Gibson v. Babbitt

8 Citing cases

  1. Yahweh v. United States Parole Commission

    Case No. 01-2848-CIV-MOORE (S.D. Fla. Aug. 15, 2001)   Cited 8 times
    Holding that "habeas corpus is not an exclusive remedy for parolees challenging their parole conditions" because parole conditions are akin to prison conditions, which may be challenged in a civil rights action

    In order to state a claim under RFRA, Yahweh Ben Yahweh must first show that his parole conditions substantially burden the exercise of his sincerely held religious beliefs; if he does so, the Parole Commission must then demonstrate that (1) the parole conditions were imposed in furtherance of a compelling government interest, and (2) the parole conditions are the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling government interest. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb; see also Gibson v. Babbitt, 223 F.3d 1256, 1248 (11th Cir. 2000); Fawaad v. Jones, 81 F.3d 1084, 1086-87 (11th Cir. 1996) ("RFRA now would require us to apply strict scrutiny to the prison regulation."); Gunning v. Runyon, 3 F. Supp.2d 1423, 1433 (S.D.Fla. 1998). However, in applying this heightened test, the Court must, even under RFRA, take into consideration the unique environment in which the burden occurs.

  2. McAllen Grace Brethren Church v. Salazar

    764 F.3d 465 (5th Cir. 2014)   Cited 28 times
    Holding that RFRA's requiring the least-restrictive means "is a severe form of the 'narrowly tailored' test"

    See Wilgus, 638 F.3d at 1285 (“[T]he interest found compelling arises from the federal government's obligations, springing from history and from the text of the Constitution, to federally-recognized Indian tribes.”); Gibson v. Babbitt, 223 F.3d 1256, 1258 (11th Cir.2000) (same). Cf. United States v. Hardman, 297 F.3d 1116, 1128 (10th Cir.2002) (en banc) (finding a compelling interest in “protecting Indian cultures from extinction”).

  3. U.S. v. Antoine

    318 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 2003)   Cited 23 times
    Assuming that "raz[ing]" a "house of worship" to build a freeway would be a substantial burden

    Circuits have split over the exclusion of nonmember Indians from the permit program. In Gibson v. Babbitt, 223 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam), the Eleventh Circuit determined that restricting permits to members of federally recognized tribes was the least restrictive means of pursuing a compelling interest in restoring Indian treaty rights. Id. at 1258.

  4. U.S. v. Hardman

    297 F.3d 1116 (10th Cir. 2002)   Cited 201 times
    Holding that the government's interest in eagle protection remains compelling whether eagle populations are threatened or not because the bald eagle remains "our national symbol whether there [are] 100 eagles or 100,000 eagles" and noting that "[w]hat might change depending on the number of birds is the scope of a program that we would accept as being narrowly tailored as the least restrictive means of achieving its interest"

    Moreover, most other courts that have addressed this issue have agreed that the preservation of eagle species represents a compelling interest. United States v. Oliver, 255 F.3d 588, 589 (8th Cir. 2001); United States v. Hugs, 109 F.3d 1375, 1378 (9th Cir. 1997) (per curiam); Gibson v. Babbitt, 72 F.Supp.2d 1356, 1360 (S.D.Fla. 1999), aff'd, 223 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 2000). The prohibition on hunting golden eagles is intrinsically related to the prohibition on hunting bald eagles.

  5. Saenz v. Department of the Interior

    No. CIV 03-232 MCA/LFG (D.N.M. Feb. 20, 2004)   Cited 3 times

    Moreover, the government's opposition brief [Doc. No. 40] fails to provide any additional evidence or argument to convince the Court otherwise. In its brief, the United States primarily argues that it took its position in the Saenz matter based on previous challenges and/or analogous challenges decided by other Courts. The first case cited by the government, Gibson v. Babbitt, 223 F.3d 1256 (11th Cir. 2000), was decided after Saenz brought his motion to recover the eagle feathers and after Judge Mechem issued his ruling but before the Tenth Circuit affirmed Judge Mechem. Thus, the government could not have relied on this case prior to its appeal of Saenz since Gibson had not been decided.

  6. U.S. v. Wilgus

    638 F.3d 1274 (10th Cir. 2011)   Cited 48 times
    Holding that, in a least restrictive means inquiry, “the government's burden is two-fold: it must support its choice of regulation, and it must refute the alternative schemes offered by the challenger, but it must do both through the evidence presented in the record”

    We would also be remiss if we failed to note that, in upholding the Eagle Act provisions against a RFRA challenge by non-Native American practitioners of Native American religion, we join the two other circuit courts to have considered the question. See United States v. Antoine, 318 F.3d 919, 924 (9th Cir. 2003); Gibson v. Babbitt, 223 F.3d 1256, 1258 (11th Cir. 2000) (per curiam). As a final coda in light of the Ninth and Eleventh Circuit cases, we observe that our decision today sidesteps a serious potential enforcement problem.

  7. Armbrester v. Corizon, LLC

    2:20-cv-77-JTA (WO) (M.D. Ala. Feb. 6, 2023)

    Johnson v. Meadows, 418 F.3d 1152, 1157 (11th Cir. 2005) (inmate who files an untimely grievance or simply spurns the administrative process until it is no longer available fails to satisfy the exhaustion requirement of the PLRA); Higginbottom v. Carter, 223 F.3d 1256, 1261 (11th Cir. 2000) (inmate's belief that administrative procedures are futile or needless does not excuse the exhaustion requirement). “The only facts pertinent to determining whether a prisoner has satisfied the PLRA's exhaustion requirement are those that existed when he filed his original complaint.

  8. U.S. v. Tawahongva

    456 F. Supp. 2d 1120 (D. Ariz. 2006)   Cited 10 times

    Defendant did not testify he believed the permit requirement would require undue physical effort on his part, or require him to endure any delay in performing rites necessary to the free exercise of his religion. The testimony indicated the permit requirement places only a subjective emotional burden on Defendant. Compare Hugs, 109 F.3d at 1378 ("We do not question that the BGEPA imposed a substantial burden on the practice of such religions by restricting the ability of adherents to obtain and possess eagles and eagle parts."); Gibson v. Babbit, 223 F.3d 1256, 1258 (11th Cir. 2001); Hardman, 297 F.3d at 1126-27 ("Any scheme that limits [legitimate practitioners of American Indian religions] access to eagle feathers therefore must be seen as having a substantial effect on the exercise of religious belief.");United States v. Gonzales, 957 F. Supp. 1225, 1228 (D.N.M. 1997) (holding that regulations requiring the defendant "to state on an application the name of the tribal religious ceremony for which he seeks an eagle and requiring him to obtain certification from a religious elder to the effect that he is authorized to participate in that ceremony, constitute a substantial burden on his exercise of his religion.