N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 3016(a); Bobal v. Rensselaer Polytechnic Inst., 916 F.2d 759, 763 (2d Cir. 1990) (affirming dismissal of claim where plaintiff failed to "plead adequately the actual words spoken [or] publication"); Kissner v. Inter-Continental Hotels Corp., 1998 WL 337067, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 1998); Gill v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 655 N.Y.S.2d 623, 625 (2d Dept. 1997);Vardi v. Mutual Life Ins. Co. of N.Y., 523 N.Y.S.2d 95 (1st Dept. 1988); see also Jones v. Commerce Bank, N.A., 2006 WL 2642153, at * 4 (S.D.N.Y. 2006) (denying pro se plaintiff's motion to amend to assert defamation claim where plaintiff failed to identify to whom the false information was disseminated); Carchidi v. Kenmore Dev., 2001 WL 967569, at * 8 (W.D.N.Y. 2001) (denying pro se plaintiff's motion to amend complaint to assert defamation claim because plaintiff failed to "set forth allegedly defamatory material").
According to Massachusetts and New York law, an at-will employee's employment relationship with his or her employer may be terminated by either party at any time without reason. SeeSuzuki v. Abiomed, Inc. , Civil Action No. 16-12214-DJC, 2019 WL 109340, at *8 (D. Mass. Jan. 4, 2019), aff'd, 943 F.3d 555 (1st Cir. 2019) ; Gill v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 237 A.D.2d 563, 655 N.Y.S.2d 623, 624 (1997). There is no distinction between an independent contractor and an employee-at-will as to the issues presently under consideration.
"It is well settled [under New York law] that absent an agreement establishing employment of a fixed duration, an employment relationship is presumed to be a hiring at will, terminable at any time by either party." Gill v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 237 A.D.2d 563, 655 N.Y.S.2d 623, 624 (2d Dep't 1997). Furthermore, New York law does not impose a duty of good faith and fair dealing with respect to termination of an at-will employment agreement.
Accordingly, this claim is subject to dismissal. See, e.g., id. at *12 (dismissing defamation claim due to failure to specify speaker and audience, citing cases); Hawkins v. City of New York, No. 99-CV-11705 (RWS), 2005 WL 1861855, at *18 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 4, 2005) (dismissing defamation claim due to failure to specify remarks and audience); Gill v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 655 N.Y.S.2d 623, 624-25 (2d Dep't 1997) (affirming dismissal of defamation claim due to failure to specify defamatory remarks and audience); Ott v. Automatic Connector, Inc., 598 N.Y.S.2d 10, 11 (2d Dep't 1993) (similar). Therefore, I dismiss this claim with leave to replead.
Failure to state the particular person or persons to whom the allegedly slanderous or libelous comments were made as well as the time and manner in which the publications were made warrants dismissal. See Loria v. Plesser, 699 N.Y.S.2d 438, 267 A.D.2d 213 (2d Dep't 1999); see also Gill v. Pathmark Stores, 655 N.Y.S.2d 623, 237 A.D.2d 563 (2d Dep't 1997); Ott v. Automatic Connector, Inc., 598 N.Y.S.2d 10, 193 A.D.2d 657 (2d Dep't 1993). Here, the Plaintiff alleges that "[d]uring December, 1998 [d]efendants March, Turner, and Zerbo intentionally and willfully made false representations of fact about the plaintiff and his employment, his character and professional standing to other supervisors of [p]laintiff with [the] NYPD."
"It is well settled [under New York law] that absent an agreement establishing employment of a fixed duration, an employment relationship is presumed to be a hiring at will, terminable at any time by either party." Gill v. Pathmark Stores, Inc., 655 N.Y.S.2d 623, 624 (2d Dep't 1997). Furthermore, New York law does not impose a duty of good faith and fair dealing with respect to termination of an at-will employment agreement. See Nunez v. A-T Fin'l Info., Inc., 957 F. Supp. 438, 443 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); Knudsen v. Quebecor Printing (U.S.A.) Inc., 792 F. Supp. 234, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1992).
Rather, the complaint sets forth only the general content of the alleged defamatory statements, which were made at unspecified times to unnamed members of the community and unnamed persons at a business entity. Under such circumstances, the allegations failed to satisfy the pleading requirements of CPLR 3016(a) (see Kimso Apts., LLC v Rivera, 180 A.D.3d at 1034-1035; Simpson v Cook Pony Farm Real Estate, Inc., 12 A.D.3d 496, 497; Gill v Pathmark Stores, 237 A.D.2d 563, 564; see also Horbul v Mercury Ins. Group, 64 A.D.3d 682, 683; cf. Epifani v Johnson, 65 A.D.3d at 234)
Here, the amended complaint failed to set forth the elements of a viable defamation cause of action, as it does not allege the particular defamatory words, the dates of the alleged statements, or the persons to whom the statements were allegedly published (seeCSI Group, LLP v. Harper, 153 A.D.3d 1314, 1320, 61 N.Y.S.3d 592 ; Lemieux v. Fox, 135 A.D.3d 713, 714, 22 N.Y.S.3d 581 ; Simpson v. Cook Pony Farm Real Estate, Inc., 12 A.D.3d 496, 497, 784 N.Y.S.2d 633 ; Gill v. Pathmark Stores, 237 A.D.2d 563, 564, 655 N.Y.S.2d 623 ). In addition, the defamation cause of action is untimely to the extent that it is premised upon alleged defamatory statements made more than one year prior to the commencement of the action (see CPLR 215[3] ; Arvanitakis v. Lester, 145 A.D.3d 650, 651, 44 N.Y.S.3d 71 ; Melious v. Besignano, 125 A.D.3d 727, 728, 4 N.Y.S.3d 228 ).
The Supreme Court also should have granted that branch of the defendants' motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the third cause of action, alleging defamation, insofar as asserted against Abdullah. The plaintiff failed to comply with the pleading requirements of CPLR 3016(a) by failing to identify any persons to whom the allegedly defamatory statements were made (seeCSI Group, LLP v. Harper , 153 A.D.3d 1314, 1320, 61 N.Y.S.3d 592 ; Raymond v. Marchand , 125 A.D.3d 835, 836, 4 N.Y.S.3d 107 ; Schwegel v. Chiaramonte , 4 A.D.3d 519, 521, 772 N.Y.S.2d 379 ; Gill v. Pathmark Stores , 237 A.D.2d 563, 564, 655 N.Y.S.2d 623 ). Furthermore, the Supreme Court should have granted that branch of the defendants' motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the fourth cause of action, alleging "willful eviction," which was predicated upon the allegation that the defendants compelled the plaintiff to leave the premises occupied by Big City Bagels, where they knew he had been residing.
Failure to state the particular person or persons to whom the allegedly defamatory statements were made also warrants dismissal (see Simpson v. Cook Pony Farm Real Estate, Inc., 12 A.D.3d 496, 784 N.Y.S.2d 633 ). Here, the plaintiffs did not set forth the actual words complained of, nor did they specify the persons to whom Harper allegedly published the statements (see id.;Gill v. Pathmark Stores, 237 A.D.2d 563, 655 N.Y.S.2d 623 ). Accordingly, the Supreme Court, upon reargument, should have granted that branch of the appellants' motion which was for summary judgment dismissing the eleventh cause of action.