Gilliam v. Armtex, Inc.

12 Citing cases

  1. Cooper v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co.

    836 F.2d 1544 (10th Cir. 1988)   Cited 144 times
    Finding that section 626(b), read in light of section 216(b) of the Fair Labor Standards Act, provides for two types of relief — "amounts owing" and other "legal or equitable relief" — and that front pay is included in the latter and is not subject to doubling

    Recent cases in the Fourth and Eighth Circuits appear to seek a definition of willfulness in disparate treatment cases requiring somewhat more fault than Lindsey but less than Dreyer. In upholding a jury verdict finding an ADEA violation but also upholding the district court's grant of judgment n.o.v. rejecting that jury's willfulness finding, Gilliam v. Armtex, Inc., 820 F.2d 1387 (4th Cir. 1987), declared that an employer's awareness of the statutory prohibition when it takes an adverse employment action because of age is not enough to constitute a willful violation. The jury finding of an ADEA violation "does not obviate consideration of the defendant's business justification defense."

  2. Eden v. Amoco Oil Company, Inc.

    741 F. Supp. 1192 (D. Md. 1990)   Cited 15 times
    Defining "willful disregard" as the franchisor knowing "its conduct was prohibited by the PMPA or if the franchisor acted with plain indifference to its prohibitions" and does not "encompass a requirement of showing maliciousness in motive"

    This conclusion is supported by analogous decisions of the Fourth Circuit defining willfulness in other contexts. For example, the Fourth Circuit has indicated that Thurston does not mandate a finding of "willfulness" in ADEA cases simply because an employer's explanations for its actions were found to be mere pretexts for conduct which violated the statute. See, e.g., Herold v. Hajoca, 864 F.2d 317, 323-24 (4th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 3159, 104 L.Ed.2d 1022 (1989); Gilliam v. Armtex, Inc., 820 F.2d 1387, 1389-90 (4th Cir. 1987). In both Hajoca and Gilliam, the Fourth Circuit upheld a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, overturning a jury award of liquidated damages, because "there was no evidence that 'the employer acted in bad faith or with knowledge that its action was so lacking in justification as to warrant a jury's characterization of its conduct as willful.'"

  3. Starceski v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.

    54 F.3d 1089 (3d Cir. 1995)   Cited 408 times
    Holding that the plaintiff is entitled to prejudgment interest on the compensatory portion of the award

    The relevance of an employer's good faith has been repeatedly recognized by the courts of appeals. See, e.g., Schrand v. Federal Pacific Electric Co., 851 F.2d 152, 158 (6th Cir. 1988); Gilliam v. Armtex, Inc., 820 F.2d 1387, 1390 (4th Cir. 1987); Whitfield v. City of Knoxville, 756 F.2d 455, 463 (6th Cir. 1985). IV.

  4. Andover Newton Theological School, Inc. v. Continental Casualty Co.

    930 F.2d 89 (1st Cir. 1991)   Cited 24 times
    Finding that the claims alleged conduct which was covered under the policy and the only relevant question was the scope of the exclusion

    See Schrand v. Federal Pacific Elec. Co., 851 F.2d 152, 158 (6th Cir. 1988); Cooper v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 836 F.2d 1544, 1549 (10th Cir. 1988); Dreyer v. Arco Chemical Co., 801 F.2d 651, 658 (3d Cir. 1986).See also Burlew v. Eaton Corp., 869 F.2d 1063, 1069 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding of intentional discrimination does not necessarily indicate a "conscious, deliberate state of mind"); Bethea v. Levi Strauss Co., 827 F.2d 355, 359 (8th Cir. 1987) (applying Thurston standard, a finding of intentional discrimination does not require finding of willfulness); Gilliam v. Armtex, Inc., 820 F.2d 1387, 1390 (4th Cir. 1987) (admission of awareness of ADEA coupled with finding of violation does not require finding of willfulness). But cf. Lindsey v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 810 F.2d 1094, 1099 (11th Cir. 1987) (on facts of case, finding of discrimination together with admission of knowledge about ADEA required finding of liquidated damages under Thurston standard).

  5. Krause v. Dresser Industries, Inc.

    910 F.2d 674 (10th Cir. 1990)   Cited 31 times
    Holding that prima facie case established where employer fires fifty-two year old accountant pursuant to RIF, but retains one younger employee in similar position

    We agree with the district court that the evidence in this case was too thin to supply an inference that age was the predominant factor in Krause's termination. See also Bethea v. Levi Strauss Co., 827 F.2d 355, 358-59 (8th Cir. 1987) and Gilliam v. Armtex, Inc., 820 F.2d 1387, 1389-91 (4th Cir. 1987) (relied upon in Cooper, 836 F.2d at 1550-51). II A

  6. Herold v. Hajoca Corp.

    864 F.2d 317 (4th Cir. 1988)   Cited 124 times
    Holding the District Court properly denied directed verdict and JNOV motions when the plaintiff presented evidence the defendant had a policy of laying off workers with less seniority but failed to follow that policy in the challenged RIF

    The ADEA does not define "willful" but this court has recently provided some guidance in interpreting the term. See Gilliam v. Armtex, Inc., 820 F.2d 1387 (4th Cir. 1987). Although Gilliam failed to offer an all-inclusive definition of "willful," it upheld a JNOV after a jury finding of willfulness because there was no evidence that "the employer acted in bad faith or with knowledge that its action was so lacking in justification as to warrant a jury's characterization of its conduct as willful."

  7. Schrand v. Federal Pacific Elec. Co.

    851 F.2d 152 (6th Cir. 1988)   Cited 140 times
    Holding that error was not harmless in a "close case" where the inadmissible testimony was arguably the strongest evidence at trial weighing in plaintiff's favor

    The problem arises in differentiating intent and the requirements of willfulness. See, e.g., Dreyer v. ARCO Chemical Co., 801 F.2d 651, 658 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 107 S.Ct. 1348, 94 L.Ed.2d 519 (1987) (requires a showing of "outrageous" conduct to establish willfulness); Lindsey v. American Cast Iron Pipe Co., 810 F.2d 1094, 1099-1100 (11th Cir. 1987) (rejects "outrageous conduct" standard for a case-by-case determination of good faith question); Gilliam v. Armtex, Inc., 820 F.2d 1387, 1390 (4th Cir. 1987) (something more required than "a retrospective finding that there was a simple violation of the statute"); Cooper v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 836 F.2d 1544, 1551 (10th Cir. 1988) (adopts a middle ground between Dreyer and Lindsey, a willful violation occurs when age is the predominant factor in employer's decision). Congress clearly intended that courts would recognize a two-tiered approach in awarding damages.

  8. Riley v. Dow Corning Corp.

    767 F. Supp. 735 (M.D.N.C. 1991)   Cited 7 times
    Stating a plaintiff's claim under the FLSA accrued when he was denied his proper wage

    Autry v. North Carolina Department of Human Resources, 820 F.2d 1384, 1386 (4th Cir. 1987). See, e.g., Gilliam v.Armtex, Inc., 820 F.2d 1387, 1388 (4th Cir. 1987); Gries v. Zimmer, Inc., 742 F. Supp. 1309, 1314 (W.D.N.C. 1990). The court finds that Riley has failed to substantiate his age discrimination claim.

  9. E.E.O.C. v. D.C., Dept. of Human Services

    729 F. Supp. 907 (D.D.C. 1990)   Cited 5 times
    Noting various Courts of Appeals' interpretations of the Thurston standard

    The Fourth, Eighth, Sixth and Tenth Circuits, while requiring a greater standard for willfulness than the Eleventh Circuit, have refused to adopt the "outrageous" standard of the Third Circuit. See e.g., Gilliam v. Armtex, Inc., 820 F.2d 1387, 1390-91 (4th Cir. 1987) (requiring consideration of employer's business justification); Uffelman v. Lone Star Steel Co., 863 F.2d 404, 409-10 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 109 S.Ct. 2448, 104 L.Ed.2d 1003 (1989) (weighing credibility of witnesses regarding employer's good faith and reasonable actions); Schrand v. Federal Pacific Electric Co., 851 F.2d 152, 158 (6th Cir. 1988) (age must be "predominant factor in the employer's decision" in order to find willfulness); MacDissi v. Valmont Industries, 856 F.2d 1054, 1061 (8th Cir. 1988) (requiring evidence of a conscious intent to violate the law); Cooper v. Asplundh Tree Expert Co., 836 F.2d 1544, 1551 (10th Cir. 1988) (age must be "predominant factor in the employer's decision" in order to find willfulness). The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals has yet to rule on this issue.

  10. Duke v. Uniroyal, Inc.

    719 F. Supp. 428 (E.D.N.C. 1989)   Cited 4 times

    Instead, liquidated damages are reserved for those cases where an employer wholly disregards the law, or shows reckless disregard as to whether its conduct violates the ADEA. The Fourth Circuit adopted this standard in Gilliam v. Armtex, 820 F.2d 1387 (4th Cir. 1987). The Court in Gilliam stated that there is no willful violation of the ADEA by an employer when there is no basis for finding that the employer acted in bad faith or with knowledge that its action was not justified, Gilliam, supra, at 1390.