Opinion
Civil Action 2:22-cv-0604
01-12-2023
JAMES GILBERT, SR., Plaintiff, v. JAMES RAYMER, CONNOR BATTIN, Defendants.
William S. Stickman, IV United States District Judge
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS (ECF No. 17)
Cynthia Reed Eddy United States Magistrate Judge
I. Recommendation
Before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendants James Raymer and Connor Battin. (ECF No. 17). For reasons that follow, it is respectfully recommended that the motion be granted and the Complaint be dismissed with prejudice.
The matter has been referred to the undersigned United States Magistrate Judge for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) and Fed.R.Civ.P. 72(b).
II. Report
A. Procedural and Factual Background
This case was initiated on April 22, 2022, when the Clerk of Court received from Plaintiff, James Gilbert, Sr., a Complaint for Violation of Civil Rights (Prisoner). The Complaint was lodged that day as it was not accompanied by either a motion for leave to proceed in forma pauperis (“IFP motion”) or the filing fee. On May 4, 2022, Gilbert submitted an IFP motion (ECF No. 5), which the undersigned granted that day and the Complaint was officially 1 filed. (ECF Nos. 6 and 7). The Complaint is far from a model of clarity. It names two defendants: James Raymer, identified as head of pretrial services, and Connor Battin, misidentified as “defense attorney.” The facts supporting Gilbert's claims are sparce:
As correctly noted by Defendants, Connor Battin is not a “criminal defense attorney, but rather is the Beaver County Assistant District Attorney who prosecuted Gilbert. See https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/criminal dockets at CP-04-CR-1089-2021; CP-04-CR-1090-2021; and CP-04-CR-1999-2021. The public dockets reflect that during each of these prosecutions, Gilbert was represented by the Office of the Public Defender of Beaver County. Gilbert also refers to Defendant Battin as “DA Connor Battlin” in his response to the motion to dismiss.
D. What are the facts underlying your claim(s)? (For example: What happened to you? Who did what? Was anyone else involved? Who else saw what happened?)
[Redacted]
Complaint, at ¶ IV (ECF No. 8). As relief, Gilbert is seeking for the Court to “fix this and 100K for loss of time.” Id. at ¶ VI.
The Complaint reflects that Gilbert has been convicted and sentenced, which is confirmed by the public dockets in Gilbert's three criminal cases.
After being served, Defendants filed the instant motion. (ECF No. 18). Gilbert was ordered to respond to the motion by September 9, 2022. (ECF No. 19). When Gilbert had not responded by September 22, 2022, the Court sua sponte granted Gilbert an extension to October 14, 2022 to respond. (ECF No. 23). On October 7, 2022, the Clerk's Office received a 3-page document from Gilbert without a case caption or title. The first page of the document is dated September 27, 2022, and addressed to “Magistrate Judge Cynthia Reed Eddy;” the second page is dated September 6, 2022, is addressed to “Mrs. Judy Ensler, Clerk of Court,” and references 2 case no. “1999-2021;” and the third page is undated, is addressed to “Honorable President Judge Richard Mancini,” and also references case no. “1999-2021.” (ECF No. 25). The Clerk's Office filed the document as Remark: Correspondence to Court (“Correspondence”). Gilbert sheds a bit more light on his claims in this Correspondence and specifically states,
I James E. Gilbert Sr wish to go forward with my case as my Civil Rights as a Beaver Co Jail inmate has and is being violated by force with this Plea deal. and even not even getting what the plea deal was supposedly to be. I have Just a few papers of letters and just dockets where I filed and nothing has been done. I have repeatedly tried to resolve this matter for what it was worth but to end up with the same ol same ol. It corrupt within the Beaver Court system and it needs fix. The manipulate sentences and who they want to give what I just want what it civilly due. in my case. Sentencing is not what was offer by D.A. Conner Battlin.1 yr min 4 yr 29 day [unintelligible]. Cases ran concurrent not consecutive and credit for all time served in which James Raymer @ the Beaver County Jail the Population Control Officer is not Honoring and is violating my civil rights so with this I want to go forward with the case.Correspondence (quoted verbatim) (ECF No. 25 at p. 1). It appears to the Court that this Correspondence was intended by Gilbert to constitute his response to the motion to dismiss. Accordingly, the undersigned will treat the Correspondence as Gilbert's response to the motion to dismiss.
The Court may take judicial notice of Gilbert's publicly available criminal dockets..
This case centers around three criminal cases filed against Gilbert in the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County: Case Nos. 089-2021; 1090-2021; and 1999-2021. On February 22, 2022, Gilbert entered guilty pleas in each of the three cases. In each of these prosecutions, the Commonwealth was represented by ADA Connor Battin and Gilbert was 3 represented by Nathan Louis Bible, Assistant Public Defender. The following is a brief description of the charges and disposition of the cases as reflected on the state court dockets:
In 1089-2021, Gilbert was charged with one count of Harassment-Comm. Lewd, Threatening, Etc. Language in violation of 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 2709(A)(4). On February 22, 2022, he pled guilty and was sentenced to a one year term of probation, to be served concurrently with the sentence imposed at CP-04-CR-1090-2021.
In 1090-2021, Gilbert was charged with one count of Simple Assault in violation of 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 2709(A)(3). On February 22, 2022, he pled guilty and was sentenced to two to twelve months confinement, to be served concurrently with the sentence imposed at CP-04-CR-1999-2021.
In 1999-2021, Gilbert was charged with one count of Criminal Trespass - Break Into Structure, in violation of 18 Pa. C.S.A. § 3503(A)(11). On February 22, 2022, he pled guilty and was sentenced to one year to four years, 11 months, 29 days.
According to the dockets in each of these criminal cases, since the entry of his guilty plea and sentencing, Gilbert has filed a Petition to Withdraw his plea on February 23, 2022; March 1, 2022, and April 13, 2022; a Petition for RRI and Work Release on April 24, 2022; and a Writ of Mandamus on June 1, 2022. As of the date of this Report, the matters remain pending before the Court of Common Pleas.
See https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/Report/CpDocketSheet?docketNumber=CP-04-CR-0001089-2021; https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/Report/CpDocketSheet?docketNumber=CP-04-CR-0001090-2021; and https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/Report/CpDocketSheet?docketNumber=CP-04-CR-0001999-2021. (sites last viewed 1/12/2023).
C. Standard of Review
A motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of the complaint. Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 183 (3d Cir. 1993). The Supreme Court of the United States has issued two decisions that pertain to the standard of review for failure to state a 4 claim upon which relief could be granted. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, the Supreme Court held that a complaint must include factual allegations that “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “[W]ithout some factual allegation in the complaint, a claimant cannot satisfy the requirement that he or she provide not only ‘fair notice' but also the ‘grounds' on which the claim rests.” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 232 (3d Cir. 2008). In determining whether a plaintiff has met this standard, a court must reject legal conclusions unsupported by factual allegations, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements;” “labels and conclusions;” and “ ‘naked assertion[s]' devoid of ‘further factual enhancement.'” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citations omitted). Although this Court must accept the allegations in the Complaint as true, it is “not compelled to accept unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences, or a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.” Baroka v. McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007) (citations omitted).
With this standard in mind, the undersigned now turns to the pending motion to dismiss.
C. Discussion
Defendants have put forth three arguments in favor of their Motion to Dismiss: (1) this Court lacks jurisdiction to adjudicate Gilbert's claims under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine; (2) any claims for monetary damages are barred by Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994); and (3) any claims against ADA Battin are barred by the doctrine of absolute prosecutorial immunity. The Court addresses each of these arguments in turn. 5
A. Subject Matter Jurisdiction
“[A] federal court always has jurisdiction to determine its own jurisdiction.” Vuyanich v. Smithton Borough, 5 F.4th 379, 384 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Ruiz, 536 U.S. 622, 628, (2002)).
Defendants first argue that this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to hear Gilbert's claims under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
The doctrine is derived from two decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States: Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 (1923), and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 (1983).
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine operates to prevent federal district courts from exercising jurisdiction “in certain circumstances[ ] where a federal suit follows a state suit.” Vuyanich v. Smithton Borough, 5 F.4th 379, 384 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Great W. Mining & Min. Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615 F.3d 159, 163-64 (3d Cir. 2010)). The doctrine stems from 28 U.S.C. § 1257, which “vests authority to review a state court's judgment solely in the United States Supreme Court.” Id. (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 292 (2005) (internal marks omitted)).
Habeas corpus petitions are an exception to the jurisdictional bar of Rooker-Feldman. See Walker v. Horn, 385 F.3d 321, 329 n.22 (3d Cir. 2004) (citations omitted).
Courts within the Third Circuit apply a four-factor test to determine whether the Rooker-Feldman doctrine has been triggered: “ ‘(1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff ‘complains of injuries caused by the state-court judgments'; (3) those judgments were rendered before the federal suit was filed; and (4) the plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and reject the state judgments.' ” Vuyanich, 5 F.4th at 385 (quoting Great Western, 615 F.3d at 166) (quoting Exxon Mobil, 544 U.S. at 284)). Our appellate court has instructed that, 6
[A] claim is barred by Rooker-Feldman under two circumstances; first, if the federal claim was actually litigated in state court prior to the filing of the federal action or, second, if the federal claim is inextricably intertwined with the state adjudication, meaning that federal relief can only be predicated upon a conviction that the state court was wrong. In either case, Rooker-Feldman bars a litigant's federal claims and divests the District Court of subject matter jurisdiction over those claims.
In re Knapper, 407 F.3d 573, 581 (3d Cir. 2005). In the instant case, Defendants contend that Gilbert's claims are barred by Rooker-Feldman because his federal claims are “inextricably intertwined” with his underlying criminal prosecution. A federal claim is inextricably intertwined with an issue adjudicated by state court when:
(1) the federal court must determine that the state court judgment was erroneously entered in order to grant the requested relief, or (2) the federal court must take an action that would negate the state court's judgment . . . . In other words, Rooker-Feldman does not allow a plaintiff to seek relief that, if granted, would present a state court from enforcing its orders.Walker v. Horn, 383 F.3d 321, 330 (3d Cir. 2004) (citations, internal quotations, and ellipses omitted). See also Port Auth. Police Benevolent Assoc., Inc. v. Port Authority of New York, 973 F.2d 169, 177 (3d Cir. 1992) (holding that Rooker-Feldman deprives federal courts of jurisdiction where the issue before the federal court is “inextricably intertwined with the state court's [decision] in a judicial proceeding”) (citing District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 483 n.16 (1983)).
Here, it is difficult to determine from reading Gilbert's complaint and his response to the motion to dismiss exactly what Gilbert is alleging. It is clear however, both from the documents he has submitted to this Court and from the state court dockets, that Gilbert is challenging his plea agreement arguing that he was “forced” into entering the plea agreement and that he is “not even getting what the plea deal was supposedly to be.” It is also clear that he has filed numerous 7 pro se motions in state court in an attempt to withdraw his plea agreement and to challenge the credit he has received for time served. He appears now to be turning to federal court because “nothing has been done” on his state court motions. Resp. at p. 1. (ECF No. 25).
The injury Gilbert has alleged, “being forced into this Plea deal,” clearly stems from his underlying conviction and sentencing. As Defendants point out, Gilbert is “essentially inviting the Court to second-guess the state court's adjudication of guilt.” Br. at p. 2. Such relief would “effectively nullify” the state court judgment, which was based upon the validity of the plea agreement. Thus, voiding Gilbert's sentence because of the plea agreement's alleged invalidity would effectively reverse the state court judgment. See Market v. City of Garden City, Kan., 723 Fed.Appx. 571, 575 (10th Cir. 2017) (holding that a § 1983 plaintiff's challenge of a portion of her already served state-court sentence was a “cleverly framed” attempt to reverse a state-court judgment and thus “avoid the Rooker-Feldman bar”).
For these reasons, it is recommended that Defendants' motion be granted as Gilbert's claims are barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.
The dismissal of this lawsuit will not leave Gilbert without a remedy. He has filed pro se motions to withdraw his plea agreement with the state court, which are pending as of the date of this report. See https://ujsportal.pacourts.us/Report/CpDocketSheet?docketNumber=CP-04-CR-0001999-2021 (site last viewed 1/12/2023).
B. Alternative Grounds for Dismissal
1. Claims for Monetary Damages are Barred by Heck v. Humphrey
In the alternative, and assuming this Court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear Gilbert's claims, to the extent that Gilbert may be seeking monetary damages, those claims are barred by the holding of the Supreme Court of the United States in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck, the Supreme Court held that: 8
to recover damages [or other relief] for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus[.]Heck, 512 U.S. at 486-87 (footnote and internal citation omitted). In his complaint, Gilbert acknowledges that he has not had a favorable termination of his conviction as the conviction has not been invalidated or reversed. Thus, to the extent that he is alleging that his plea agreement was unconstitutional or that he “should of been out of jail bye now,” Resp. at p. 1 (ECF No. 25), his claims for monetary damages are barred by Heck v. Humphrey. Amendment would be futile.
2. Claims Against ADA Battin are Barred by Absolute Immunity
As a prosecutor, ADA Battin enjoys absolute immunity for conduct “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Fogle v. Sokol, 957 F.3d 148, 164 (3d Cir. 2020) (quoting Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976)). To the extent Gilbert is alleging that ADA Battin somehow violated his rights during the plea-bargaining process, this conduct is protected by absolute immunity. See Moretti v. Seilhammer, No. 2: 07-cv-600, 2008 WL 282469, at *1 (W.D.Pa. Jan. 31, 2008) (explaining that absolute immunity extends to “decisions as to whether and under what conditions a case should be disposed of by plea bargain”). Amendment would be futile.
III. Conclusion
For all the above reasons, it is respectfully recommended that the motion to dismiss be granted with prejudice and leave to amend be denied as futile.
Any party is permitted to file Objections to this Report and Recommendation to the assigned United States District Judge. In accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b), Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(d) 9 and 72(b)(2), and LCvR 72.D.2, Plaintiff, because he is a non-electronically registered party, may file written objections, if any, to this Report and Recommendation by February 1, 2023, and Defendants, because they are electronically registered parties, may file written objections, if any, by January 27, 2023. The parties are cautioned that failure to file Objections within this timeframe “will waive the right to appeal.” Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011) (quoting Siers v. Morrash, 700 F.2d 113, 116 (3d Cir. 1983). See also EEOC v. City of Long Branch, 866 F.3d 93, 100 (3d Cir. 2017) (describing standard of appellate review when no timely and specific objections are filed as limited to review for plain error). 10