Gillian v. Day

7 Citing cases

  1. Gillian v. Day

    182 S.W.2d 687 (Tex. 1944)

    MR. JUSTICE CRITZ delivered the opinion of the Court. The original opinion of the Court of Civil Appeals in this proceeding is reported in 181 S.W.2d 327. We refer to that opinion for a sufficient statement of the facts and issues involved.

  2. County of Harris v. Southern Pacific Transportation Co.

    457 S.W.2d 336 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970)   Cited 16 times

    "It has been uniformly held in this State that the trial court has the duty to grant temporary injunctions where there is substantial controversy and one party is committing or threatening immediate commission of any act which will destroy the status quo of the property involved before a full hearing can be had on the merits of the case." Gillian v. Day, 181 S.W.2d 327 (Tex.Civ.App. 1943, writ dism. as moot, 143 Tex. 56, 182 S.W.2d 687); Carter v. City of Houston, 255 S.W.2d 336 (Tex.Civ.App. 1953, no writ); City of Farmersville v. Texas-Louisiana Power Co., 33 S.W.2d 272 (Tex.Civ.App. 1930, no writ); Houston Funeral Home v. Boe, 78 S.W.2d 1091 (Tex.Civ.App. 1934, no writ). The trial judge orally expressed apprehension over the danger involved in the defendants" actively engaging in road building across a busy railroad track.

  3. Crow v. Batchelor

    456 S.W.2d 241 (Tex. Civ. App. 1970)   Cited 2 times
    Determining trial court's grant of mandatory injunction requiring defendant to remove fence was not abuse of discretion

    Forcible Detainer suits do not determine the ownership or title to land. Gillian, et ux v. Day, Tex.Civ.App., 1943, 181 S.W.2d 327, injunction dismissed as a moot question after issues on merits determined, 1944, 143 Tex. 56, 182 S.W.2d 687; Pendleton, et al v. Crabtree, supra. The only way a temporary injunction can be set aside is to show that the trial court clearly abused his discretion.

  4. James v. Hitchcock

    294 S.W.2d 859 (Tex. Civ. App. 1956)   Cited 1 times

    Shelton v. Palmer Grover Methodist Church, Tex.Civ.App., 279 S.W.2d 917; City of Wichita Falls v. Bruner, Tex.Civ.App., 191 S.W.2d 912; Gillian v. Day, Tex.Civ.App., 181 S.W.2d 327; Pearce v. Atlantic Life Ins. Co., Tex.Civ.App., 36 S.W.2d 553. Appellants next contend that the effect of the injunction was to destroy the status quo ante.

  5. Scurry Canyon Operatr v. Popnoe

    283 S.W.2d 819 (Tex. Civ. App. 1955)   Cited 3 times

    In the absence of a showing of an abuse of such discretion the trial court's action will not be disturbed on appeal. Gillian v. Day, Tex.Civ.App., 181 S.W.2d 327. See also 6 Tex.Jur., 10 Year Supp., page 26, Sec. 85.

  6. Pendleton v. Crabtree

    214 S.W.2d 675 (Tex. Civ. App. 1948)   Cited 12 times

    The status quo referred to which should be preserved by a temporary injunction in the pending suits refers to the last actual, peaceable, noncontested status of the parties to the controversy which preceded the pending suit and which should be preserved until a hearing can be had on the merits and a final decree can be entered. Gillian v. Day, Tex. Civ. App. 181 S.W.2d 327, injunction dismissed as a moot question after issues on merits determined, 143 Tex. 56, 182 S.W.2d 687; Houston Funeral Home v. Boe, Tex. Civ. App. 78 S.W.2d 1091; Dallas Joint Stock Land Bank of Dallas v. Davis, Tex. Civ. App. 73 S.W.2d 989; City of Farmersville v. Texas-Louisiana Power Co., Tex. Civ. App. 33 S.W.2d 272; Vogelsang v. Gray, Tex. Civ. App. 224 S.W. 535; Gibbons v. Ross, Tex. Civ. App. 167 S.W. 17; Texas Land Company v. Turman, 53 Tex. 619. Some of the above authorities and others hold that the rights of the parties are not concluded by granting a temporary injunction but they remain undisturbed for determination at a hearing for that purpose.

  7. Gillian v. Day

    179 S.W.2d 575 (Tex. Civ. App. 1944)   Cited 8 times

    Affirmed. See, also, 181 S.W.2d 327. Dick Young and P. Harvey, both of Houston, for appellants.