Giddens v. Cannon

4 Citing cases

  1. Mitchell v. State

    227 So. 2d 728 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969)   Cited 8 times

    Thus, while the high Court held it was permissible to take blood involuntarily from the body of a person upon the supposed constitutional distinction between the forcible extraction of blood and the forcible extraction of spoken or written words, yet the all-important fact remains, crucial to our holding here, that when the blood was so taken Schmerber was actually under arrest and in actual legal custody of the police upon a valid criminal charge. And while the writer personally disagrees thoroughly with the high Court's distinction between "testimonial evidence" and "physical evidence" in applying the constitutional guaranties against compulsorily extracted evidence, as heretofore expressed in Giddens v. Cannon, Fla.App. 1967, 193 So.2d 453, yet we of this 2nd District Court are all agreed that blood forcibly taken by the police from a "free" man, who is not under arrest nor in police custody upon any criminal charge, cannot be later used to convict him of a criminal offense under the constitutional guaranties. The ominously frightening consequences of a contrary doctrine are obvious.

  2. State v. Mitchell

    245 So. 2d 618 (Fla. 1971)   Cited 52 times
    Recognizing Schmerber as the law of the land

    384 U.S. 757, 86 S.Ct. 1826, 16 L.Ed.2d 908 (1966). 193 So.2d 453 (Fla.App.2d 1967). The decision of the District Court creates clear and unavoidable conflict with the decision of this Court in Wilson v. State, supra, wherein we held:

  3. State v. Coffey

    212 So. 2d 632 (Fla. 1968)   Cited 39 times
    Concluding accident report privilege only applied to statements from those required to make an accident report and results from a blood alcohol test were admissible because defendant's right against self-incrimination was not protected under the accident report privilege when defendant knew he was being criminally investigated and he consented to the test

    "`Evidence resulting from a medical examination of accused for the purposes of the prosecution rather than for treatment, after an accusation has been made against him, is admissible where, in the absence of any compulsion, accused submits or consents to the examination.'" Accord: State v. Wardlaw, Fla.App. 1958, 107 So.2d 179; Giddens v. Cannon, Fla. App. 1967, 193 So.2d 453, writ disch. May 22, 1968, Fla., 210 So.2d 714.

  4. Cannon v. Giddens

    210 So. 2d 714 (Fla. 1968)   Cited 1 times

    Petition for writ of certiorari in this cause has been granted on the ground of alleged conflict with the decision in Cooper v. State, Fla.App. 1966, 183 So.2d 269, holding that a blood alcohol test made at the request of an investigating officer is inadmissible in evidence when it can be considered "a part of the investigation for the purpose of completing the report" which is privileged under F.S. Sec. 317.171, F.S.A. The opinion of the district court in the present case, 193 So.2d 453, states the facts upon which verdict and judgment for plaintiff (petitioner) was rendered in a negligence action arising out of an automobile accident. The appellate court reversed because of error in exclusion of results of a blood alcohol test on constitutional grounds, but the opinion made no express disposition of the alternative ground upon which the evidence was excluded, stated by the trial court as follows: