This court employs the material evidence rule. Gibson v. Francis, No. E2003-02226-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 1488541, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 30, 2004). Ultimately, our task is to review the record to determine whether it contains material evidence to support the jury's verdict.
See Shropshire v. Roach, No. M2007-02593-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 230236, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2009). This court employs the material evidence rule as outlined in the Forrester and Crabtree cases. Gibson v. Francis, No. E2003-02226-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 1488541, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 30, 2004). Ultimately, our task is to review the record to determine whether it contains material evidence to support the jury's verdict.
In its role as fact-finder, it is the duty and prerogative of the jury to assess the credibility of the witnesses, and the jury was at liberty to either believe or disbelieve the subjective complaints of Mr. and Mrs. Roach. See Gibson v. Francis, No. E2003–02226–COA–R3–CV, 2004 WL 1488541, at *4 (Tenn.Ct.App. June 30, 2004). The parties in this case presented sharply contrasting evidence of the circumstances surrounding the Dixie Gas incident and of the damages caused, or not caused, by the explosion.
In its role as fact-finder, it is the duty and prerogative of the jury to assess the credibility of the witnesses, and the jury was at liberty to either believe or disbelieve the subjective complaints of Mr. and Mrs. Roach. See Gibson v. Francis, No. E2003-02226-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 1488541, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 30, 2004). The parties in this case presented sharply contrasting evidence of the circumstances surrounding the Dixie Gas incident and of the damages caused, or not caused, by the explosion.
"Where the trial court simply approves the jury's verdict without further comment, we presume the court adequately performed its function as thirteenth juror." Gibson v. Francis, No. E2003-02226-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 1488541, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. E.S., June 30, 2004) (citing Ridings v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 894 S.W.2d 281, 288 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994)). Once a trial court approves a jury verdict, the standard of review on appeal is stringent, see Shropshire v. Roach, No. M2007-02593-COA-R3-CV, 2009 WL 230236, at *3 (Tenn. Ct. App. M.S., Jan. 30, 2009), and this court employs the material evidence rule as outlined in the Forrester and Crabtree cases. Gibson, 2004 WL 1488541, at *2.
We reversed as to the passenger, holding that the passenger was "entitled to the reasonable medical expenses required to determine if injuries were sustained," 1999 WL 281311 at *2, and we remanded the case to the trial court for a new trial on damages only. However, in Gibson v. Francis, No. E2003-02226-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 1488541, (Tenn. Ct. App. June 30, 2004) (no Tenn. R. App. P. 11 application filed) the Eastern Section of this Court was faced with a similar situation but reached a different conclusion. In that case, the jury returned a $6,900 verdict for damages to the plaintiff's automobile, but declined to award her any damages for personal injuries.