The Arkansas Supreme Court, relying on Faretta, held a criminal appellant pursuing a first appeal as a matter of right may avail himself or herself of the right to self-representation upon a voluntary and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel. ( State v. Van Pelt (1991) 305 Ark. 125 [ 810 S.W.2d 27, 28]; Gidron v. State (1993) 312 Ark. 517 [ 850 S.W.2d 331, 332].) The Pennsylvania Supreme Court, citing Faretta and Pennsylvania authority, stated: "It is well settled that a criminal defendant or appellant has the right to proceed pro se at trial and through appellate proceedings.
An appellant is not permitted to supplement a brief filed by counsel unless he clearly shows that counsel's brief is lacking. Gidron v. State, 312 Ark. 517, 850 S.W.2d 331 (1993) (per curiam) (citing Wade v. State, 288 Ark. 94, 702 S.W.2d 28 (1986) (per curiam)). Accordingly, we deny the motion.
As Newman is represented by counsel, he is not entitled to pursue his own motions for relief and also rely on counsel to represent him. Hamilton v. State, 348 Ark. 532, 74 S.W.3d 615 (2002). The only exception to this rule is where an appellant can demonstrate that counsel's arguments are deficient. Gidron v. State, 312 Ark. 517, 850 S.W.2d 331 (1993) (per curiam). Newman has failed to make such a showing here.
Parkerson apparently was not able to obtain another lawyer in the three-month period between the trial court's grant of continuance and the time in which she was to respond to the renewed summary-judgment motion. Nevertheless, I agree that a pro se litigant can receive no special consideration on appeal, see, e.g., Gidron v. State, 312 Ark. 517, 850 S.W.2d 331 (1993), and that this case must be affirmed.