Gillette v. Mitchell

8 Citing cases

  1. Central Pipe Line Co. v. Hutson

    82 N.E.2d 624 (Ill. 1948)   Cited 11 times
    In Central Pipe Line Co. v. Hutson, 401 Ill. 447, 82 N.E.2d 624, 632, the Supreme Court of Illinois, after considering cases cited from other jurisdictions, stated the majority rule in state courts as follows:"The great prevailing weight of authority is against holding unaccrued oil or gas royalties are rent, and as a consequence are to be apportioned.

    A. 934, and refused to apply it to the facts, saying, "The fact that oil and gas are vagrant and transitory in their nature does not prevent their adhering to and becoming a part of the land while passing from one tract to another, and while so in one tract they are a part of that tract and belong to the owner thereof until they escape from such tract, and, if brought to the surface before such escape, they become personal property belonging to the owner of the land. It therefore irresistibly follows that the oil or gas taken from the well on a particular tract of land belongs to the owner of that tract, even though the contract under which the well was drilled included other tracts of land. Because the contract of production may have included two or more tracts of land, such contract cannot have the force of taking from the owner of one tract the oil or gas adhering to such tract for the time being and bestowing it upon the owner of another tract, where it may never have been." In Gillette v. Mitchell, — Texas, —, 214 S.W. 619, Minnie Gaillard owned 42 acres and leased the acreage to Hindman for the production of oil and other minerals. He developed a producing well prior to the death of Mrs. Gaillard. The lease provided for its forfeiture if the lessee failed to diligently prosecute the development for oil; it also provided Hindman should be entitled to retain the lease so far as it may relate to any well already drilled and to 7 acres around it, there to be no forfeit insofar as the 7 acres is concerned, as long as it shall produce oil and the lessee shall operate thereon. When Mrs. Gaillard died, there were three producing wells on the 42 acres under the lease.

  2. McRae v. Japhet

    269 S.W. 829 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925)   Cited 13 times
    Holding that if a property is subject to a mineral lease and is later subdivided, the owners of the subdivided tracts are only entitled to royalties obtained from wells on their tract and are not entitled to the royalties from adjoining tracts simply because they were part of the original property

    "Judgment was on June 19, 1923, rendered against the plaintiffs in error, that they take nothing by their suit, and that the Houston Land Trust Company continue to hold said trust funds together with such additional deposits as might be made with it, during the pendency of this suit, until the final determination thereof, to which action the plaintiffs in error in open court excepted and gave notice of appeal." In this court plaintiffs in error complain of the denial to them of any interest in the fund so impounded, contending that the one-eighth royalty on all oil produced and saved on the 15 acres, although brought to the surface through wells drilled on the south 10 acres only, should be prorated between the present owners of the two subdivisions of the whole tract in proportion to the acreage therein owned by each, that is, one-third and two-thirds, respectively, relying mainly, in so far as concerns the direct question of law presented, upon the cases of Gillette v. Mitchell, 214 S.W. 619, by this court, Wettengel v. Gormley, 160 Pa. 559, 28 A. 934, 40 Am.St.Rep. 733; Id., 184 Pa. 354, 39 A. 57, by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, and Higgins v. Cal. P. A. Co., 109 Cal. 304, 41 P. 1087, by the Supreme Court of California. We agree with them, reverse the judgment, and render the cause in their favor, principally upon these considerations and conclusions:

  3. Griffith v. Gulf Refining Co.

    215 Miss. 15 (Miss. 1952)   Cited 28 times
    In Griffith v. Gulf Refining Company, 215 Miss. 15, 60 So.2d 518, 521 (Miss. 1952), it was there also held that where the unit was created without formal notice and hearing, under the laws prior to the 1948 Act, the lessee in the spacing and drilling of wells represented the royalty owners.

    Also the following: Bruce v. Ohio Oil Co., 169 F.2d 709, 336 U.S. 913; Carlock v. Krug, 151 Kan. 407, 99 P.2d 858; Coyne v. Simrall Corp., 140 F.2d 574; Eason v. Rosamond, 173 Okla. 10, 46 P.2d 471; Fisher v. Teter, 108 S.E. 896, 89 W. Va. 693; French v. George, 159 S.W.2d 566; Garza v. De Montalvo, 147 Tex. 525, 217 S.W.2d 988; Gillette v. Mitchell, 214 S.W. 619; Gypsy Oil Co. v. Schonwald, 107 Okla. 253, 231 P. 864; Harley v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 378 Ill. 19, 37 N.E.2d 760; Herring v. United Gas Public Service Co., 153 So. 710; Hinds v. McCord, 45 S.W.2d 442; Hurst v. Paken Oil Co., 287 Ky. 257, 152 S.W.2d 981; Investor's Royalty Co. v. Lewis, et al., 85 P.2d 275, 91 P.2d 764; Japhet, et al. v. McRae, et al., 276 S.W. 669; Kimbley v. Luckey, 179 P. 928, 72 Okla. 217; Knight v. Chicago Corp., 144 Tex. 98, 188 S.W.2d 564; McRae v. Japhet, 269 S.W. 829; Placid Oil Co. v. North Central Texas Oil Co., 206 La. 693, 19 So.2d 616; Schrader v. Gypsy Oil Co., 38 N.M. 124, 28 P.2d 885; Shell Petroleum Corp. v. Carter, 187 La. 382, 175 So. 1; Stephenson v. Glass, 115 Tex. 192, 276 S.W. 1110, 279 S.W. 260; United Gas Public Service Co. v. Eaton, 153 So. 702; Walker v. Gas Corp., 121 W. Va. 251, 35 S.E.2d 55; Wettengel v. Gormley, 160 Penn. 559, 28 A. 934, 40 A.S.R. 733; Sec. 179 (25, et seq.), Title 26, Conservation Statute, Alabama Code 1940; Secs. 4

  4. IMO OIL GAS CO. v. CHAS.E. KNOX OIL CO

    120 Okla. 13 (Okla. 1926)   Cited 11 times

    The Supreme Court of Texas has a number of decisions to the same effect. See the case of Gillette v. Mitchell et al. (Tex. Civ. App.) 214 S.W. 619, in which the Wettengel Case, supra, is quoted with approval, and in which a long list of authorities are cited in support of this principle. We are clearly of the opinion that the plaintiff in the instant case has no right to maintain this action against the defendants, for the reason that it has no right, title, or interest, legal or equitable, in or to the 10-acre tract of land, described in the petition, or any lease thereon, or any interest in the royalty, and is a stranger to the title to said 10-acre tract; that the judgment of the court, reserving the 10-acre tract to the Empire Gas Fuel Company, gave to said company all the rights it had in its lease so far as the 10-acre tract of land so reserved is concerned, and no one has the right to complain of the acts of the defendants, except the owner of the land or someone having an interest in the oil and gas rights pertaining thereto, none of which rights are possessed by the plaintiff in this action, and that the trial court w

  5. LUSK v. GREEN

    245 P. 636 (Okla. 1926)   Cited 14 times
    In Lusk et al. v. Green et al., 114 Okla. 113, 245 P. 636, this court approved a distribution that had been made to a grantee of two of the devisees named in a will of an interest in the estate, under the authority of that provision.

    The district court sustained a demurrer to their petition, to reverse which ruling the case is appealed here. Plaintiffs in error cite Harness v. Eastern Oil Co., 49 W. Va. 232, 38 S.E. 662; Wettengel v. Gormley (Pa.) 28 A. 934; Higgins v. California Petroleum Asphalt Co. (Cal.) 41 P. 1087, and Gillette v. Mitchell (Tex.) 214 S.W. 619, but an examination of all these authorities discloses a different state of facts from that disclosed by the record in this case. In the case at bar the two tracts of land were several miles apart and there is no intimation in the record that it was the intention of the lessors for each to share in the other's royalties.

  6. Johnson v. Sunshine Oil Corp.

    111 Tex. 578 (Tex. 1922)   Cited 1 times

    Joe D. Johnson and Sunshine Oil Corporation had the right to bind themselves by any contract they pleased inter se and to determine for themselves the sufficiency of the grounds for cancellation. The violation of an express stipulation in a contract, whether condition or covenant, when the terms of the contract give that authority, gives the party in whose favor the stipulation is made the immediate right to terminate the contract. Jeffrey v. Graham, 61 Tex. 482; Miller v. Havens, 51 Mich. 482; New Orleans v. Rigny, 24 La. Ann., 235; Patton v. Bond, 50 Iowa 508; Gillette v. Mitchell, 214 S.W. 619; Witherspoon v. Staley, 156 S.W. 557; Taylor v. Brice, 34 N.E. 833; Gruwell v. Nat'l Council, 104 S.W. 884; 13 Corpus Juris, p. 608; 24 Cyc., pp. 1347-8-9. Jackson, Isaacks Fryer, for defendant in error Beard.

  7. Hill v. Roberts

    284 S.W. 246 (Tex. Civ. App. 1926)   Cited 19 times

    It appears that in the Wettengel Case the oil and gas lease had been made by the father before his death, and the Pennsylvania court held that, inasmuch as the lessee could locate his wells wherever he might choose, all on one tract owned by one of the sons, if he willed, and thus drain from under the tracts of the other two sons any oil there existing, justice and right demanded that the three sons share equally in the royalty. This decision was especially approved in the case of Gillette v. Mitchell, 214 S.W. 619, by the Galveston Court of Civil Appeals. But the ruling of that court on the question of ownership in the royalty interest, on appeal, was especially disapproved by the Commission of Appeals in Japhet v. McRae, 276 S.W. 669. The Commission of Appeals held that the decisions by the courts of Arkansas, Indiana, Ohio, Oklahoma, and West Virginia represented the majority and the better rule.

  8. Stephenson v. Glass

    276 S.W. 1110 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925)   Cited 9 times

    The effect of these provisions was to vest in the lessee the title to the oil to be produced from the land during his tenure under the lease, so that the only estate remaining in the lessor during this tenure was the right to claim his royalty of one-eighth of the oil produced under the lease, and the right to a reinvestiture of the whole of his original estate upon a termination of the lease. Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Co., 113 Tex. 160, 254 S.W. 290, 29 A.L.R. 566; Queen v. Turman (Tex.Com.App.) 257 S.W. 1092; McRae v. Japbet (Tex.Civ.App.) 29C S.W. 829; Gillette v. Mitchell (Tex.Civ.App.) 214 S.W. 619. It was provided in the original lease that, should a sale be made of the surface of the leased premises, "it shall be subject to this lease agreement," and in the conveyance from Stitz to Glass of the specifically described 20 acres, which was made by general warranty deed, it was expressly provided that the conveyance was made subject to the existing lease.