We elect to resolve the issue of whether respondent validly waived her right to counsel because, in our view, it is one capable of repetition, yet evasive of our review. See Gilford v. People, 2 P.3d 120, 124 (Colo. 2000) (applying capable of repetition exception to mootness doctrine in context of civil commitment statute); Goedecke v. State, 198 Colo. 407, 410 n. 5, 603 P.2d 123, 124 (1979)(same). The record here suggests that respondent's desire to represent herself may have been triggered by an inability to trust or cooperate with professionals assigned to assist and care for her that in future proceedings will likely produce the same desire for self-representation. Respondent's apparent inability to trust or cooperate with professionals is not uncommon in similarly situated individuals.
We decline to apply this criminal standard to a civil commitment hearing because “civil commitment proceedings in Colorado are not criminal in nature.” People ex rel. Ofengand, 183 P.3d 688, 692 (Colo.App.2008) (citing Gilford v. People, 2 P.3d 120, 124–25 (Colo.2000)). Colorado's mental health statutes afford due process, and so our inquiry turns on whether the magistrate deviated from the statutes.
Although the court did not hold the hearing until twelve days after Vivekanathan's request, we do not address whether this is an independent basis for reversal because Vivekanathan did not argue it as such and because we conclude this appeal is now moot. SeeGilford v. People, 2 P.3d 120, 124 (Colo.2000) (“Deviations from the statutory process governing civil commitment proceedings, however minor, are subject to exacting appellate review, for even the slightest departure from these codified procedures can raise profound constitutional concerns.”); People in Interest of Lloyd–Pellman, 844 P.2d 1309, 1311(Colo.App.1992) (“Because of the curtailment of personal liberty which results from certification of mental illness, strict adherence to the procedural requirements of the civil commitment statutes is required.”); cf.People in Interest of Lynch, 783 P.2d 848, 852 (Colo.1989) (no need to vacate certification when hearing was held fifteen days after request because respondent had waived ten-day hearing requirement).
Section 27–65–107 requires a court to hold a hearing within ten days of the respondent's request. Although the court did not hold the hearing until twelve days after Vivekanathan's request, we do not address whether this is an independent basis for reversal because Vivekanathan did not argue it as such and because we conclude this appeal is now moot. SeeGilford v. People, 2 P.3d 120, 124 (Colo.2000) (“Deviations from the statutory process governing civil commitment proceedings, however minor, are subject to exacting appellate review, for even the slightest departure from these codified procedures can raise profound constitutional concerns.”); People in Interest of Lloyd–Pellman, 844 P.2d 1309, 1311(Colo.App.1992) (“Because of the curtailment of personal liberty which results from certification of mental illness, strict adherence to the procedural requirements of the civil commitment statutes is required.
Although the court did not hold the hearing until twelve days after Vivekanathan's request, we do not address whether this is an independent basis for reversal because Vivekanathan did not argue it as such and because we conclude this appeal is now moot. See Gilford v. People, 2 P.3d 120, 124 (Colo. 2000) ("Deviations from the statutory process governing civil commitment proceedings, however minor, are subject to exacting appellate review, for even the slightest departure from these codified procedures can raise profound constitutional concerns."); People in Interest of Lloyd-Pellman, 844 P.2d 1309, 1311 (Colo. App. 1992) ("Because of the curtailment of personal liberty which results from certification of mental illness, strict adherence to the procedural requirements of the civil commitment statutes is required."); cf. People in Interest of Lynch, 783 P.2d 848, 852 (Colo.
Even so, a party may waive a challenge to personal jurisdiction. Gilford v. People , 2 P.3d 120, 127 n.6 (Colo. 2000) ; Meggitt v. Stross , 2021 COA 50, ¶¶ 44-45, 488 P.3d 1220 ; see also C.R.C.P. 12(h)(1). And such a waiver may be implied.
Compare id. , with People v. Dash , 104 P.3d 286, 291 (Colo. Ct. App. 2004) (stating that " ‘no penal or punitive considerations underlie the state's interest’ in civil commitment, which is designed to address not criminal conduct, but instead the present and future mental health and well-being of the mentally ill individual") (quoting Gilford v. People , 2 P.3d 120, 125 (Colo. 2000) ) (cleaned up). As a result, the State did not violate Mr. Wimberly's right to equal protection by failing to start proceedings for civil commitment 24 years into his indeterminate term.
Specifically, instances of repeated hospitalization of a psychiatric patient have been considered capable of repetition yet evading review. Gilford v. People, 2 P.3d 120, 124 (Colo. 2000). A.J.J. has repeatedly been hospitalized for mental health treatment and subject to involuntary administration of medication, as addressed by prior decisions of this court in May and October 2015. Under these circumstances, we conclude that the January 6 Order is not moot. See People in Interest of King, 795 P.2d 273, 274 (Colo. App. 1990).
Colorado courts have long adhered to the common law principle that “the lawful jurisdiction of courts cannot be ousted by the private agreements of individuals.” In re Brown's Estate, 65 Colo. 341, 345–46, 176 P. 477, 479 (1918) ; see also Isham v. People, 82 Colo. 550, 567–68, 262 P. 89, 96 (1927) (“Jurisdiction of the subject-matter is conferred by the Constitution and laws of the state, not by the action of one or both parties.”), superseded on other grounds by statute, as recognized in Gilford v. People, 2 P.3d 120, 128–29 (Colo.2000). Section 80 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws also reflects this principle:
See State v. Gottschalk, 138 P.3d 1170, 1173(Alaska App. 2006) (Mannheimer, J., concurring) (citing Alaska R.Crim. P. 4).See Kotsonis v. Superior Motor Express, 539 F.Supp. 642, 646 (M.D.N.C. 1982) (stating that, in the context of transfer of venue, "[p]ersonal jurisdiction once obtained is not lost."); Gilford v. People, 2 P.3d 120, 130 (Colo. 2000) (en banc) (Hobbs, J., concurring) (explaining that "[a] court does not generally lose jurisdiction by the occurrence of a subsequent event, even if that event would have prevented acquiring jurisdiction in the first instance"); Boardman v. Boardman, 135 Conn. 124, 62 A.2d 521, 525 (1948) (regarding as settled law that "if a court of a state has jurisdiction when an action is brought to it, a subsequent removal of a party from the state will not terminate that jurisdiction"); People v. Goecke, 457 Mich. 442, 579 N.W.2d 868, 876 (1998) ("Having once vested in the circuit court, personal jurisdiction [over a criminal defendant] is not lost even when a void or improper information is filed.").