Opinion
Civil Action No. 18-1280
07-08-2019
BLAINE KOBY GHOLSON, Plaintiff, v. BRADLEY J. SHEEDER, BENJAMIN E. WEAVER, MR. SOKIRA, WHEARY, LT. BYERS, CRONHAUER, JUDY L. SMITH, LEE J. ESTOCK, YOLANDA S. WEBB, and HEIDE, Defendants.
District Judge Arthur J. Schwab
Re: ECF No. 32 REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
I. RECOMMENDATION
Presently before the Court is Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Restraining Order. ECF No. 32. For the reasons that follow, it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Restraining Order be denied.
II. REPORT
A. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Plaintiff Blaine Koby Gholson ("Plaintiff"), proceeding pro se, filed a Complaint in the above-titled action on September 21, 2018, alleging violations of his First, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights by officials at the State Correctional Institution ("SCI") Pine Grove, where he was previously incarcerated. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff is currently incarcerated at SCI Houtzdale. ECF No. 27.
Plaintiff initiated this action in the United States District Court for the Middle District of Pennsylvania, which subsequently transferred the case to this Court because the events giving rise to this case occurred within the territorial limits of this District. ECF Nos. 7 and 8.
On June 4, 2019, Plaintiff filed the instant Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Restraining Order. ECF No. 32. Although Plaintiff asserts that he is, and has been, housed alone in a cell since 2016, he requests that the Court enter an order "to grant the Plaintiff permanent Administrative Custody in segregation and a permanent Z Code (single cell status)," in order to ensure his safety. Id. According to Plaintiff, various prison officials are engaged in a plot to have him killed for purposes of collecting the profits on a fraudulent life insurance policy taken out in Plaintiff's name, and making his current housing conditions "permanent" is necessary to prevent him from being injured or killed. Id.
Although the motion purports to seek both a restraining order and preliminary injunction, because Defendants have been provided with notice prior to the issuance of an order, the Court will consider Plaintiff's request as a motion for preliminary injunction only under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(a)(1), (b); Story v. Wetzel, No. 15-528029, 2017 WL 528029, at *1, n.1 (W.D. Pa. Feb. 9. 2017). --------
In opposition, Defendants filed Department of Corrections Defendants' Response to Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction on June 21, 2019. ECF No. 37. Defendants offer three arguments for denying Plaintiff's motion. First, Defendants argue that Plaintiff's motion should be denied because Plaintiff's allegations of potential harm are conclusory and speculative, as they rely upon the unproven existence of a fraudulent life insurance policy. Id. at 2. Second, Defendants assert that, because Plaintiff admits he is currently in long-term custody and has been granted temporary Z-Code status, he is improperly requesting that the Court grant a "status" that he already possesses. Id. Finally, Defendants argue that Plaintiff does not have a constitutional right to a Z-Code status under the Eighth Amendment. Id. at 3-4.
B. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Preliminary injunctive relief is an extraordinary remedy and should issue only in limited circumstances. Four factors inform a court's decision as to the issuance of a preliminary injunction: (1) whether the movant has shown a reasonable probability of success on the merits; (2) whether the movant will suffer irreparable harm if denied relief; (3) whether the requested relief will cause greater harm to the nonmovant; and (4) whether an injunction would be in the public interest. Am. Express Travel Related Servs., Inc. v. Sidamon-Eristoff, 669 F.3d 359, 366 (3d Cir. 2012). The first two factors are "most critical" to the court's analysis, and the movant cannot succeed if either of these two factors are not established. Reilly v. City of Harrisburg, 858 F.3d 173, 179 (3d Cir. 2017). If these first two "gateway factors" are met, the court considers the remaining factors and determines whether all four factors, on balance, weigh in favor of granting the requested preliminary relief. Id.
In assessing the second factor, a court may not grant preliminary injunctive relief unless the plaintiff can show "immediate irreparable injury," which is more than merely serious or substantial harm. ECRI v. McGraw-Hill, Inc., 809 F.2d 223, 226 (3d Cir. 1987). Additionally, "the claimed injury cannot merely be possible, speculative, or remote." Dice v. Clinicorp, Inc., 887 F. Supp. 803, 809 (W.D. Pa. 1995). Thus, an injunction shall not be issued "simply to eliminate a possibility of a remote future injury." Acierno v. New Castle Cty., 40 F.3d 645, 655 (3d Cir. 1994) (quoting Cont'l Group, Inc. v. Amoco Chemicals Corp., 614 F.2d 351 (3d Cir. 1980)).
C. DISCUSSION
Here, Plaintiff does not satisfy the requirements for granting injunctive relief. As a threshold matter, Plaintiff's allegations of a plot by prison officials against his life do not appear to be grounded in reason or evidence, and therefore Plaintiff does not demonstrate a likelihood of success on the merits. See Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 32-33 (1992); Pavalone v. Bush, No. 3:11-1620, 2012 WL 1569614, at *1 (M.D. Pa. March 27, 2012) ("Within the Third Circuit, courts have found that allegations which are considered fanciful, fantastic, and delusional are to be dismissed as frivolous.").
Moreover, while Plaintiff argues that he should be placed in administrative custody and granted single cell status in order to protect his safety, he concedes that he has already been housed alone in a cell since 2016, is currently assigned administrative custody and temporary Z-Code status, and that there is "no difference" in what he is requesting from his present status. ECF. No. 32-1 ¶ 8. Plaintiff offers no evidence that there is any impending change to his custody status, and he therefore does not identify any immediate, non-speculative threat to his safety. See ECRI, 809 F.2d at 226 (preliminary injunction requires "clear showing of immediate irreparable injury") (quoting Cont'l Group, 614 F.2d at 359). To the contrary, Plaintiff asserts that, as recently as May 2019, prison officials reviewed Plaintiff's housing status and assigned him temporary Z Code and "Long Term Administrative Custody Status." ECF No. 32 ¶ 6; ECF No. 32-4. Accordingly, there is no basis for granting Plaintiff's requested injunctive relief.
D. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff's Motion for Preliminary Injunction and Restraining Order, ECF No. 32, be DENIED.
In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1), and Local Rule 72.D.2, the parties are permitted to file written objections in accordance with the schedule established in the docket entry reflecting the filing of this Report and Recommendation. Objections are to be submitted to the Clerk of Court, United States District Court, 700 Grant Street, Room 3110, Pittsburgh, PA 15219. Failure to timely file objections will waive the right to appeal. Brightwell v. Lehman, 637 F.3d 187, 193 n. 7 (3d Cir. 2011). Any party opposing objections may file their response to the objections within fourteen (14) days thereafter in accordance with Local Civil Rule 72.D.2.
Dated: July 8, 2019
Respectfully submitted,
/s/_________
MAUREEN P. KELLY
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
cc: The Honorable Arthur J. Schwab
United States District Court Judge
Blaine Koby Gholson
HJ8101
SCI HOUTZDALE
P.O. Box 1000
Houtzdale, PA 16698-1000
All counsel of record by Notice of Electronic Filing