Opinion
Case No. 09-5114RJB/KLS.
April 6, 2010
ORDER ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter comes before the Court on the Report and Recommendation by Magistrate Judge Karen L. Strombom (Dkt. 27). The Court has considered the relevant documents and the remainder of the file herein.
I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On April 28, 2004, Plaintiff Gibbs filed applications for disability insurance and supplemental security income ("SSI") benefits. Dkt. 27, p. 1-2. She alleged disability as of December 1, 2000, due to anxiety, chronic fatigue, depression, migraine headaches, a nervous stomach, and sweating problems. Dkt. 27, p. 1-2. The Plaintiff's applications were denied initially and on reconsideration. Dkt. 27, p. 2. On October 20, 2007, a hearing was held before an administrative law judge ("ALJ"), at which Plaintiff, represented by counsel, appeared and testified, as did a vocational expert. Id. On January 24, 2008, the ALJ issued a decision, determining that Plaintiff was not disabled. On January 9, 2009, Plaintiff's request for review was denied by the Appeals Council, making the ALJ's decision the Commissioner's final decision. Id.
On March 4, 2009, Plaintiff filed a complaint in district court seeking review of the ALJ's decision. Dkt. 27, p. 2. Plaintiff argues that the ALJ's decision should be reversed and remanded to the Commissioner for an award of benefits because the ALJ erred in evaluating the medical evidence in the record, in assessing the Plaintiff's credibility, in evaluating the lay witness evidence, in assessing the Plaintiff's residual functional capacity, and in finding that the Plaintiff is capable of performing other work existing in significant numbers in the national economy. Dkt. 27, p. 3.
On Marcy 8, 2010, Magistrate Judge Strombom issued a Report and Recommendation which agreed that the ALJ erred in determining that Plaintiff was not disabled, but for reasons which were different from the Plaintiff's assertions. Dkt. 27, p. 3. The Report and Recommendation recommended that the ALJ's decision be reversed, and the matter remanded to the Commissioner for further administrative proceedings. Id.
Magistrate Judge Strombom specifically found the following:
(1) the ALJ erred in evaluating Dr. Cosgrove's findings. Dkt. 27, p. 7.
(2) the ALJ erred in rejecting Dr. Crist's assessment of Plaintiff's mental health status and erred in evaluating the opinions of medical sources in the record who had mental health expertise. Dkt. 27, p. 9-10.
(3) the ALJ erred by not giving any reasons for failing to adopt many of the mental functional limitations Drs. Kuhner and Houck found, even though he had afforded their opinions great weight. Dkt. 27, p. 11.
(4) the ALJ did not fail to provide clear and convincing reasons for discounting Plaintiff's credibility. Dkt. 27, p. 13.
(5) the ALJ was required to provide germane reasons for rejecting the limitations related by Plaintiff's mother. Dkt. 27, p. 16.
(6) the ALJ erred in his assessment of Plaintiff's residual functional capacity and Step Five analysis due to errors in evaluating the medical and lay witness evidence. Dkt. 27, p. 17-18.
The Magistrate Judge concluded by finding that the "ALJ improperly concluded plaintiff was not disabled, and should reverse the ALJ's decision and remand [the] matter to the Commissioner for further administrative proceedings." Dkt. 27, p. 22.
The Defendant objects to only one finding by the Magistrate Judge, the opinions of Drs. Kuhner and Houck. Dkt. 28, p. 2. The Defendant argues that the Magistrate Judge misinterpreted the agency form at issue, SSA-4734-F4. Id. The Defendant requests that, if the Court remands the case for further proceedings, the Court not include an erroneous instruction to the agency in a remand order. Id. Plaintiff responds by asserting that Magistrate Judge Strombom was correct in her finding and that the Report and Recommendation should be adopted in its entirety. Dkt. 30, p. 3.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Review Standard
The ALJ's decision denying the disability insurance benefits will be disturbed only if that decision is not supported by substantial evidence or it is based upon legal error. Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d 599, 600 (9th Cir. 1998). Substantial evidence is "more than a mere scintilla. It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 4022 U.S. 389, 401, 91 S.Ct. 1420, 28 L.Ed.2d 842 (1971); Tidwell v. Apfel, 161 F.3d at 600. If the evidence admits of more than one rational interpretation, the Court must uphold the Commissioner's decision. Allen v. Heckler, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984).
B. Evaluation of Medical Evidence Standard
The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and resolving any other ambiguities that might exist. Reddick v. Chater, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998); Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). Where the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ's decision that must be upheld. Morgan v. Commissioner of the Social Security Administration, 169 F.3d 595, 601 (9th Cir. 1999); Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995) ; Sample v. Schwiker, 694 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1982).
In resolving questions of credibility and conflicts in the evidence, an ALJ's findings "must be supported by specific, cogent reasons." Reddick, 157 F.3d at 725. The ALJ can do this "by setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence, stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings." Id. The ALJ also may draw inferences "logically flowing form the evidence." Sample, 694 F.2d at 642. Further, the Court itself may draw "specific and legitimate inferences from the ALJ's opinion." Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 755 (9th Cir. 1989). The ALJ must only explain why "significant probative evidence has been rejected." Vincent on Behalf of Vincent v. Heckler, 739 F.3d 1393, 1394-95 (9th Cir. 1984).
As a general rule, more weight should be given to the opinion of a treating source than to the opinion of doctors who do not treat the claimant. Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). Where the treating doctor's opinion is not contradicted by another doctor, it may be rejected only for "clear and convincing" reasons. Id. Additionally, "clear and convincing" reasons are required to reject the treating doctor's ultimate conclusions. Id. Even if the treating doctor's opinion is contradicted by another doctor, the Commissioner may not reject this opinion without providing "specific and legitimate reasons" supported by substantial evidence in the record. Id. However, the ALJ need not accept a treating physician's opinion which is brief and conclusory in form with little in the way of clinical findings to support its conclusion. Batson v. Commissioner of Social Security Administration, 359 F.3d 1190, 1195 (9th Cir. 2004); Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989). A non-examining physician's opinion may constitute substantial evidence if "it is consistent with other independent evidence in the record." Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31.
C. Analysis
The Report and Recommendation found that the ALJ erred by not giving reasons for failing to adopt many of the mental functional limitations Drs. Kuhner and Houck found, even though the ALJ had afforded their opinions great weight. The Magistrate Judge specifically stated that the ALJ's assessment of Plaintiff's mental residual functional capacity fails to adequately account for a number of the moderate limitations Drs. Kuhner and Houck found. Dkt. 27, p. 11.
Defendant asserts that the mental residual functional form, SSA-4734-F4, completed by Drs. Kuhner and Houck were correctly completed in accordance with the instructions printed on the form, and that the ALJ correctly interpreted the form. Dkt. 28, p. 2-3. The Defendant states that the ALJ relied on the opinions of Drs. Kuhner and Houck in resolving medical evidence, and that the ALJ incorporated the opinions written in the "Functional Capacity Assessment" section for the form, also referred to as the narrative section in this order, into his residual functional capacity finding. Dkt. 28, p. 3. Thus, the Defendant argues, the ALJ interpreted the form consistent with the instructions printed on the form. Id.
Defendant also argues that the Report and Recommendation would require that the ALJ adopt the moderate limitations identified in the "Summary Conclusions" section, which would be a misinterpretation of the form. Dkt. 28, p. 4.
Plaintiff contends that the Report and Recommendation is correct and that the Defendant has failed to show how the narrative portion of the report incorporated each of the ten "moderate" limitations. Dkt. 30, p. 3.
The Defendant's argument is not persuasive. First, the Report and Recommendation does not require the ALJ to "adopt" the moderate limitations identified in the "Summary Conclusions" section. The Report and Recommendation states the ALJ's "assessment fails to adequately account for a number of moderate limitations Dr. Kuhner and Dr. Houck found." Dkt. 27, p. 11. The Report and Recommendation only requires that the moderate limitations be addressed by the ALJ, which was not done in this case. It does not require that the ALJ "adopt" or "incorporate" the Summary Conclusions section into his findings.
Second, the Report and Recommendation does not misinterpret the form. The narrative section instructions explicitly states, "Explain your summary conclusions in narrative form." Tr. 195. The two sections, the "summary conclusions" and "functional capacity assessment" or narrative section, are inextricably linked. Drs. Kuhner and Houck failed to adequately explain the summary conclusions in the narrative section of the form. Therefore, it would have been error for the ALJ to adopt the statements in the narrative section of the form without explanation, when the narrative section did not explain the summary conclusions. The ALJ need not adopt the summary conclusions as findings, but the ALJ should have, at the least, explained the deficiencies in the narrative section in relation to the summary conclusions.
For the foregoing reasons, the ALJ did err in explaining why he did not adopt many of the moderate limitations in Drs. Kuhner and Houck's report. The Report and Recommendation should be adopted, and the matter reversed and remanded to the Commissioner for further administrative proceedings.
III. ORDER
The Court does hereby find and ORDER:
(1) The Report and Recommendation (Dkt. 27) is ADOPTED;
(2) The ALJ erred in his decision as described in the Report and Recommendation;
(3) The matter is therefore REVERSED and REMANDED to the Commissioner for further administrative proceedings; and
(4) The Clerk is directed to send copies of this Order all counsel of record, any party appearing pro se at said party's last known address, and Magistrate Judge Strombom.