. at 7.)
A motion to dismiss will be granted only where it is clear that no set of facts consistent with the allegations could provide a basis for relief. "It is well established that a complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a claim pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 12(b)(6) `unless it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts that would entitle him to relief.'" Bradberry v. Pinellas County, 789 F.2d 1513, 1515 (11th Cir. 1986) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). For purposes of a motion to dismiss, a court must construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff and accept as true all facts alleged by the plaintiff. Hishon v. King Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73 (1984). The issue is not whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, but "whether the claimant is entitled to offer evidence to support the claims." Little v. City of North Miami, 805 F.2d 962, 965 (11th Cir. 1986) (citation omitted).
With regards to Count I for violation of due process, the Eleventh Circuit clearly stated that "only when the state refuses to provide a process sufficient to remedy the procedural deprivation does a constitutional violation actionable under § 1983 arise." McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir. 1994). The Miami Dade County Public Schools, School Board Rules specifically provide that "[a]ny party petitioning for a hearing under the provisions of Chapter 120, Florida Statutes, . . . shall initiate proceedings for the hearing by filing a petition as set forth below. The petition shall be delivered in the office of the School Board Clerk within 15 calendar days of the event which is claimed to give rise to the hearing right." School Board Rule 6Gx13-8C-1.064. Moreover, under Florida law "[a] party who is adversely affected by final agency action is entitled to judicial review. Judicial review shall be sought in the appellate district where the agency maintains its headquarters or where a party resides. . . . All proceedings shall be instituted . . . within 30 days after the rendition of the order being appealed." § 120.68(1)-(2)(a), Fla. Stat. (2002).
The School Board Rules and the Florida Statutes delineate grievance procedures for individuals who wish to challenge decisions rendered by Defendant. Thus, prior to seeking relief in federal court under a claim for violation of due process, Plaintiff must first exhaust those remedies. The Court finds that because the Complaint does not allege that Plaintiff exhausted all administrative and judicial remedies prior to filing the current suit, Count I must be dismissed.
As to Count IV for breach of contract, under Florida law no individual employee or collective group of employees, including a superintendent or principal, "may enter into a contractual agreement with a teacher without the express approval of the School Board." School Bd. of Leon County v. Goodson, 335 So.2d 308, 310 (Fla 1st DCA 1976). Specifically, Florida courts have stated that an employee who is "negotiating for favorable administration recommendation for reemployment or tenure cannot acquire, from administrators, contractual rights effective against the Board."Hart v. School Bd. of Wakulla County, 340 So.2d 121, 122 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976). Unless the School Board approves an agreement entered into between an individual and an employee of the School Board, the agreement is not binding on the School Board. School Bd. of Leon County, 335 So.2d at 311. Therefore, the School Board cannot breach such an agreement. Id.
In the instant case, Plaintiff alleges that "the acting Chief of Business Operations for [Defendant] presented [Plaintiff] with an offer of employment for the position Assistant Superintendent for Management/Operations. Said offer was for the term ending on June 30, 2002. [And that Plaintiff] accepted said job offer." (Compl. at 3.) The Complaint lacks any allegations regarding Defendant's approval or ratification of said agreement. Therefore, the Court finds that Defendant is not bound by the terms of said agreement and as such, Count II for breach of contract must be dismissed.
Accordingly, after a careful review of the record and the Court being otherwise fully advised, it is
ORDERED and ADJUDGED that Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Counts I and IV be, and the same is hereby, GRANTED. Counts I and IV are DISMISSED without prejudice.
DONE and ORDERED in chambers at the James Lawrence King Federal Justice Building and United States Courthouse, Miami, Florida, this 23rd day of January, 2003.