Regardless of the time element, the facts and circumstances of each case must be looked to and considered in determining the question of remoteness. Davis, supra; Dillard v. State, 153 Tex.Crim. R., 218 S.W.2d 476 (Tex.Cr.App. 1949). Evidence of the lack of reformation or subsequent felony and certain misdemeanor convictions may then cause the prior conviction to fall outside the general rule and not be subject to the objection of remoteness. Crisp v. State, 470 S.W.2d 58 (Tex.Cr.App. 1971); Gill v. State, 147 Tex.Crim. 392, 181 S.W.2d 276 (Tex.Cr.App. 1944). See also Davis, supra, at 150.
Gill v. State, 147 Tex.Crim. R., 181 S.W.2d 276, 277 (1944); Crisp v. State, 470 S.W.2d 58, 59 (Tex.Cr.App. 1971). The third ground of error is overruled.
On the other hand, the tendency has been that the trial court's discretion to admit such conviction has generally been upheld if the period of time was less than ten years. See, e.g., Bustillos v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 464 S.W.2d 118; King v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 425 S.W.2d 356; Courtney v. State, Tex.Cr.App., 424 S.W.2d 440; Taylor v. State, 163 Tex.Crim. R., 288 S.W.2d 516; Gill v. State, 147 Tex.Crim. R., 181 S.W.2d 276; Shipp v. State, supra. In Gill v. State, supra, the conviction was reversed because the defendant was not permitted to prove prior convictions of the state's witness ranging from seven to eighteen years old.
The appellant contends that the prior federal conviction of 1956 was too remote to be admissible for impeachment purposes. In Gill v. State, 147 Tex.Crim. R., 181 S.W.2d 276, this Court stated the rule as follows: "The question of remoteness is usually to be determined in the light of the particular facts of each case, especially regarding subsequent conduct of the convict. If there be evidence showing a lack of reformation, or the subsequent conviction of another felony, then the prior conviction is not deemed subject to the objection of remoteness."
We note further that a ten year term in the penitentiary was assessed in each of said prior convictions and, in determining remoteness of a conviction, the computation of time should begin after release from prison. King v. State, Tex.Crim.App., 425 S.W.2d 356; Vaughn v. State, 143 Tex.A.R. 150, 157 S.W.2d 894; Gill v. State, 147 Tex.Crim. R., 181 S.W.2d 276; Toms v. State, 150 Tex.Crim. R., 200 S.W.2d 174. Ground of error No. 1 is overruled.
In determining remoteness of a conviction the computation of time should begin after release from prison. Vaughn v. State, 143 Tex.Crim. R., 157 S.W.2d 894; Gill v. State, 147 Tex.Crim. 392, 181 S.W.2d 276; Toms v. State, 150 Tex.Crim. R., 200 S.W.2d 174. There being no period of more than 8 years between the prior convictions, the contention that they were too remote is without merit.
" 62 Tex.Jur.2d 380, Sec. 340. In Gill v. State, 147 Tex.Crim. R., 181 S.W.2d 276, this Court held that the appellant should have been permitted to prove the prior convictions of the state's witness ranging from 7 years old to 18 years old. "The question of remoteness is usually to be determined in the light of the particular facts of each case, especially regarding subsequent conduct of the convict. If there be evidence showing a lack of reformation, or the subsequent conviction of another felony, then the prior conviction is not deemed subject to the objection of remoteness. * * * (collation of authorities) * * *."
The facts of the case are much the same as the statement given in a former appeal of this case. (See Gill v. State, 181 S.W.2d 276.) So far as new questions are raised, additional statements will be made herein.
This testimony was admissible on the issue of appellant's credibility as a witness. See Brown v. State, 158 S.W.2d 1018; Gill v. State, 181 S.W.2d 276, and cases cited. In 1939 and 1940, the driving of an automobile upon a public highway while intoxicated was a felony under Article 802, P. C., and hence the testimony as to appellant's conviction of that offense at that time was admissible as affecting his credibility as a witness in the present instance.
In Texas, appellate courts have traditionally looked to evidence of lack of reformation or an intervening conviction for a felony offense as a circumstance which removes the remoteness objection to a conviction more than ten years old. See McClendon v. State, 509 S.W.2d 851, 855 (Tex.Crim.App. 1974); Crisp v. State, 470 S.W.2d 58, 59 (Tex.Crim.App. 1971); Gill v. State, 147 Tex.Crim. R., 181 S.W.2d 276 (1944). In the instant case, appellant was twice convicted of a felony following his 1969 convictions.