Opinion
March 3, 1952.
Order granting plaintiffs' motion for a compulsory reference under section 466 of the Civil Practice Act, reversed on the law and the facts, with $10 costs and disbursements, and the motion denied, without costs. Although the granting of the motion did not impinge upon the constitutional right to a trial by jury ( Steck v. Colorado Fuel Iron Co., 142 N.Y. 236; 4 Carmody on New York Practice, p. 2692, and cases cited) the record did not warrant the granting of a compulsory order of reference on the ground that the examination of a long account was necessary within the meaning of section 466 of the Civil Practice Act, under long-settled authority. ( Davidson v. Sterngass, 279 App. Div. 875, and cases cited therein; Untermyer v. Beinhauer, 105 N.Y. 521.) Carswell, Acting P.J., Johnston, Adel, Wenzel and MacCrate, JJ., concur.