Opinion
ORDER
VAUGHN WALKER, District Judge.
Pursuant to its November 17, 2003, order and in accordance with the analysis below, the court GRANTS defendant General Dynamics' (GD) motion for attorney fees and costs (Doc # 49) and awards GD its reasonable attorney fees in the amount of $31, 771.25 and its costs in the amount of $2, 782.69.
I
On July 15, 2002, plaintiff William Gilliam (Gilliam) filed his original complaint in this action. Doc # 1. The first three causes of action, which stated claims under 42 USC §§ 1983 and 1985, formed the sole basis for federal jurisdiction. On September 30, 2002, defendant GD filed a motion to dismiss the claims Gilliam asserted against it. Doc # 9. Defendant Sonoma County (County) also filed a motion to dismiss on November 8, 2002. Doc # 19. The court granted GD and County's motions to dismiss on May 27, 2003. Doc # 31. The court found that a one-year statute of limitations applied to Gilliam's federal causes of action. May 2003 Ord 6:20-7:14. The incidents giving rise to Gilliam's claims were his June 13, 2001, arrest and the concomitant issuance of an emergency protective order. Id at 8:8-18. As of June 28, 2001, no criminal charges remained pending against Gilliam, and thus the latest date upon which the statute of limitations could have begun to run was June 28, 2001. Id at 9:15-10:10. Additionally, Gilliam could not avail himself of the doctrine of continuing acts in asserting that the statute of limitations had begun to run at a later date. Id at 10:11-11:15. This meant Gilliam's July 15, 2002, complaint was filed outside the statutory time period. Based on these findings, the court dismissed Gilliam's complaint on the basis that it was time-barred. Id at 12:5-7. The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Gilliam's state law claims. Id at 12:9-24.
Gilliam filed an amended complaint on July 3, 2003. Doc # 33. The complaint asserted only federal causes of action and contained essentially the same allegations as did his original complaint. County filed a motion to dismiss on August 4, 2003. Doc # 35. GD filed a motion to dismiss on August 8, 2003, and also requested attorney fees under 42 USC § 1988(b), which permits such an award for a prevailing defendant in a civil rights cases when the plaintiff's claims are unreasonable and vexatious. Doc # 39. When Gilliam failed to respond in a timely fashion to those two motions, the court issued on September 11, 2003, an order to show cause why the motions should not be treated as unopposed. Doc # 42. Gilliam responded on September 19, 2003, by filing an opposition memorandum. Doc # 45.
On November 17, 2003, the court granted County and GD's motions to dismiss, finding that Gilliam's amended complaint did little to rectify the insufficiencies of his original complaint. Doc # 48. The court once again found that Gilliam's causes of action were time-barred, see 11/17/03 Ord (Doc # 48) 21:6-17, and that Gilliam could not save his claims by resorting to the doctrine of continuing acts, see id at 27:1-8.
The court further found that the claims asserted by Gilliam in his amended complaint were meritless within the meaning of § 1988(b) and thus awarded GD its requested attorney fees. Id at 32:26-33:1. The court, however, reserved judgment on the proper amount of such fees. To inform its decision, the court required that GD submit its bill of costs and additional information regarding the reasonability of the hourly rate and number of hours for which it sought compensation. See id at 37:24-38:7. The court ordered GD to file such documentation by December 8, 2003, and ordered Gilliam to file any objections by December 22, 2003. Id at 38:7-11.
On December 8, 2003, GD filed a memorandum in support of its motion for attorney fees, as well as supporting documentation. Docs ## 49, 50. Gilliam failed to file any objections to the bill by December 22, 2003.
II
The court determined in its previous order that a prevailing defendant in a civil rights action brought under § 1983 or § 1985 is eligible for an award of reasonable attorney fees and costs if the civil rights action is groundless or without foundation. See 11/17/03 Ord 29:16-19. The court determined that Gilliam's claims stated in the amended complaint were groundless and frivolous and thus awarded GD its reasonable fees and costs incurred in moving to dismiss that complaint, as well as those incurred in moving the court to award fees and costs. Id at 33:16-21. GD seeks a combined award of $31, 771.25 as reasonable attorney fees for its dismissal and attorney fee motions. See GD Fee Award Memo 4 at ¶ 9. This represents 3.25 hours of attorney time at an hourly rate of $325.00, 50.5 hours of attorney time at an hourly rate of $250.00 and 100.5 hours of attorney time at an hourly rate of $180.00. Id at 11 ¶ 22. GD also seeks costs incurred in the amount of $2, 782.69. Id at 11-12 ¶ 24.
To determine a reasonable attorney fee award, courts commonly employ the lodestar method. The lodestar method requires the court to calculate an award of reasonable attorney fees by "multiplying the number of hours the prevailing party reasonably expended on the litigation by a reasonable hourly rate." Morales v City of San Rafael , 96 F.3d 359, 363 (9th Cir 1996). Generally, "the prevailing market rate in the community is indicative of a reasonable hourly rate. Jordan v Multnomah County , 815 F.2d 1258, 1262 (9th Cir 1987). So the court looks to whether the requested fee award is in line with rates "prevailing in the community for similar services of lawyers of reasonably comparable skill and reputation." Id at 1262-63 (citing Blum v Stenson , 465 U.S. 886 (1984); internal citations omitted; emphasis supplied).
GD initially provided the court with no information concerning the amount of fees and costs it sought. Therefore, in its November 17, 2003, order, the court instructed GD to file its bill of costs and directed GD's attention to the following analysis recently conducted by the court in connection with another civil action involving an award of attorney fees.
Recent Census data, drawn from the Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2001, indicated that gross receipts for law partnerships nationwide totaled $66 billion in 2001. See U.S. Census Bureau, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2001, (121st ed) (Stat Abs), tbl 712. Net receipts for those partnerships totaled $26 billion. Id . The ratio of net to gross receipts was 39.39%. The ratio of net to gross receipts for proprietorships was higher, 48.15%, but the court focuses here on the ratio for partnerships, a figure more favorable to GD.
Relying on Census data for the San Francisco, California primary metropolitan statistical area, the BLS has calculated employment and wage estimates for a wide range of employment categories, including lawyers, for the year 2001. See United States Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, "San Francisco, CA PMSA - 2001 OES Metropolitan Area Occupational Employment and Wage Estimates, " available at http://www.bls.gov/ oes/2001/oes_7360.htm. For lawyers employed in the San Francisco metropolitan area, the BLS estimated the median hourly wage at $57.33 and the mean hourly wage at $54.01. See id, "Legal Occupations." Employing the higher median figure, $57.33, and dividing that amount by 39.39% - the ratio of net to gross income for law partnerships derived from the national census data - yielded a figure of $145.54 as a rough average billing rate for the entire spectrum of San Francisco area lawyers, including attorneys working in private firms of all sizes, in-house counsel, solo practitioners, attorneys employed by nonprofit organizations and attorneys employed by the local, state and federal government. This average appeared accurately to reflect the going rate in the San Francisco legal community for legal services across a broad range of practice areas. In sum, the BLS and Census data reflected an approximate "customary fee" of $150 per hour for lawyers in the Bay area. This approximation, while imperfect, was drawn from objective data compiled by disinterested governmental agencies and served as a useful baseline for the calculation of reasonable attorney fees.
The court also noted that a lawyer's appraisal of the value of his own work is, at best, an imperfect measure of its "reasonable" value. With respect to posted fees, nothing is said about discounts given clients, write-offs of time, collection experience or the host of other matters that determine the attorney fees that actually prevail.
In light of these considerations, the court ordered GD to file documentation providing verifiable data on the basis of which the court could determine a reasonable amount of attorney fees (i e, a reasonably hourly rate as set by the market, not simply posted by an attorney, and a reasonable number of hours) to award GD on the basis of the fact that Gilliam's amended complaint stated meritless claims.
GD filed its request for attorney fees and costs, along with supporting documentation, on December 8, 2003. GD provided the court with substantial information on which to base an assessment of reasonable fees. GD asserts that its attorneys spent a total of 154.25 hours working to dismiss Gilliam's amended complaint and that the total amount charged was $44, 759.74. GD Fee Award Memo at 4 ¶ 8; Decl Christopher D Liguori (Liguori Decl; Doc # 50) at 2 ¶ 3. GD, however, submits a claim for $31, 771.25, representing almost a 30% decrease from the fees actually charged. GD Fee Award Memo at 4 ¶ 9; Liguori Decl at 2 ¶ 5. Additionally, GD does not include in its request "sums expended in preparing and submitting its [supplemental] Petition for Attorneys' Fees and Expenses." GD Fee Award Memo at 4 ¶ 9; Liguori Decl at 2-3 ¶ 5. GD justifies its claim to the $31, 771.25 figure in several ways.
First, GD contends that, because this matter was pending in 2003, the "most up-to-date fee data is appropriate to apply in this case." GD Fee Award Memo at 6 ¶ 14. GD then provides the court with updated BLS data regarding employment and wage statistics for the year 2002. See Liguori Decl at 4 ¶ 9, Exh C. For attorneys in the San Francisco metropolitan area, the mean hourly wage was $70.23 and the median hourly wage was $64.88. Id, Exh C at 11 ("Legal Occupations"). GD thus employs the same analysis as the court did previously with the 2001 statistics. GD calculates that $70.23 divided by the 39.39% figure, which represented the ratio of net to gross income for law partnerships derived from the 2001 national census data, yields a rough average rate of $178.29. Accordingly, GD contends, $180 per hour reflects an appropriate customary fee. See GD Fee Award Memo at 6 ¶ 14.
The court agrees with GD that the most up-to-date information is appropriate to use in calculating the attorney fees in this case. The increase in mean hourly wage for 2002 is significant in terms of determining an accurate customary fee. Although GD provides the court with updated information regarding BLS employment statistics, GD does not provide the court with updated information on the ratio of net to gross income for law partnerships. Thus, the court conducted its own research on the matter and learned that the Statistical Abstract of the United States: 2002 is now available online at http://www.census.gov/prod/www/statistical-abstract-02.html. According to the new figures, gross receipts for law partnerships totaled $72 billion, while net receipts totaled $27 billion. See id, tbl 701. This yields a ratio of net to gross receipts of 37.5%. Dividing the $70.23 figure by 37.5% yields a rough estimated hourly wage of $187.28. Thus, the court considers that an approximate customary wage of $190 is the most current and accurate figure - which, of course, is a figure even more favorable to GD than the figure it calculates in its papers.
Second, GD contends that attorneys with "significantly higher than average experience merit fee awards closer to the top of the customary range, at or around $350 per hour." See GD Fee Award Memo at 7 ¶ 16. GD cites to several recent district court cases, some from the Northern District of California, in which judges awarded attorney fees for experienced counsel at an hourly rate from $300 to $400. See id (citing district court cases from the Northern and Central Districts of California, the Southern District of New York and the Southern District of Texas). Such an elevated fee, GD contends, would be appropriate for a senior partner with upwards of 20 years of civil litigation experience. See id. GD then cites to several district court cases that awarded fees of $250 per hour for attorneys with slightly less experience, such as junior partners or senior associates with 7 to 20 years of experience. See id (citing district court cases from the Southern District of New York).
GD then describes the relative experience of each attorney who worked on the case. Richard Franch, a senior partner at the Chicago law firm Jenner & Block, has over 30 years of civil litigation experience. Franch graduated from the University of Chicago Law School in 1967. Franch is a member of the American College of Trial Lawyers and the American Law Institute and is admitted to the bars of the United States Supreme Court, the United States Tax Court and the Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth and Ninth Circuits. Franch's hourly billing rate is $510. GD Fee Award Memo at 8 ¶ 17.A; Liguori Decl at 3 ¶ 6. William Goodman, a senior partner at the San Francisco firm Topel & Goodman, has 29 years of experience in civil litigation. Goodman graduated from Boalt Hall School of Law at the University of California, Berkeley, in 1974. Goodman has been listed for ten years in the publication "The Best Lawyers in America." Goodman's hourly billing rate is $425. GD Fee Award Memo at 9 ¶ 17.B; Liguori Decl at 4 ¶ 7. Based on Franch and Goodman's level of experience, GD requests that the services of these two attorneys be assessed at an hourly rate of $325.
Christopher Liguori is a partner at Jenner & Block with 16 years of civil litigation experience. Liguori graduated magna cum laude from the American University law school in 1987 and is admitted to the bars of the United States Court of Federal Claims and of the Fourth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits. Liguori's hourly billing rate is $425. GD Fee Award Memo at 8 ¶ 17.A; Liguori Decl at 3 ¶ 6. GD requests that Liguori's services be assessed at an hourly rate of $250. GD Fee Award Memo at 9 ¶ 18.
Jennifer Hasch is an associate at Jenner & Block with three years of civil litigation experience. Hasch received her law degree from Boalt Hall at the University of California, Berkeley, in 2000. Hasch's hourly billing rate is $240. GD Fee Award Memo at 8-9 ¶ 17.A. Jeremy Blank is a senior associate at Topel & Goodman with 9 years of experience litigating civil and criminal matters. Blank graduated from Golden Gate University law school with highest honors in 1994. Blank's hourly billing rate is $325. GD Fee Award Memo at 9 ¶ 17.B; Liguori Decl at 4 ¶ 7. GD requests that the services of these two attorneys be assessed at an hourly rate of $180, ten dollars below the average figure calculated by the court above. See GD Fee Award Memo at 11 ¶ 22.
Third, GD submits information about its hourly rates based upon its billing statements. Liguori Decl at 2 ¶ 3, Exhs A & B. GD asserts that Jenner & Block gave GD a 10% discount off the normal hourly billing rates due to the volume of business GD gives to that firm. Id at 2 ¶ 4. Further, as noted above, GD's requested billing rates are substantially lower (roughly 30% lower) than the rates it was actually charged. See id at 2 ¶ 3, Exhs A & B.
In light of this information, the court considers the hourly rates claimed by GD to be reasonable for the purposes of the lodestar calculation. First, as noted above, the updated U.S. Census and BLS information shows that a higher customary billing rate is now warranted and that the appropriate baseline figure to use is now $190, rather that $150. Second, although the court has noted that a lawyer's own assessment of the value of his work is not particularly accurate, GD has demostrated that Franch and Goodman are highly experienced and that Liguori is also above average in terms of experience. Thus, higher fees for these attorneys are justified. Further, GD reasonably requests that the two associates who worked on the case, although no doubt highly capable, only be assessed at a rate slightly below average. Third, GD requests average or moderately above average fees for the majority of the hours claimed; the higher billing rates requested for Franch and Goodman apply only to a handful of requested hours. See GD Fee Award Memo at 11 ¶ 22. Fourth, the requested fees not only reflect the 10% discount given to GD by Jenner & Block, but also represent a substantial reduction from the fees actually charged to GD by the five attorneys. Altogether, then, the court finds that the fees requested reflect reasonable hourly rates, in light of counsels' experience and factors such as write-offs and client discounts.
The court also considers the number of hours requested by GD to be reasonable. GD only requests compensation for hours spent working to dismiss Gilliam's amended complaint and not for hours spent working on the fee award request. See Liguori Decl at 2-3 ¶ 5. As GD notes, its attorneys were required to wade through Gilliam's convoluted 24-page amended complaint to ascertain whether that complaint cured the deficiencies on which the court dismissed the original complaint. GD's attorneys also were required to obtain documents relating to the Sonoma County criminal proceedings against Gilliam. GD Fee Award Memo at 10-11 ¶ 21. GD attaches its billing sheets to prove the number of hours spent working on the matter. See Liguori Decl at ¶ 3, Exhs A & B. In addition, GD carefully breaks down the requested hours according to the attorney who worked on them. Id; see also GD Fee Award Memo at 11 ¶ 22. The court finds this request to be reasonable.
Under § 1988(b), GD may also recover its full costs expended in its effort to dismiss Gilliam's amended complaint. GD requests reimbursement for costs that were incurred incident to the attorneys' provision of services and that are "normally charged to fee-paying clients." GD Fee Award Memo at 11-12 ¶ 24. GD requests reimbursement of $194.20 for copying costs, $1, 258.42 for Lexis and Westlaw fees, $10.01 for long-distance telephone charges, $28.54 for delivery services, $.77 for Pacer services, $5.00 for parking fees and $1, 285.75 for paralegal fees. Id; Liguori Decl at 6 ¶ 13. Total claimed expenses are $2, 782.69. Id . The court finds that the Liguori declaration sufficiently establishes that GD incurred such expenses and thus finds this request to be reasonable as well.
Accordingly, the court finds that an award of $31, 771.25 in attorney fees is reasonable, as defined by the lodestar method and the court's previous order. An award for the requested $2, 782.69 in costs is also warranted.
III
In sum, the court finds that GD's requested hourly billing rate and requested number of hours are both reasonable for purposes of the lodestar calculation. Thus, the court awards GD its reasonable attorney fees in the amount of $31, 771.25 and its costs in the amount of $2, 782.69. The court ORDERS that Gilliam pay GD a total fee and cost award of $34, 553.94 upon receipt of this order.
IT IS SO ORDERED.