Opinion
FSTCV095009827
12-04-2015
Nicholas Gianopoulos v. West Park Stamford, LLC et al
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS (#124)
Charles T. Lee, J.
On January 20, 2015, the defendant West Park Stamford, LLC (defendant or West Park) filed this motion to dismiss the plaintiff's amended complaint on the grounds that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter because (1) the plaintiff is not the true claimant and therefore does not have standing to prosecute his claims or the right to recover the deposit of $350,000 at issue in this case, and (2) the plaintiff's claim is properly in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York. The defendant also filed a memorandum in support of the motion. On March 5, 2015, the plaintiff filed a memorandum in opposition to the motion. The defendant filed a supplemental memorandum of law in support of the motion on March 16, 2015, as well as a transcript of the plaintiff's bankruptcy proceedings. On April 22, 2015, the plaintiff filed a reply memorandum in opposition to the motion to dismiss, requesting ninety days to substitute the trustee in bankruptcy as party plaintiff. On August 14, 2015, defendant filed a memorandum in support of its motion noting that plaintiff had failed to substitute the trustee as a plaintiff. As more fully explained below, the motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction is granted.
BACKGROUND
On January 5, 2009, the plaintiff, Nicholas Gianopoulos, filed a four-count complaint against the defendants, West Park Stamford, LLC and 1551 Summer Street, LLC. The plaintiff filed the operative amended complaint on January 29, 2009 including the following allegations: On or about January 31, 2006, the plaintiff and West Park entered into a real estate agreement. At the time, the defendant had an option to purchase property known as 92 West Park Place, Stamford, Connecticut, pursuant to a lease with its landlord, 20 Summer St. Associates. The terms of the agreement between the plaintiff and the defendant provided that the defendant would exercise its option to purchase 92 West Park Place, whereupon the plaintiff would purchase the property from the defendant. It also provided that the plaintiff would pay a $350,000 deposit to allow the defendant to exercise the option to purchase. The plaintiff tendered the deposit to 20 Summer St. Associates Limited Partnership on behalf of the defendant and the defendant attempted to exercise the option. However, the transaction failed to close and defendant commenced suit against 20 Summer St. Associates Limited Partnership to enforce the option. It later withdrew the action and purchased 92 West Park Place on or about December 4, 2008. The defendant purchased the property for $3.9 million with the $350,000 deposit credited to the purchase price. The defendant failed to deliver title of 92 West Park Place to plaintiff or to return the plaintiff's deposit. The agreement provided that if the defendant defaulted on the agreement, the plaintiff could pursue all legal and equitable remedies to which he is entitled, including specific performance.
In count one of the amended complaint, the plaintiff seeks specific performance of the agreement through conveyance of the property to the plaintiff. In count two, the plaintiff claims damages for breach of contract. Count three sounds in unjust enrichment, and count four seeks, among other things, the imposition of a constructive trust over the property and the deposit.
CONTENTIONS OF THE PARTIES
In the memorandum of law in support of its motion, the defendant argues that the court does not have subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiff lacks standing. In particular, the defendant contends that, because the plaintiff filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 7 in the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York on September 13, 2010 and failed to list the present claim on his schedule of assets or executory contracts, such claim was not abandoned to the debtor upon discharge and remains an asset of the bankruptcy estate. On that basis, the defendant argues that, because the plaintiff does not own the claim, he lacks standing to pursue the claim in this court. The plaintiff argues that the court should disregard this assertion because the defendant failed to provide any evidence to support the argument. Even with evidence, the plaintiff argues, any question as to the correct parties or ownership of the claim does not raise a jurisdictional issue. In its reply memorandum, the defendant filed the docket of the plaintiff's bankruptcy proceeding and continues to assert that the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York has exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over the plaintiff's present claim. In his reply memorandum filed on April 22, 2015, the plaintiff requested the court to allow him ninety days to reopen his Chapter 7 bankruptcy action and substitute the trustee as the plaintiff in this action. The plaintiff continues to maintain that subject matter jurisdiction is not defeated by a change in ownership of the claim. Defendant has noted the plaintiff has not, in fact, substituted the bankruptcy trustee as a plaintiff herein.
Defendant also asserts an alternative ground for its motion, namely that plaintiff lacks standing because he admitted at his deposition that the money for the deposit did not come from his bank account and he did not know where it did come from, although presumably it was from a member of his family. Because the court dismisses the action on the bankruptcy ground discussed above, it does not reach this alternative ground.
DISCUSSION
" A motion to dismiss . . . properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court . . ." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Ferreira v. Pringle, 255 Conn. 330, 346, 766 A.2d 400 (2001). " The grounds which may be asserted in [a motion to dismiss] are: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter; (2) lack of jurisdiction over the person; (3) improper venue; (4) insufficiency of process; and (5) insufficiency of service of process." Zizka v. Water Pollution Control Authority, 195 Conn. 682, 687, 490 A.2d 509 (1985). " When a trial court decides a jurisdictional question raised by a pretrial motion to dismiss on the basis of the complaint alone, it must consider the allegations of the complaint in their most favorable light . . . In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessarily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader . . . In contrast, if the complaint is supplemented by undisputed facts established by affidavits submitted in support of the motion to dismiss . . . other types of undisputed evidence . . . and/or public records of which judicial notice may be taken . . . the trial court, in determining the jurisdictional issue, may consider these supplementary undisputed facts and need not conclusively presume the validity of the allegations of the complaint." (Citations omitted; emphasis in original; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642, 651-52, 974 A.2d 669 (2009).
" [B]ecause the issue of standing implicates subject matter jurisdiction, it may be a proper basis for granting a motion to dismiss . . ." (Citation omitted.) Electrical Contractors, Inc. v. Dept. of Education, 303 Conn. 402, 413, 35 A.3d 188 (2012). " If . . . the plaintiff's standing does not adequately appear from all materials of record, the complaint must be dismissed." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Burton v. Dominion Nuclear Connecticut, Inc., 300 Conn. 542, 550, 23 A.3d 1176 (2011). " If a party is found to lack standing, the court is without subject matter jurisdiction to determine the cause . . . Because standing implicates the court's subject matter jurisdiction, the plaintiff ultimately bears the burden of establishing standing." (Citations omitted; internal quotations omitted.) Seymour v. Region One Board of Education, 274 Conn. 92, 104, 874 A.2d 742, cert. denied, 546 U.S. 1016, 126 S.Ct. 659, 163 L.Ed.2d 526 (2005).
" When a debtor files for bankruptcy protection, a bankruptcy estate is created." Weiss v. Smulders, 313 Conn. 227, 239, 96 A.3d 1175 (2014). " The debtor must file a formal statement with the Bankruptcy Court including a schedule of his or her assets and liabilities . . . Property that is scheduled pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 521(1), but not administered by the plan, is abandoned to the debtor by operation of law at the close of the bankruptcy case . . . By contrast, property that is not formally scheduled is not abandoned and therefore remains part of the estate." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Manning v. Feltman, 149 Conn.App. 224, 232-33, 91 A.3d 466 (2014). " It is well settled that [property that comprises the bankruptcy estate] includes causes of action possessed by the debtor at that time." Weiss v. Smulders, supra, 313 Conn. 240; see also Association Resources, Inc. v. Wall, 298 Conn. 145, 165, 2 A.3d 873 (2010) (" [t]he assets, which become the property of the bankruptcy estate, include all causes of action belonging to the debtor that accrued prior to the filing of the bankruptcy petition."). " Courts have held that because an unscheduled claim remains the property of the bankruptcy estate, the debtor lacks standing to pursue the claim after emerging from bankruptcy, and the claims must be dismissed." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Manning v. Feltman, supra, 149 Conn.App. 233.
" The outcome of failing to schedule a claim with the bankruptcy court is clear when the Bankruptcy Court has closed the bankruptcy case. If the outcome of the bankruptcy case is a discharge or its functional equivalent, then an unscheduled claim remains the property of the bankruptcy estate, the debtor lacks standing to pursue the claims after emerging from bankruptcy, and the claim must be dismissed . . . In contrast, when the bankruptcy proceeding is dismissed, the failure to disclose a cause of action in bankruptcy proceedings does not preclude the assertion of that claim in proceedings instituted after the dismissal of the bankruptcy proceedings." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Fortier v. White Flower Farms, Inc., Superior Court, judicial district of Litchfield, Docket No. CV-14-6010958-S (November 21, 2014, Marano, J).
ANALYSIS
In the present case, the court finds that the plaintiff filed a bankruptcy petition on September 13, 2010 in the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York, and did not list his claim against defendants on the relevant schedule of assets and liabilities or of executory contracts. This lawsuit was commenced on or about January 5, 2009, prior to the filing of plaintiff's bankruptcy petition, for alleged wrongful acts beginning on or about January 31, 2006. Subsequently, the plaintiff was discharged of his debts on February 7, 2011, thereby closing the bankruptcy proceeding.
Because the plaintiff did not include this pre-petition claim in his bankruptcy schedule, and the bankruptcy proceeding is closed, the claim is the property of the bankruptcy estate, as directed by the authorities discussed above. The plaintiff asserted in his reply memorandum of April 22, 2015 that he intended to reopen his bankruptcy proceeding and substitute the bankruptcy trustee as the plaintiff in this matter. He further requested ninety days to accomplish the substitution; however, he has not done so. Accordingly, the action is without a proper plaintiff.
Nevertheless, plaintiff asserts that, on January 5, 2009, on January 5, 2009 the motion to dismiss should be denied because the bankruptcy proceeding followed the filing of the complaint, and jurisdiction was proper at the inception of the case. While it is true that a court generally is not deprived of jurisdiction by after-occurring events, Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Lone Star Industries, Inc., 290 Conn. 767, 795 n.32, 967 A.2d 1 (2009), an exception to the rule exists where such events deprive the court of any ability to render meaningful relief, rendering the dispute moot. RAL Management, Inc. v. Valley View Associates, 278 Conn. 672, 687, 899 A.2d 586 (2006).
That is the situation here. Because plaintiff failed to list his claim on the schedule of assets in the bankruptcy proceeding, the claim remained in the bankruptcy estate. Because the trustee has not been substituted in this proceeding, the court cannot make any award, even if defendant's liability were to be established. Accordingly, the court must dismiss the case without taking any further action. See Manning v. Feltman, supra, 149 Conn.App. 234.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing reasons, the defendant's motion to dismiss the plaintiff's amended complaint is granted.