Regardless of the time element, the facts and circumstances of each case must be looked to and considered in determining the question of remoteness. Davis, supra; Dillard v. State, 153 Tex.Crim. R., 218 S.W.2d 476 (Tex.Cr.App. 1949). Evidence of the lack of reformation or subsequent felony and certain misdemeanor convictions may then cause the prior conviction to fall outside the general rule and not be subject to the objection of remoteness. Crisp v. State, 470 S.W.2d 58 (Tex.Cr.App. 1971); Gill v. State, 147 Tex.Crim. 392, 181 S.W.2d 276 (Tex.Cr.App. 1944). See also Davis, supra, at 150.
The appellant contends that the prior federal conviction of 1956 was too remote to be admissible for impeachment purposes. In Gill v. State, 147 Tex.Crim. R., 181 S.W.2d 276, this Court stated the rule as follows: "The question of remoteness is usually to be determined in the light of the particular facts of each case, especially regarding subsequent conduct of the convict. If there be evidence showing a lack of reformation, or the subsequent conviction of another felony, then the prior conviction is not deemed subject to the objection of remoteness."
Lack of reformation is shown by evidence of an intervening conviction for a felony or a misdemeanor involving moral turpitude. Crisp v. State, 470 S.W.2d 58 (Tex.Cr.App. 1971); King v. State, 425 S.W.2d 356 (Tex.Cr.App. 1978); Courtney v. State, 424 S.W.2d 440 (Tex.Cr.App. 1968); Gill v. State, 147 Tex.Crim. R., 181 S.W.2d 276 (1944). In each of these cases the prior convictions were held not to be remote, although they exceeded ten years, because of the occurrence of the intervening offenses.