Id. at 402, 630 P.2d at 689. In adopting the project completion rule, the Farber Court distinguished Farber from an earlier ITCA case, Ralphs v. City of Spirit Lake, 98 Idaho 225, 560 P.2d 1315 (1997), and cited approvingly to the Washington case, Gillam v. City of Centralia, 128 P.2d 661 (1942) (overruled in part on other grounds). Id. at 400, 630 P.2d at 687.
We have not previously addressed the question of when the 120 day notice requirement begins to run in cases of continuing torts involving damage to property. In support of their position that the 120 day provision begins to run from the time that the contract is approved by the state, the Farbers cite Gillam v. City of Centralia, 14 Wn.2d 523, 128 P.2d 661 (1942), which held that: "[W]here a municipality, without condemnation proceedings, takes or damages private property for a public improvement, the statute of limitations does not commence to run against the property owner's right of action for compensation until construction of the improvement has been entirely completed or until operations thereon have ceased for such a period of time as reasonably to indicate that the project has been abandoned."
Nourbakhsh also argues that under Washington law, accrued causes of action for breaches of a lease are personal and, as a matter of law, do not pass upon assignment. He relies on Gillam v. City of Centralia, 14 Wn.2d 523, 530, 128 P.2d 661 (1942). Gillam is not on point.
We have reexamined the statute of limitation cases which have been before this court, as urged by respondent, and find this view to be consistent with these cases. See Gillam v. Centralia, 14 Wn.2d 523, 128 P.2d 661 (1942); Papac v. Montesano, 49 Wn.2d 484, 303 P.2d 654 (1956); Cheskov v. Port of Seattle, 55 Wn.2d 416, 348 P.2d 673 (1960); Gazija v. Nicholas Jerns Co., 86 Wn.2d 215, 543 P.2d 338 (1975); Haslund v. Seattle, 86 Wn.2d 607, 547 P.2d 1221 (1976). In those cases involving damage to real property arising out of construction or activity on adjacent property, the cause of action accrues at the time the construction is completed if substantial damage has occurred at that time. If the damage has not occurred when the construction is completed, the action accrues when the first substantial injury is sustained thereafter.
[T]he right to compensation [for condemnation] is a personal one which does not run with the land, and does not pass to a vendee of the land after the right accrues, in the absence of an express agreement to that effect.See also 2 Nichols, Law of Eminent Domain ยง 5.21, at 48-50 (1975); Gillam v. City of Centralia, 14 Wn.2d 523, 128 P.2d 661, 664 (1942). Although a "quitclaim deed" was used for conveyance of a vessel in Blumenstein v. Phillips Insurance Center, Inc., 490 P.2d 1213 (Alaska 1971), the court there was not concerned with whether the conveyance was indeed a "quitclaim deed."
roperty or damages it so as to deprive the owner of possession prior to the sale, the original owner is entitled to the award. See, e.g., United States v. Dow, 357 U.S. 17, 78 S.Ct. 1039, 2 L.ed.2d 1109 (1958); Toles v. United States, 371 F.2d 784 (10 Cir. 1967); Duke Power Co. v. Rutland, 60 F.2d 194 (4 Cir. 1932); Majestic Heights Co. v. Board of County Commrs. 173 Colo. 178, 476 P.2d 745 (1970); Enke v. City of Greeley, 31 Colo. App. 337, 504 P.2d 1112 (1972); Dougherty County v. Pylant, 104 Ga. App. 468, 122 S.E.2d 117 (1961); Crawford v. City of Des Moines, 255 Iowa 861, 124 N.W.2d 868 (1963); Steele v. City of Topeka, 138 Kan. 425, 26 P.2d 447 (1933); Markiewicus v. Town of Methuen, 300 Mass. 560, 16 N.E.2d 32 (1938); City of Albuquerque v. Chapman, 77 N. Mex. 86, 419 P.2d 460 (1966); Steinle v. City of Cincinnati, 142 Ohio St. 550, 53 N.E.2d 800 (1944); Rogers v. Oklahoma City, 190 Okla. 78, 120 P.2d 997 (1942); Matthews v. City of Fort Worth, 84 S.W.2d 803 (Tex.Civ.App. 1935); Gillam v. City of Centralia, 14 Wn.2d 523, 128 P.2d 661 (1942). The rationale behind this rule seems to be simple and logical.
interest taken is entitled to the benefit of the statute relating to adverse possession, inasmuch as the city could not sooner acquire the appropriated interest in the land if no action were instituted. This theory was, of course, inapplicable to a damaging of land, as opposed to a taking, but the court in Jacobs v. Seattle, supra, gave the plaintiff the benefit of the most favorable statute of limitations theoretically applicable, holding that where a municipality, having the power of eminent domain, damages property without having first brought an action to condemn the right to so damage it, there is an implied contract that the municipality will do that which the constitution decrees it must do and will pay just compensation for the damage done. The three-year statute (RCW 4.16.080) was therefore held to be applicable. Subsequent cases recognizing the applicability of the three-year statute are Ackerman v. Port of Seattle, supra, Papac v. Montesano, 49 Wn.2d 484, 303 P.2d 654, and Gillam v. Centralia, 14 Wn.2d 523, 128 P.2d 661. This was the statute applied by the trial court in this case.
[4-6] Admittedly, we have indicated that where property is not actually appropriated, but is merely damaged, the three-year statute of limitations (RCW 4.16.080 (3)) might well be applicable. Papac v. Montesano (1956), 49 Wn.2d 484, 303 P.2d 654; Gillam v. Centralia (1942), 14 Wn.2d 523, 128 P.2d 661; Marshall v. Whatcom County (1927), 143 Wn. 506, 255 P. 654; Jacobs v. Seattle (1918), 100 Wn. 524, 171 P. 662. This court has never recognized the doctrine of acquisition of a prescriptive right to commit damage to property in the absence of an actual physical invasion of the property.
[1-4] Where property is taken or damaged in the exercise of the power of eminent domain, the three-year statute of limitations applies. Gillam v. Centralia, 14 Wn.2d 523, 128 P.2d 661. The damaging of land by the construction of a street or highway, causing it to be flooded by surface waters, is a taking and damaging, within the meaning of Art. I, ยง 16 (amendment 9) of the constitution.
Gillam v. City of Centralia, 14 Wn.2d 523, 525-29, 128 P.2d 661 (1942).