Patricia Burns reported that plaintiff had achieved her goal of reduction or relief of neck pain by January 11, 1980. Dr. Claybourn released plaintiff from observation in July of 1980, and in a letter written later that year stated that she had recovered. (Compare Giddings v. Wyman (1961), 32 Ill. App.2d 220, 223, 177 N.E.2d 641.) Plaintiff sought no medical treatment for injuries relating to this case between July of 1980 and May of 1981. The last time she saw a doctor in connection with such injuries was June of 1981.
The assessment of a monetary award for personal injuries is a factual problem to be decided by a jury; such a decision can be disturbed only when a verdict is grossly and wholly inadequate. Browder v. Beckman (1934), 275 Ill. App. 193; Giddings v. Wyman (1961), 32 Ill. App.2d 220, 177 N.E.2d 641; Davis v. Yellow Cab Co. (1971), 133 Ill. App.2d 190, 273 N.E.2d 35. In this case, the plaintiff's damage claims rest entirely upon a subjective analysis: his characterization of the physical injuries suffered, his depiction of the medical treatment undergone, his explanations of the difficulty encountered at work and in leisure-time, his description of lost wages and their cause.
The court stated the jury "`may well have believed that plaintiffs' injuries . . . [were] most minimal, to the point of being incapable of evaluation, and that plaintiffs would be fairly compensated if they only received their specials.'" ( Id. at p. 559, quoting Giddings v. Wyman (1961) 32 Ill.App.2d 220, 223-224 [ 177 N.E.2d 641].) The court observed: "The evidence would here amply support a finding that plaintiff received no injury whatever. . . . Faced by this conflict in testimony and with evidence that there was negligence on the part of the defendant, it seems entirely probable that the jury felt that although plaintiff was entitled to no more than nominal damages, the kindest disposition of the case was to award to her an amount at least equivalent to her medical bills."
That judgment was affirmed, there being no evidence of passion or prejudice on the part of the jury. See also Giddings v. Wyman, 32 Ill. App.2d 220, 177 N.E.2d 641, where the facts of the collision, the injuries sustained and the verdict awarded were quite similar to this case and judgment was sustained upon appeal. Plaintiff cites Freeman v. Chicago Transit Authority, 50 Ill. App.2d 125, 200 N.E.2d 128, but that opinion expressly points out that a new trial was awarded not because the verdict was in an inadequate amount, but because the jury finding upon a special interrogatory was inconsistent with the general verdict. Plaintiff further urges that the amount of the verdict demonstrates that the jury failed to consider the proper elements of the damages suffered by the plaintiff, pointing out that the verdict seemed inadequate as to the factors of pain and suffering testified to by the plaintiff, and to the fact that she was deprived of the pursuit of her hobbies.
The attention of this court has not been called to any California decision in which the verdict was in the same amount as the medical expenses. In Giddings v. Wyman ( 32 Ill. App.2d 220 [ 177 N.E.2d 641]), a verdict was rendered in the exact amount of the claimed medical expenses, the exact situation here involved. There was a conflict in the evidence as to the extent of the injuries and as to whether the medical expenses were the proximate result of the collision complained of.
" To the same effect, it was held in Giddings v. Wyman, 32 Ill. App.2d 220, 177 N.E.2d 641, 643 (1961), also involving a jury verdict for the amount of the medical bills, but nothing for alleged pain and suffering: "This jury may well have believed that plaintiffs' injuries here was most minimal, to the point of being incapable of evaluation, and that plaintiffs would be fairly compensated if they only received their specials.
For example, in Miller, the Court of Appeal found that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a motion for a new trial where the jury "'may well have believed that plaintiffs' injuries . . . [were] most minimal, to the point of being incapable of evaluation, and that plaintiffs would be fairly compensated if they only received their [special damages].'" (Miller, supra, 212 Cal.App.2d at p. 559, quoting Giddings v. Wyman (1961) 32 Ill.App.2d 220, 223-224.) In such situations, "it seems entirely probable that the jury [would feel] that although [a] plaintiff was entitled to no more than nominal damages, the kindest disposition of the case [would be] to award to [the plaintiff] an amount at least equivalent to [the plaintiff's] medical bills."
Depending upon their determinations about credibility and their ordinary experiences in life, jurors must decide whether the plaintiff's complaints are exaggerated or genuine, whether certain treatment was unnecessary or justified, or whether various charges were unreasonable or reasonable. See Giddings v. Wyman, 32 Ill. App. 2d 220, 223-24, 177 N.E.2d 641, 643 (1961). Credibility issues and circumstances surrounding the incident or the treatment may give rise to varying inferences.
A similar inconsistency appears in Williams v. McCallister (1978), 60 Ill. App.3d 635, 376 N.E.2d 1093, where the plaintiff in an automobile `whiplash' case was awarded only the expenses for her medical treatment, which included injections for pain and physical therapy, and received nothing for pain and suffering. (See also Ford v. Baker (1978), 61 Ill. App.3d 45, 377 N.E.2d 853; Bledsoe v. Amiel (1978), 57 Ill. App.3d 54, 372 N.E.2d 1033; Giddings v. Wyman (1961), 32 Ill. App.2d 220, 177 N.E.2d 641.) There, however, the question of the verdict's inconsistency was never addressed by the court.
he verdict is so low as to appear to be a compromise on the issues of liability and damages ( Gainer v. Bates (1st Dist. 1973), 14 Ill. App.3d 297, 302 N.E.2d 463); if it is obvious that the jury overlooked or disregarded elements of damages ( Davis v. Yellow Cab Co. (1st Dist. 1971), 133 Ill. App.2d 190, 273 N.E.2d 35); if there was an improper admission or exclusion of evidence ( Zielinski v. Goldblatt Bros. (1st Dist. 1969), 110 Ill. App.2d 248, 250, 249 N.E.2d 245); if the jury was improperly instructed ( Zielinski v. Goldblatt Bros.); or, if it could be said that the verdict was rendered as a result of passion or prejudice ( Romine v. Scott). Where, as here, the plaintiff makes no such contention, and we find nothing in the record, this court must exercise extreme caution in overturning the jury's determination. Then, only where the verdict is grossly and wholly inadequate, will a new trial be granted. Bledsoe v. Amiel (1st Dist. 1978), 57 Ill. App.3d 54, 55-56, 372 N.E.2d 1033; Giddings v. Wyman (4th Dist. 1961), 32 Ill. App.2d 220, 222-23, 177 N.E.2d 641. • 6 The evidence indicates that in Dr. Speigel's opinion, the trauma from the 1971 accident caused plaintiff's injury. But he stated that his opinion was based upon the fact that plaintiff did not complain of reading problems after the 1969 accident.