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holding that "the judicially created doctrine of res judicata can be invoked to give conclusive effect to a determination of parentage contained in a dissolution decree or a legitimation order * * *"
Summary of this case from Atchison v. AtchisonOpinion
No. 86-734
Decided August 19, 1987.
Paternity — Res judicata — Determination of parentage in dissolution decree or legitimation order given conclusive effect, when — Subsequent paternity action barred.
O.Jur 3d Family Law §§ 251, 259, 289.
The doctrine of res judicata can be invoked to give conclusive effect to a determination of parentage contained in a dissolution decree or a legitimation order, thereby barring a subsequent paternity action brought pursuant to R.C. Chapter 3111.
APPEAL from the Court of Appeals for Athens County.
On June 6, 1977, at a time when she was sixteen years old and living in her parents' home, appellant Tamara Dailey Gilbraith, n.k.a. Tamara Hixson, gave birth out of wedlock to a child named Michelle Dailey. Approximately one year later, on June 24, 1978, Tamara married the appellee, Michael Gilbraith, and the two of them thereafter began to live together, along with the child, as a family.
The marriage of Tamara and Michael Gilbraith came to an end on December 6, 1979, when a decree of dissolution was placed of record in the Domestic Relations Division of the Court of Common Pleas of Athens County. On the strength of explicit acknowledgements made by Michael, both in the dissolution petition and in an incorporated separation agreement, the decree contained a finding that Michelle Dailey was the natural-born daughter of the parties and required, inter alia, that Michael provide support for the child in the amount of $25 per week.
Michael separately acknowledged his status as the natural father of Michelle by filing, in the Probate Division of the Athens County Court of Common Pleas, a sworn application to establish legitimation pursuant to R.C. 2105.18. With the mother consenting to the relationship that the application sought to have recognized, an entry was journalized in the probate court, on the same day that the parties' marriage was judicially dissolved, ordering that Michelle "be the child of the Applicant as though born to him in natural wedlock." The order was specifically predicated upon the findings that Michael was the natural father of Michelle, and that the legitimation was in Michelle's best interest.
The series of events that has given rise to the present controversy began on March 9, 1984, when Tamara initiated contempt proceedings in the Athens County domestic relations court as a result of an alleged arrearage in the child-support payments owed by her former husband. In response to the contempt allegations, Michael moved, inter alia, for the elimination of the child-support provisions from the dissolution decree, asserting, in direct conflict with his prior acknowledgements, that he was not Michelle's natural father. The modification was requested pursuant to Civ. R. 60(B) and 75(I) on the theory that the decree and the accompanying separation agreement "were premised on a mistake" concerning the identity of the true father.
While the disputed matters of child support remained pending in the domestic relations court, Michael sought additional relief by filing in the Juvenile Division of the Court of Common Pleas of Athens County on May 9, 1984, an action seeking a judicial determination pursuant to R.C. Chapter 3111 that he was not Michelle's natural father. Two days before the complaint in juvenile court was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, Michael filed an identical action under R.C. Chapter 3111 in the General Division of the Athens County Court of Common Pleas. The action in the general division was dismissed on July 30, 1984, primarily on the separate ground that matters involving the paternity of Michelle and the responsibility for her support were res judicata. Approximately two weeks later, on August 16, 1984, a judge in the domestic relations court adopted a referee's recommendations, denied Michael's motion for a modification of the dissolution decree and withheld judgment on the contempt charge lodged against Michael pending a further hearing.
Michael filed separate appeals from the three judgments entered against him in the domestic relations court, the juvenile court and the general division of the court of common pleas. After the cases were consolidated for review, a three-judge panel in the Court of Appeals for Athens County unanimously relied on procedural grounds in dismissing the appeal from the judgment of the juvenile court and affirming the judgment separately entered in the domestic relations court. With respect to the remaining judgment before it, however, the court of appeals reversed, holding in a split decision that neither the legitimation order nor the dissolution decree barred Michael as a matter of law from questioning the paternity of Michelle in the subsequent action filed in the general division of the court of common pleas pursuant to R.C. Chapter 3111.
That part of the cause involving the reversal of the judgment entered in the general division of the court of common pleas is now before this court pursuant to the allowance of a motion to certify the record.
Lavelle Goldsberry Co., L.P.A., Frank A. Lavelle and Herman A. Carson, for appellee.
Gwinn Wallace and Susan L. Gwinn, for appellants.
It is well-settled in Ohio, under the doctrine of res judicata, that "[a] final judgment or decree rendered upon the merits, without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive of rights, questions and facts in issue as to the parties and their privies, and is a complete bar to any subsequent action on the same claim or cause of action between the parties or those in privity with them." Norwood v. McDonald (1943), 142 Ohio St. 299, 27 O.O. 240, 52 N.E.2d 67, paragraph one of the syllabus, approved and followed in Whitehead v. Gen. Tel. Co. (1969), 20 Ohio St.2d 108, 49 O.O. 2d 435, 254 N.E.2d 10, paragraph one of the syllabus, and quoted in Werlin Corp. v. Pub. Util. Comm. (1978), 53 Ohio St.2d 76, 81, 7 O.O. 3d 152, 154, 372 N.E.2d 592, 596. In this appeal, the fundamental question presented to us is whether the judicially created doctrine of res judicata can be invoked to give conclusive effect to a determination of parentage contained in a dissolution decree or a legitimation order, thereby barring a subsequent paternity action brought pursuant to Ohio's Parentage Act, R.C. Chapter 3111. We answer this question in the affirmative.
As it has come to be recognized in its modern form, res judicata also takes in the doctrine of collateral estoppel, which provides that "if an issue of fact or law actually is litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, such determination being essential to that judgment, the determination is conclusive in a subsequent action between the parties, whether on the same or a different claim." Hicks v. De La Cruz (1977), 52 Ohio St.2d 71, 74, 6 O.O. 3d 274, 276, 369 N.E.2d 776, 777.
The majority's decision in the court of appeals relied primarily on two grounds in support of its general legal conclusion that neither a dissolution decree nor a legitimation order can serve to foreclose further inquiry into the matter of paternity in proceedings initiated pursuant to the parentage provisions of R.C. Chapter 3111. Determining first that the essentially nonadversarial nature of dissolution and legitimation proceedings under Ohio law is a significant consideration that weighs against the application of the doctrine of res judicata, the majority went on to say that "clear mandates" appearing within two of the parentage statutes, R.C. 3111.03 and 3111.04, eliminate any doubt that the doctrine has no place in an R.C. Chapter 3111 parentage action. For the following reasons, we are not persuaded by either line of this rationale.
With respect to the effect to be given to the nonadversarial nature of the proceedings, we have said, in Horne v. Woolever (1959), 170 Ohio St. 178, 182, 10 O.O. 2d 114, 117, 163 N.E.2d 378, 382, that, as a general rule, a consent judgment operates as res judicata with the same force given to a judgment entered on the merits in a fully adversarial proceeding. See Vulcan, Inc. v. Fordees Corp. (C.A.6, 1981), 658 F.2d 1106 (strong public interest in achieving finality in litigation is advanced by giving res judicata effect to consent decrees). Implicit in the rule is the recognition that a judgment entered by consent, although predicated upon an agreement between the parties, is an adjudication as effective as if the merits had been litigated and remains, therefore, just as enforceable as any other validly entered judgment. Sponseller v. Sponseller (1924), 110 Ohio St. 395, 399, 144 N.E. 48, 50. See, also, Ohio State Medical Bd. v. Zwick (1978), 59 Ohio App.2d 133, 139-140, 13 O.O. 3d 178, 181-182, 392 N.E.2d 1276, 1280.
There is, in our view, no sound reason for departing from what has come to be accepted among a majority of state courts as the prevailing modern view on consent judgments and their operation. Annotation, Modern Views of State Courts as to Whether Consent Judgment is Entitled to Res Judicata or Collateral Estoppel Effect (1979), 91 A.L.R. 3d 1170. We find, therefore, that a dissolution decree or a legitimation order cannot, in law, be denied res judicata effect simply because it results from an agreement between parties in a nonadversarial proceeding.
This brings us to the question of whether the General Assembly has removed the doctrine of res judicata, in whole or in part, from the realm of parentage actions by virtue of any provision appearing in R.C. Chapter 3111. In this respect, our attention is drawn, in particular, to the statutes cited by the majority below in support of its holding.
Under R.C. 3111.04(A), an "action to determine the existence or nonexistence of the father and child relationship" may be commenced by any one of several specified individuals, including "* * * a man alleged * * * to be the child's father * * *." R.C. 3111.04(B) provides in general terms that "[a]n agreement does not bar an action under this section," and R.C. 3111.03 separately catalogues a series of presumptions that apply to the existence of the relationship drawn into question. Two of the circumstances giving rise to a presumption of paternity are recognized following a marriage between the alleged father and the child's mother: (1) when the alleged father makes a sworn acknowledgement of paternity before a notary public, or (2) when the alleged father either voluntarily agrees to support the child or is obligated to do so by court order. R.C. 3111.03(A)(3)(a) and (c). A presumption arising under these described circumstances is not, however, irrebuttable; it may be overcome, in accordance with R.C. 3113.03(B), by the presentation of clear and convincing evidence demonstrating the absence of a biological relationship.
In our judgment, none of the foregoing statutory provisions — and, for that matter, no other part of R.C. Chapter 3111 — clearly mandates, either expressly or by implication, the exclusion of the doctrine of res judicata from parentage actions. Although it is beyond cavil, with respect to R.C. 3111.04(B), that "an agreement" is explicitly removed as a barrier to the pursuit of an action, we are convinced that the statute is, in general, limited by its terms to those agreements ordinarily made outside the judicial process, and that it is not intended to apply when there is a final judicial resolution of rights and obligations on the basis of an underlying agreement between the parties to an action. This is just as true for a legitimation order as it is for a dissolution decree, both of which manifestly involve, by virtue of their roles in the judicial process, something more than an "agreement" as that term is used in R.C. 3111.04(B).
We reject the appellee's argument that legitimation proceedings initiated pursuant to R.C. 2105.18 can result in nothing more than a "finding [of fact]." Under the statute, if it is found that the applicant is the natural father of the child in question, "[t]hereafter, the child is the child of the applicant, as though born to him in lawful wedlock." This result, which was explicitly recognized in the legitimation order entered in this cause, is similar, in its binding legal effect, to that achieved by a declaratory judgment. Among other things, it preserves for the child all rights of inheritance enjoyed by legitimate children.
Our conclusion is no different with respect to the effect of the rebuttable statutory presumptions. R.C. 3111.03 (A)(3)(a) cannot be said to defeat the doctrine of res judicata because the written acknowledgements of paternity to which it refers are made before a notary public outside the judicial process, and thus fall distinctly short of final court orders in proceedings such as those for legitimation and dissolution. R.C. 3111.03(A)(3)(c) likewise fails as an effective deterrent to application of the doctrine, because to the extent that it reaches judicial action, the provision is limited explicitly to orders requiring only the payment of child support; it does not bring within its sweep those markedly different instances in which a determination of paternity is made as part of the comprehensive judicial resolution of rights and obligations attendant to the dissolution of a marriage under R.C. 3105.61 through 3105.65.
In the absence of any other statutory basis for the outright rejection of the doctrine, we are left to decide only whether there exists, on grounds of public policy, a persuasive reason for holding that res judicata should not apply in parentage actions. Our starting point here is the recognition that the doctrine itself has deep roots in the policy considerations that have shaped the operation of this country's legal system. As the United States Supreme Court has said, "* * * `[the] doctrine of res judicata is not a mere matter of practice or procedure inherited from a more technical time than ours. It is a rule of fundamental and substantial justice, "of public policy and of private peace," which should be cordially regarded and enforced by the courts * * *.'" Federated Dept. Stores, Inc. v. Moitie (1981), 452 U.S. 394, 401, quoting Hart Steel Co. v. RR. Supply Co. (1917), 244 U.S. 294, 299.
Simply put, the doctrine serves vital public interests by assuring that all litigation has a reasonable ending point and by preventing a party from having to contest the same issue or cause more than once. LaBarbera v. Batsch (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 106, 113, 39 O.O. 2d 103, 108, 227 N.E.2d 55, 62. "`[P]ublic policy dictates that there be an end of litigation; that those who have contested an issue shall be bound by the results of the contest, and that matters once tried shall be considered forever settled as between the parties.'" Federated Dept. Stores, supra, at 401, quoting Baldwin v. Traveling Men's Assn. (1931), 283 U.S. 522, 525. In achieving precisely these ends, the doctrine effectively promotes stability, certainty, respect, consistency and finality, both in individual judicial determinations and in the legal system as a whole.
In our estimation, the same considerations underpinning res judicata as a doctrine of general significance apply with equal force in parentage actions, and there is, accordingly, no sound policy reason for denying effect to the doctrine in such cases. The establishment and maintenance of the various aspects of the relationship between parent and child is a particularly intricate, sensitive and emotional process with which courts should be reluctant to interfere. In those cases where, by force of events, judicial intervention occurs, where the matter of parentage is determined with finality and in the absence of fraud, and where that determination is not later vacated, either on direct appeal or pursuant to a recognized legal remedy such as that set forth in Civ. R. 60(B), the policy of this state requires, in sum, that the parent-child relationship be shielded from the unsettling effects of further judicial inquiry, and that relitigation of parentage be barred, as a general rule, in any subsequent actions, including those initiated under R.C. Chapter 3111.
Having determined that there is no impediment in law to the application of the doctrine of res judicata in a parentage action, even when the bar is asserted on the basis of a consent judgment such as a legitimation order or a dissolution decree, we turn now to an examination of whether the doctrine was erroneously applied in the context of the particular facts and circumstances of the instant case. With respect to this final stage in our analysis, we are not persuaded by any of the three reasons advanced by the appellee in support of the exclusion of the doctrine. In our view, (1) the determinations of parentage were essential parts of the prior legitimation and dissolution proceedings; (2) that part of the doctrine generally requiring strict mutuality of parties was properly relaxed in the interest of justice, both because there was a substantial identity of parties and because the doctrine was invoked solely against a party who had been afforded a full and fair opportunity to contest the issue of paternity in the prior proceedings, see Goodson v. McDonough Power Equip. Co. (1983), 2 Ohio St.3d 193, 2 OBR 732, 443 N.E.2d 978; Hicks v. De La Cruz (1977), 52 Ohio St.2d 71, 6 O.O. 3d 274, 369 N.E.2d 776 (recognizing that, in some cases a party barred from relitigating an issue against a named opponent is similarly precluded in a subsequent action involving another person); and (3) the matter of fraud in obtaining the legitimation order and the dissolution decree was not properly raised in the trial court and was, therefore, not preserved for appellate review.
For all the foregoing reasons, we must conclude that the court of appeals erred when it reversed the common pleas court's determination on the ground of res judicata. Accordingly, the judgment of the court of appeals is hereby reversed.
Judgment reversed.
MOYER, C.J., SWEENEY, COOK, WRIGHT and H. BROWN, JJ., concur.
DOUGLAS, J., concurs in judgment only.
COOK, J., of the Eleventh Appellate District, sitting for LOCHER, J.
SHANNON, J., of the First Appellate District, sitting for HOLMES, J.