Opinion
5:02-CV-328 (CAR).
January 21, 2005
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR JUDGMENT AS MATTER OF LAW
Currently before the Court is Defendant's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law. [Doc. 71]. Plaintiffs filed a timely brief in opposition to the present motion [Doc. 73], and Defendant thereafter filed a timely reply [Doc. 77] thereto. Because this Court finds that the jury verdict in this case was supported by sufficient evidence, Defendant's motion is hereby DENIED.
BACKGROUND
This case was tried before a jury on September 13, 2004. At trial, the issues to be decided were breach of express warranty under O.C.G.A. § 11-2-103, breach of implied warranty of merchantability under O.C.G.A. § 11-2-104, breach of written warranty under Magnuson-Moss 15 U.S.C. § 2301(3), breach of implied warranty under Magnuson-Moss 15 U.S.C. § 2310(d)(1), and damages. Following the close of Plaintiffs' evidence, Defendant moved, pursuant to Rule 50(a), for judgment as a matter of law, contending that Plaintiffs had failed to produce sufficient evidence of breach of implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose, breach of express warranty, breach of implied warranty of merchantability, and that Plaintiffs did not have standing to bring some of their claims. The Court granted Defendant's motion as to the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose but denied the motion as to all other claims. Defendant then presented its case, and at the close of its evidence, the Court submitted the remaining questions to the jury.Upon consideration of the testimony presented, the jury found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Defendant did not breach the express warranty but that Defendant did breach the implied warranty and that Plaintiffs were entitled to $100,000 in damages. [Doc. 66]. The jury also found that Plaintiffs were "consumers" for the purposes of the claims brought under the Magnuson-Moss Act. [Doc. 66]. Defendant now renews its motion contending that Plaintiffs did not present evidence sufficient to prove their damages and that Plaintiffs were not the "buyers" of the motor home and were therefore not entitled to enforce any implied warranty. Defendant moves the Court to vacate the jury's verdict and enter judgment in its favor as a matter of law.
LEGAL STANDARD FOR RULE 50(b) MOTIONS
The present motion for judgment after trial is, of course, governed by Rule 50(b), which provides that:
If, for any reason, the court does not grant a motion for judgment as a matter of law made at the close of all evidence, the court is considered to have submitted the action to the jury subject to the court's later deciding the legal questions raised by the motion. The movant may renew its request for judgment as a matter of law by filing a motion no later than 10 days after entry of judgment — and may alternatively request a new trial or join a motion for new trial under Rule 50. In ruling on a renewed motion, the court may:
(1) if a verdict was returned:
(A) allow the judgment to stand,
(B) order a new trial, or
(C) direct entry of judgment as a matter of law
. . . .
"When reviewing a Rule 50(b) motion, the Court must consider the evidence presented at trial, drawing all factual inferences and resolving all credibility determinations in favor of the nonmoving party." Transamerica Leasing, Inc. v. Institute of London Underwriters, 338 F. Supp. 2d 1299, 1303 (S.D. Fla. 2004) (citing Munoz v. Oceanside Resorts, Inc., 223 F.3d 1340, 1344 (11th Cir. 2000)). "If substantial evidence exists in opposition to the motion . . ., such that reasonable people, exercising impartial judgment, could reach different conclusions, then the motion must be denied." Viart v. Bull Motors, Inc., 149 F. Supp. 2d 1346, 1347 (S.D. Fla. 2001). "Judgment as a matter of law is appropriate only if the evidence is so overwhelming in favor of the moving party that a reasonable jury could not arrive at a contrary verdict." Middlebrooks v. Hillcrest Foods, Inc., 256 F.3d 1241, 1246 (11th Cir. 2001).
DISCUSSION
In the present motion, the issues are whether Plaintiffs presented legally sufficient evidence at trial for a reasonable jury to find that they were entitled to $100,000 in damages and whether Plaintiffs were the buyers of the motor home and thus entitled to enforce the implied warranty. As instructed to the jury in this case, Plaintiffs, as the claimants, bore the responsibility to prove every essential part of their claims by a preponderance of the evidence. The jury was further instructed that a "preponderance of the evidence" simply means an amount of evidence that is enough to persuade them that Plaintiffs' claims are more likely true than not true. In deciding whether any fact has been proved by a preponderance of the evidence, the jurors were told that they may consider the testimony of all of the witnesses, regardless of who may have called them, and all of the exhibits received in evidence, regardless of who may have produced them. If the proof failed to establish any essential part of Plaintiffs' claim by a preponderance of the evidence, the jury was instructed that it should find for Defendant as to that claim. In meeting their burden of proof, it is not necessary that Plaintiffs provide expert testimony to establish an impairment, defect or nonconformity with the motor home. This portion of the jury instructions was written in reliance with the Eleventh Circuit Pattern Jury Instructions, Civil Cases (1999), Basic Instruction 6.1 and McDonald v. Mazda Motors, 269 Ga. App. 62 (Ga.App. 2004). These instructions were given to the jury verbally by the Court, and then the jurors were provided with a written copy to take with them to the jury deliberation room.Plaintiffs bore the burden of proving their damages and that they were in fact the "buyers" of the motor home and entitled to enforce the implied warranty, and at trial, they had to prove those facts by a preponderance of the evidence. Thus, the verdict in this case should be upheld if Plaintiffs presented sufficient evidence of their damages and that they were indeed buyers of the motor home. The Court will now address these two issues in turn.
I. Measure of Damages
The only issue at trial that Plaintiffs prevailed upon and were awarded damages for was their breach of implied warranty claim. Under O.C.G.A. § 11-2-714(2), the measure of damages for breach of an implied warranty is the difference as of the date of sale between the value of the motor home as warranted and as delivered. Because Defendant claims that Plaintiffs in this case were unable to testify specifically as to the value of the motor home as warranted or as delivered, Defendant now, through the motion at bar, argues that there was insufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to find that the difference in these two figures was the $100,000 awarded in damages to Plaintiffs. The Court will examine both evidentiary prongs necessary for the jury to arrive at an appropriate measure of damages.
A. Value of Motor Home as Delivered
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs did not present adequate evidence as to the value of the motor home as delivered. Plaintiffs testified that the motor home was valued at $325,000.00 at the time it was delivered. Defendant makes three arguments concerning this evidentiary issue. First, Defendant contends that Plaintiffs only testified as to their opinion of the motor home's value as delivered and did not present expert testimony as to its value or other evidence concerning the market value of the motor home as delivered. Federal Rule of Evidence 701 allows Mr. Gill to testify as a layperson as to his opinion and inference that were rationally based on his perception. Mr. Gill is therefore qualified to give his own opinion as to the market value based on his perceptions, and the jury could draw its own conclusions from his testimony concerning the value of the motor home as delivered and how he arrived at that opinion.
Furthermore, Mr. Gill's opinion as to the motor home's market value was bolstered by the testimony of Mr. Barnes, Defendant's representative, when he said that the market base for their luxury motor homes is very individualized. "And our customer base, because they're rich, extremely wealthy in many cases, is . . . so individual." [Doc. 80, Barnes depo. testimony, p. 36, l. 17-19]. The owner's individual opinion matters in this industry and that is what Mr. Gill offered in the way of evidence as to the motor home's value. Defendant also states that only three Millenium Wanderlodge coaches were made that year by Defendant. [Doc. 71]. Based on this fact which was made known to the jury at trial, Mr. Gill's opinion is extremely relevant as to market value of the motor home as delivered because he constitutes one-third (1/3) of the entire market for that year.
Second, the jury was presented with evidence that Mr. Gill understood a new motor home to be worth $650,000 and the value of his motor home as delivered to have had a value of $325,000. [Doc. 80, Bob Gill testimony, pp. 139-140, l. 12-25, 1-16]. Mr. Gill based his opinion of the value of his motor home as delivered with a three-year old motor home. Defendant states that Plaintiffs received a new, repairable motor home while Plaintiffs testified that they were using a three-year old, used motor home as the standard from which to base their estimate of the motor home's value as delivered. Defendant argues that a repaired motor home has the same value as a new motor home, and therefore, Plaintiffs' equation of their motor home as delivered with a three-year old motor home was misleading.
The Court finds that the jury drew reasonable conclusions as to its estimation of damages from the evidence presented concerning the value of the motor home as delivered. The jury from its common knowledge and experience reasonably could have found that "there is a potential for a diminution in value loss in every event of loss, and that diminution in value can occur even when a vehicle is repaired properly." State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Mabry, 274 Ga. 498, 503 (2001). Thus, when a new motor home has any significant repair history either before, immediately after, or for a prolonged period after its sale, there is a common perception that such a repaired vehicle is worth less simply because it has been broken and repaired. See id. Mr. Gill testified as to how the value of the motor home as delivered was reduced by half in his mind because of the repairs. [Doc. 80, Bob Gill testimony, pp. 139-140, l. 12-25, 1-16]. Mr. Lacy, Defendant's own customer service representative, testified to the jury that a motor home with a repair history is less valuable because of such repair history. [Doc. 80, Lacy testimony, pp. 114-115, l. 24-25, 1-2].
Mr. Barnes further testified to the jury that he would not make light of the repairs that needed to be made to Plaintiffs' motor home. He described the repairs having involved "a lot of different things, and, of course, all of those, with a coach of that — I don't try to diminish those items, because a coach of Wanderlodge category of luxury coaches is, those items, they may seem very small and minor to many people — of course, they wouldn't put the coach out of service, but to a customer that's paid that much money, it's a huge issue to a lot — to a lot of them." [Doc. 80, Barnes depo. testimony, p. 36, l. 11-17]. The jury was presented with this testimony that these repairs were considerable and would have caused concern to most Wanderlodge coach owners. Mr. Barnes asserted that Plaintiffs' reaction was a reasonable one considering their peers of luxury coach owners. Therefore, Mr. Gill's opinion as to the diminished value of the motor home as delivered was not an unusual one, and the jury was presented testimony as to that effect.
The public generally "perceives a loss of value in any [repaired] vehicle and would choose an [unrepaired] vehicle over a [repaired] one, assuming the vehicles are otherwise the same."See Mabry, 274 Ga. at 503. Upon hearing Mr. Gill's, Mr. Barnes', and Mr. Lacy's testimony coupled with their common understanding of diminished value in a repaired vehicle, even if relatively new, the jurors had adequate bases to equate the value of the motor home as delivered with that of a used motor home with a diminished value because of the repairs made.
Third, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs' estimation of the motor home as delivered allowed for a double recovery by Plaintiffs. The prior explanation of how value of a vehicle can be diminished even if it is repaired and repaired properly also pertains to this argument made by Defendant. Plaintiffs did not pay for many of the repairs done to their motor home, and the jury was presented with evidence concerning that and instructed not to include the cost of such repairs in the damage award. The reduced value of the motor home as delivered was reasonably found by the jury. Plaintiffs also did not seek incidental or consequential damages which could have resulted in a double recovery. Defendant has not presented overwhelming or even persuasive evidence that the measure of damages awarded by the jury to Plaintiffs was a double recovery for Plaintiffs.
None of these three arguments made by Defendant concerning the value of the motor home as delivered is persuasive to the Court. The Court finds that adequate testimony was presented to the jury to support their measure of damages for the motor home as delivered.
B. Value of the Motor Home as Warranted
Defendant also contends that Plaintiffs did not adequately establish the value of the motor home as warranted. The Court, likewise, finds this argument without merit. Plaintiffs presented evidence of the purchase price, including the purchase contract. The purchase price of a vehicle is evidence of the value of a vehicle if it had been as warranted. See Fiat Auto U.S.A., Inc. v. Hollums, 185 Ga. App. 113, 115-6 (1987). By testifying as to the purchase price of the motor home, Plaintiffs established one of the two figures for calculating the amount of damages recoverable for breach of warranty. See Chrysler Corp. v. Marinari, 177 Ga. App. 304, 306 (1985). A buyer is buying the product as warranted by the seller, and so, the purchase price is what a buyer has negotiated or agreed upon for product as advertised, described, or warranted.
Defendant argues that the selling price changed significantly shortly before the final sale and so the purchase price is not conclusive. The Court, nonetheless, finds that the jury was presented with ample testimony and evidence to reach the conclusion that the changes in the contract price that the Gills settled upon reflected changes in the negotiations concerning the trade-in of their old motor home or the value of the new motor home. In the sale of any product of such high value, the buyer is involved in arriving at the price. There are negotiations involved with any big ticket item, and certain things are conceded to gain other advantages. The jurors are aware of this type of changes in negotiations and had ample reason to take the purchase price as evidence of the value of the motor home as warranted and not to have been confused by the changes in price.
Based upon the evidence presented to the jury, the jury could reasonably have found that Plaintiffs' measure of damages was $100,000.00. The Court has considered the evidence presented at trial through testimony and exhibits and has drawn all factual inferences and resolved all credibility determinations in favor of Plaintiffs, the nonmoving party, and finds that "substantial evidence exists in opposition to the motion . . ., such that reasonable people, exercising impartial judgment, could [have] reach[ed] different conclusions." See Transamerica Leasing, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 2d at 1303; Viart, 149 F. Supp. at 1347. The Court finds that Defendant's arguments are not sufficient to overturn the verdict of this jury. Accordingly, Defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law is DENIED as to the issue of the measure of damages.
II. Plaintiffs as "Buyers"
The second issue that Defendant presents concerns Plaintiffs' standing to bring the claim for which they were awarded damages. Defendant contends that Plaintiffs were not the "buyers" of the motor home and thus, were not entitled to enforce any implied warranty. This is pertinent because only buyers and certain members of a buyer's household are entitled to enforce an implied warranty under Georgia law. See O.C.G.A. § 11-2-314, -714. Also, for purposes of the Magnuson-Moss claims, one must be a "consumer" to bring such a claim, and the definition of "consumer" includes a "buyer." 15 U.S.C. § 2301(3).
Under Georgia law, "`buyer' means a person who buys or contracts to buy goods." O.C.G.A. § 11-2-103 (1) (a). The Court finds that the jury had adequate evidence presented to them to determine that Plaintiffs were persons who bought the motor home for the purposes of their Georgia and Magnuson-Moss claims. The Court has three reasons for its decision. First, Plaintiffs presented evidence that Defendant Blue Bird encourages or recommends the establishment of private closed corporations for tax advantages in the purchase of motor homes to its customers through its agents. The jury could reasonably have interpreted this to see that Plaintiffs were the real buyers of the motor home even if the legal transaction was done in the name of a corporate entity. The jury had ample reason to find that Plaintiffs were buyers to avoid allowing Defendant to attempt to use the very establishment of such corporations as means of cutting off warranties associated with the motor home.
Second, the Court finds that the jury was presented with significant evidence as to Defendant's course of dealing with Plaintiffs and that everything Defendant did indicated to Plaintiffs that they were covered under the warranty and that the warranty was being honored. Plaintiffs presented evidence to the jury through joint exhibits that the Gills had been listed as buyers on several service documents and receipts. They were referred to as buyers by Defendant on numerous occasions. This course of dealing alone could have allowed the jury adequate basis for finding that Plaintiffs were buyers. Furthermore, Plaintiff argued and the Court agrees that Defendant cannot use its own course of dealing to prevent Plaintiff from enforcing the implied warranty by failing to raise this defense until after pertinent warranty time periods had elapsed. This information was presented to the jury, and they made reasonable findings based on such evidence and argument by counsel.
Third, Defendant's company representative, Mr. Lacy, stated in his testimony at trial that Defendant would have honored the warranty regardless of who held title to the motor home at the time. [Doc. 80, Lacy testimony, p. 114, l. 16-23]. This statement undercut any use of this standing defense that Defendant is attempting to employ. The Magnuson-Moss definition of consumer also includes "any other person who is entitled by the terms of such warranty (or service contract) or under applicable State law to enforce against the warrantor (or service contractor) the obligations of the warranty (or service contract)." If Defendant's own customer service manager stated to the jury that Plaintiffs would have been entitled to the benefits of the warranty, the jury had ample reason to find that Plaintiffs had standing to bring this claim as a buyer and consumer.
Applying the standard for a motion for judgment as a matter of law, the Court finds no reason that the jury's decision that Plaintiffs were buyers for purposes of the implied warranty claim was not reasonable in light of the evidence presented to them by the parties at trial. The evidence presented now by Defendant is far from "so overwhelming in favor of the moving party that a reasonable jury could not [have] arrive[d] at a contrary verdict." See Middlebrooks, 256 F.3d at 1246. Accordingly, the Court hereby DENIES Defendant's motion as to the issue of Plaintiffs' standing to bring an implied warranty claim.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, Defendant's renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law is hereby DENIED in full. The judgment entered on September 17, 2004 [Doc. 68] will stand.