Id. Gibson then filed another petition for post-conviction relief. The trial court held a hearing on the petition and, on May 11, 1990, denied relief on the ground that the issues "could have been but were not raised at trial and were such which could have been but were not raised on appeal." The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed. Gibson v. State, 580 So.2d 38 (Ala. Crim. App. 1990). Gibson's petition for certiorari to the Alabama Supreme Court was initially granted but later quashed.
We agree. We have often stated that Brady claims are subject to the procedural bars of Rule 32.2(a)(3) and 32.2(a)(5), Ala.R.Crim.P. See Williams v. State, 782 So.2d 811 (Ala.Crim.App. 2000), cert. denied, 782 So.2d 842 (Ala. 2000); Holladay v. State, 629 So.2d 673 (Ala.Crim.App. 1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 1171, 114 S.Ct. 1208, 127 L.Ed.2d 555 (1994); and Gibson v. State, 580 So.2d 38 (Ala.Crim.App. 1990). DeBruce does not argue that these claims were based on newly discovered evidence.
The appellant's argument must fail because the State did not fail to disclose this information. Ex parte Cammon, 578 So.2d 1089 (Ala. 1991); Gibson v. State, 580 So.2d 38 (Ala.Cr.App. 1990). Nettles v. State, 601 So.2d 132 (Ala.Crim.App. 1992).
Indeed, this court has specifically applied the procedural bars of Rule 20 (now Rule 32) to appeals from collateral attacks on convictions in death penalty cases. Duren v. State, 590 So.2d 360 (Ala.Cr.App. 1990), [aff'd] 590 So.2d 369 (Ala. 1991), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 1594, 118 L.Ed.2d 310 (1992); Gibson v. State, 580 So.2d 38 (Ala.Cr.App. 1990)." Thompson v. State, supra, 615 So.2d at 131.
Floyd v. State, 571 So.2d 1221, 1233 (Ala.Cr.App. 1989), reversed on other grounds, 571 So.2d 1234 (Ala. 1990) (this court held that, although the trial court found an issue precluded on the incorrect basis that it was contained in a successive petition, the issue was properly precluded because it was not raised at trial or on direct appeal). Cf. Gibson v. State, 580 So.2d 38 (Ala.Cr.App. 1990) (wherein the appellant's claim pursuant to Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 10 L.Ed.2d 215 (1963), raised in both petitioners' Rule 20 petitions was procedurally barred where the issue could have been, but was not, raised at trial or on direct appeal, because the defendants filed their petitions with the trial court before oral argument on direct appeal and before the filing of reply briefs.)
Indeed, this court has specifically applied the procedural bars of Rule 20 (now Rule 32) to appeals from collateral attacks on convictions in death penalty cases. Duren v. State, 590 So.2d 360 (Ala.Cr.App. 1990), 590 So.2d 369 (Ala. 1991), cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 112 S.Ct. 1594, 118 L.Ed.2d 310 (1992); Gibson v. State, 580 So.2d 38 (Ala.Cr.App. 1990).
Because the record is clear that the appellant was furnished the tape before trial, the appellant's Brady argument must fail, as there was no failure to disclose. Ex parte Cammon, 578 So.2d 1089 (Ala. 1991); Gibson v. State, 580 So.2d 38 (Ala.Cr.App. 1990). In addition to the alleged Brady violation, the appellant argues that his conviction should be reversed because, he says, it was based on perjured testimony.
Therefore, this issue is precluded. Rule 20.2(a)(2), (4), A.R.Cr.P.Temp.; Gibson v. State, 580 So.2d 38, 41 (Ala.Cr.App. 1990). Furthermore, the fact that this murder was unskillfully and haphazardly conceived does not exclude the fact that it was premeditated and deliberate.