Gibson v. Shaver

14 Citing cases

  1. In re Marriage of Alvarado

    NO. 14-19-00250-CV (Tex. App. May. 13, 2021)

    A trial court is not authorized to render judgment against a party before the party has had the opportunity to offer evidence on his or her behalf and has rested. See, e.g., Stearns v. Martens, 476 S.W.3d 541, 546 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (directed verdict); In re Estate of Luthen, No. 13-12-00638-CV, 2014 WL 4795038, at *9 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi Sept. 25, 2014, no pet.) (mem. op.); Wedgeworth v. Kirskey, 985 S.W.2d 115, 116 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1998, pet. denied) ("[Directing a verdict] is reversible error if done before the plaintiff has presented all his evidence."); Nassar v. Hughes, 882 S.W.2d 36, 38 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1994, writ denied) (directed verdict); Jordan, 653 S.W.2d at 358; Tobola v. State, 538 S.W.2d 868, 870 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, no writ); Gibson v. Shaver, 434 S.W.2d 462, 464 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1968, no writ). The rendition of a judgment before the parties rested and closed evidence on the property division issues appears inadvertent, but we agree with Martha that she is entitled to complete the contested evidentiary trial on the property issues.

  2. Khraish v. Hamed

    762 S.W.2d 906 (Tex. App. 1989)   Cited 12 times
    Holding that lis pendens filed against property that was not subject of loan agreement at issue in suit was improper

    Therefore, temporary injunctions cannot be issued except after notice to the opposing party and the taking of evidence from both parties. Gibson v. Shaver, 434 S.W.2d 462 (Tex.Civ.App. — Tyler 1968, no writ); TEX.R.CIV.P. 681. Further, the applicant must show a probable right and probable injury, and he must give bond.

  3. In re Estate of Luthen

    NUMBER 13-12-00638-CV (Tex. App. Sep. 25, 2014)   Cited 2 times

    A trial court is not authorized to render a judgment against a party to a lawsuit before that party has had the opportunity to present evidence on disputed issues of fact. Turcotte, 499 S.W.2d at 723; see Jordan v. Jordan, 653 S.W.2d 356, 358 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1983, no writ); Gibson v. Shaver, 434 S.W.2d 462, 464 (Tex. Civ. App.—Tyler 1968, no writ); Oertel v. Gulf States Abrasive Mfg., Inc., 429 S.W.2d 623, 624 (Tex. Civ. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1968, no writ). However, a party's right to due process "does not mean that a case may never be disposed of before a trial."

  4. Elliott v. Lewis

    792 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. App. 1990)   Cited 14 times
    Holding that the trial court abused its discretion by arbitrarily terminating the temporary-injunction hearing during the cross-examination of the first witness without giving the other party a reasonable opportunity to be heard

    The court held that a trial court is not authorized to enter a temporary injunction order against a party before that party has had an opportunity to present its defenses and has rested its case. City of Austin, 528 S.W.2d at 640; see also Gibson v. Shaver, 434 S.W.2d 462, 464 (Tex.Civ.App. — Tyler 1968, no writ). We therefore sustain the eleventh point of error.

  5. Kramer Trading v. Lyons

    740 S.W.2d 522 (Tex. App. 1987)   Cited 5 times
    Holding that the trial court abused its discretion by granting a temporary injunction where the trial court terminated the hearing before the appellee had rested his case and the appellant had presented its defense

    No temporary injunction can be issued without notice to the adverse party and an opportunity to be heard. City of Austin v. Texas Public Employees Ass'n, 528 S.W.2d 637, 640 (Tex.Civ.App. — Austin 1975, no writ); Gibson v. Shaver, 434 S.W.2d 462, 464 (Tex.Civ.App. — Tyler 1968, no writ). The trial court is not authorized to enter an order of temporary injunction against a party before that party has had an opportunity to present its defenses and has rested its case.

  6. Loomis Intern v. Rathburn

    698 S.W.2d 465 (Tex. App. 1985)   Cited 7 times
    Noting "there is no right to a jury at a hearing on [an] application for temporary injunction"

    If, at the close of applicant's presentation, the judge, in the proper exercise of his discretion, has not been persuaded that the applicant is entitled to the relief requested, he is entitled to deny the application. This is the reverse of the situation presented in Gibson v. Shaver, 434 S.W.2d 462 (Tex.Civ.App.-Tyler 1968, no writ); and Ortel v. Gulf State Abrasive Manufacturing, Inc., 429 S.W.2d 623 (Tex.Civ.App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1968, no writ). These cases hold that the right of a defendant to notice in a temporary injunction proceeding also includes the right for such defendant to be heard at the hearing.

  7. Phillips v. Phillips

    695 S.W.2d 61 (Tex. App. 1985)   Cited 2 times

    I further disagree with the majority that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by ending the hearing arbitrarily and refusing to hear his side of the case. The record reflects that the trial court had made up its mind and had announced so to the parties even before appellee's phase of the case was completed, hardly indicative of impartiality and probably a violation of TEX.R.CIV.P. 262, 265, Producer's Construction Co. v. Muegge, 669 S.W.2d 717 (Tex. 1984); Jordan v. Jordan, 653 S.W.2d 356 (Tex.App. — San Antonio 1983, no writ); Tobola v. State, 538 S.W.2d 868 (Tex.Civ.App. — Houston [14th Dist.], 1976, no writ); Turcotte v. Trevino, 499 S.W.2d 705 (Tex.Civ.App. — Corpus Christi 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.); Oertel v. Gulf States Abrasive Manufacturing, Inc., 429 S.W.2d 623 (Tex.Civ.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1968, no writ); Gibson v. Shaver, 434 S.W.2d 462 (Tex.Civ.App. — Tyler 1968, no writ). The act of the trial court in denying appellant a jury trial and in additionally refusing him the right to present his case reflects the same unabashed attitude exhibited recently in Jordan v. Jordan, supra.

  8. Jordan v. Jordan

    653 S.W.2d 356 (Tex. App. 1983)   Cited 21 times
    Holding that when trial court rendered judgment after plaintiff's first witness and before either side rested, it denied defendant her due process rights "to introduce evidence at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner," "to have judicial findings based upon that evidence," and "to have judgment rendered only after trial"

    A trial court is not authorized to render judgment against a defendant before the defendant has had the opportunity to offer evidence in his or her behalf and has rested. Tobola v. State, 538 S.W.2d 868, 870 (Tex.Civ.App. — Houston [14th Dist.] 1976, no writ); Gibson v. Shaver, 434 S.W.2d 462, 464 (Tex.Civ.App. — Tyler 1968, no writ); Oertel v. Gulf States Abrasive Manufacturing, Inc., 429 S.W.2d 623, 624 (Tex.Civ.App. — Houston [1st Dist.] 1968, no writ). Appellee's arguments are without merit.

  9. Reading Bates v. O'Donnell

    627 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. App. 1982)   Cited 11 times

    Harden and O'Donnell's first cross-point of error complains of the fact that they were not afforded an opportunity to present a "case-in-chief" at the hearing on the temporary injunction. The notice requirements of Rule 681 T.R.C.P. require that an adverse party in a temporary injunction setting have a right to be heard. Gibson v. Shaver, 434 S.W.2d 462 (Tex.Civ.App.-Tyler 1968, no writ); City of Austin v. Texas Public Employees Assoc., 528 S.W.2d 637 (Tex.Civ.App.-Austin 1975, no writ). Such opportunity to be heard must amount to more than the mere right to cross-examine the other party's witnesses.

  10. Great Lakes Engineering v. Andersen

    627 S.W.2d 436 (Tex. App. 1981)   Cited 7 times
    Holding that order denying temporary injunction would be reversed because "trial court abused its discretion in not allowing the appellant to fully develop its evidence"

    The determination of the issues before a trial court should be made only after the parties have had an opportunity to offer testimony or other evidence. Gibson v. Shaver, 434 S.W.2d 462, 464 (Tex.Civ.App.-Tyler 1968, no writ). In Anderson v. Hidalgo County Water Improvements, 251 S.W.2d 761 (Tex.Civ.App.-San Antonio 1952, writ ref'd n. r. e.), the trial court refused to allow either party the right to introduce evidence and only considered the pleadings, affidavits and arguments of counsel.