Opinion
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
ORIGINAL PROCEEDINGS; petition for extraordinary writ. Wilfred J. Super. Ct. No. J217212, Schneider, Jr., Judge.
Elizabeth Price for Petitioner.
No appearance for Respondent.
Ruth E. Stringer, County Counsel, and Jeffrey L. Bryson, Deputy County Counsel, for Real Party in Interest.
OPINION
Gaut J.
G.G., father of S.G., petitions to vacate the juvenile court’s order setting a hearing to select and implement a permanent plan (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 366.26), made at the 12-month status review hearing. (§ 366.21, subd. (f).) Father contends the juvenile court erred in (1) finding he was provided with reasonable services because he is intellectually challenged (with an IQ of 64) and was not provided with services tailored to meet his needs, and (2) suspending his visits. We affirm.
All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless otherwise stated.
Mother has not appealed so we restrict our review to matters relating to father only.
BACKGROUND
Father had sole custody of S.G., age seven at the time of the initiation of dependency proceedings, since 2005. Father and S.G. lived in a small one-room adobe-like structure in a rural area with inadequate plumbing and electricity. Father is illiterate and has difficulty hearing. In July 2006, a referral was made to Department of Public Social Services (DPSS) regarding suspected sexual abuse of S.G. by a friend of father’s, but no action had been taken because the minor’s inconsistent statements led the investigators to determine the charge was not substantiated, and because father took steps to protect S.G. from the perpetrator. However, in August 2007, another referral was made to DPSS based on new allegations that S.G. had been sexually abused by another friend or relative of father’s. This allegation was substantiated. Father was cooperative but did not seem to comprehend the extent of the danger to S.G. by allowing his friends to visit.
A dependency petition was filed on September 21, 2007, alleging neglect (§ 300, subd. (b)), due to father’s failure to protect, failure to provide adequate shelter (father and S.G. lived in a one-room adobe-type structure that lacked utilities), and inability to provide regular care due to his developmental disability. The petition also alleged sexual abuse (§ 300, subd. (d)), relating to father’s failure to protect S.G. from sexual abuse by two perpetrators, despite his knowledge that she was in danger of such abuse. S.G. was detained in foster care pending the jurisdictional hearing.
Following mediation, father submitted on the allegations after language was added to reflect that the neglect was due to father’s difficulty in comprehending and accepting the fact that a relative could sexually abuse his daughter, impairing his ability to protect her. Father waived his trial rights at the jurisdictional hearing. The court declared S.G. to be a dependent child, removed her from father’s custody, approved a reunification plan and ordered father to participate in services. The court also ordered weekly unsupervised visits for father.
At a special interim hearing, DPSS submitted a report indicating S.G. was behaving very immaturely, and that father did not parent her during visits, by correcting her behavior or telling her “no.” The foster parent reported that S.G.’s behavior had deteriorated; she was rude and demanding, as well as secretive and exhibited sexualized behavior. The social worker also observed that the minor lacked manners and that father smelled of alcohol when he met with her, so a drug test was ordered.
The drug test came back positive for marijuana and benzodiazepines. Father had a letter from a doctor recommending medical marijuana use, although the doctor did not indicate the diagnosis for which the marijuana was prescribed. Father had attended group counseling, but his participation was considered minimal. Father informed the counselor that his sister helped him with his homework because he was illiterate, so the counselor could not tell if he was benefitting. A psychological evaluation was ordered.
The father’s sister’s home was evaluated as a possible relative placement in December 2007, but the home was considered too small to accommodate S.G. along with the other members of the aunt’s family. During the interview, the aunt informed the social worker that father has a drinking problem. In January 2008, the social worker confronted father about his marijuana and alcohol use, informing him that he would have to complete a substance abuse program and submit to drug tests twice monthly. Father’s subsequent drug tests were positive for marijuana also. DPSS recommended reducing visitation to one hour every other week.
The psychological evaluation was completed in May 2008. The results revealed father functions in the mentally defective range, with an IQ of 64. During the evaluation, father admitted to regular use of marijuana. The evaluator expressed concern about father’s cognitive deficits and his tendency to be concrete, as well as his impaired judgment and poor decision making. The psychologist also noted that father’s cognitive deficits made it debatable whether he could truly conceptualize the molestation of his daughter, or the inherent complexities of providing solid parenting for his daughter. He concluded by stating that while father cared for his child, he could not provide adequate parenting due to his limitations.
Nevertheless, an additional period of services was recommended. In April 2008, father agreed to a revised case plan including individual counseling, another parenting class, drug treatment and random testing, and sexual abuse counseling, among other components. The revised plan was subsequently adopted and another six months of services were ordered. On June 12, 2008, at an “appearance review” hearing, father’s counsel requested that father’s therapy and parenting classes be tailored to his needs, in light of the information about his developmental disability, and DPSS agreed to do what it could “to address those issues.”
In October 2008, DPSS submitted its report for the 12-month review hearing. The report documented S.G.’s escalating behavior problems, which included trouble focusing, abusing animals, urinating on stuffed animals, and a demanding nature. She wanted to be removed from her foster home, but referred to the foster parents as “mom” and “dad.”
On the other hand, father’s participation in the revised plan was minimal. He had attended only four meetings of Alcoholics Anonymous/Narcotics Anonymous, and had not demonstrated benefit from counseling, which was terminated due to his failure to attend. The counselor reported that father had difficulty comprehending abstract concepts and that while he had some increased understanding of sexual abuse, he had difficulty understanding normal child development, making appropriate decisions, or generalizing learned skills.
Additionally, father continued to use marijuana, and because of his refusal to give up the drug, he was rejected from the drug treatment program. Further, father had not completed the additional parenting class, and was inconsistent with visits. S.G. decompensated; she expressed anger and frustration regarding visitation with her father, actually requesting early termination or cancellation of some visits. Although the current foster parents were not interested in adopting S.G., the social worker considered adoption likely, recommending that services be terminated and that a selection and implementation hearing (§ 366.26) be set.
Prior to the 12-month review hearing, an addendum report was filed by DPSS, documenting the department’s discovery that father had been arrested for drunk driving on May 12, 2008. Father continued to test positive for marijuana use and refused to quit smoking the drug. He had missed seven out of the most recent 10 visits with S.G. When he did visit, he demonstrated a lack of awareness of how to interact with her, and an inability to redirect or correct her behavior when she would act out sexually.
S.G.’s therapist reported that the minor experienced wide emotional swings about father, expressing loyalty to him, as well as sadness and disappointment in his actions during some visits, which included yelling at S.G. or not listening to her. Also, father misled S.G. into thinking she would be placed with her aunt so she would be able to see him more regularly, causing confusion for the child. S.G.’s therapist recommended suspension of visits to allow S.G. to make adjustments “without the emotional roller coaster.”
The contested 12-month review hearing was held on December 16, 2008. After reviewing the reports and hearing the testimony of the social worker, the court found it would be detrimental to return S.G. to her father’s custody, and father had failed to make substantive progress in addressing the problems that led to the dependency, and that DPSS had provided reasonable services to reunify father and S.G. It also concluded that visits were detrimental. The court terminated services, suspended visitation, and scheduled a hearing for the selection and implementation of a permanent plan of adoption. Father timely filed a notice of intent to file a petition for extraordinary relief.
DISCUSSION
A. The Reunification Services Were Reasonable.
Father argues there is insufficient evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that reasonable services had been provided. We disagree.
In considering a claim of insufficient evidence, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether a reasonable finder of fact could have made the requisite finding. (Mark N. v. Superior Court (1998) 60 Cal.App.4th 996, 1010.) We must determine whether the trial court’s finding that services were adequate under the substantial evidence standard. (Katie V. v. Superior Court (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 586, 598.)
Section 366.21, subdivision (f), provides: “The court shall also determine whether reasonable services that were designed to aid the parent or legal guardian to overcome the problems that led to the initial removal and continued custody of the child have been provided or offered to the parent or legal guardian.” Reunification services are required to be tailored to fit the circumstances of the particular family and must be designed to redress the circumstances that led to the removal of the children and the juvenile court’s finding of jurisdiction. (In re Alvin R. (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 962, 972; In re Dino E. (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 1768, 1777.) The standard is not whether the services provided were the best that might have been provided, but whether they were reasonable under the circumstances. (Elijah R. v. Superior Court (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 965, 969.)
A developmentally disabled parent is entitled to services that are responsive to the family’s special needs in light of the parent’s particular disabilities, unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the parent is incapable of utilizing the services, within the meaning of Welfare and Institutions Code, section 361.5, subdivision (b). (In re Elizabeth R. (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1774, 1790, citing In re Victoria M. (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1317, 1320.) However, a developmentally disabled parent is not excused from complying with a reunification plan, but the record must establish by clear and convincing evidence that the plan was designed to accommodate the parent’s specific needs and limitations. (In re Christina L. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 404, 414-415; In re Victoria M., supra, at pp. 1326-1327.) If the Department does not provide reasonable reunification services to a parent, the court must order that services be continued. (§ 361.5, subd. (a)(3); In re Maria S. (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 1032, 1039.)
In Elizabeth R., supra, the Third District Court of Appeal observed that because the department could have, but did not seek to deny services to the mentally disabled mother, it was required to make an effort to provide suitable services, in spite of the difficulties of doing so or the prospects of success. (In re Elizabeth R., supra, 35 Cal.App.4th at p. 1790.) Father relies on this point in arguing that because DPSS recommended that services be provided, rather than denied, more individualized services should have been provided.
However, father, who was represented by counsel, had previously agreed to the amended service plan (following mediation); he did not object to any of the services, and was ordered to participate in that plan on April 29, 2008. Nor did father or his counsel request any particular additional service to assist him. Instead, at the June 12, 2008, appearance review hearing, father requested that his therapy and parenting classes be tailored to his needs. The department acknowledged this fact, agreed to continue services to father, and to do what it could.
By the 12-month review hearing, the social worker was not precisely aware of whether or how the counselors may have changed father’s therapy, or if the parenting class instructor or the sexual abuse prevention instructor changed the delivery of services after learning father had an IQ of 64. However, she was informed that father’s therapist had changed to a more individualized approach to therapy, as opposed to group therapy, and father completed the parenting class. The social worker had gone over the requirements of the revised plan with father and he informed her he understood them and agreed to complete them. While there is no indication that the father was referred to the Regional Center (§ 4620), there is no indication in the record or on appeal that it would have made a difference.
Additional therapy and parenting classes for father would be fruitless given father’s continued drug use, excessive drinking, and inconsistent visits. It was unlikely that father would benefit from additional services, even if they had been provided. (See Curtis F. v. Superior Court (2000) 80 Cal.App.4th 470, 474.) The juvenile court is not required to unnecessarily prolong the lengthy dependency process when there is no chance of successful reunification because of circumstances that make it fruitless to provide reunification services. (In re Joshua M. (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 458, 470.)
Father’s own failures prevent us from finding that DPSS failed to make reasonable efforts to accommodate his intellectual limitations. There is substantial evidence to support the juvenile court’s finding that reasonable services were provided.
B. The Suspension of Visits Was Proper Where Father’s Inconsistency and His Conduct During Visits Created an Emotional Roller Coaster for S.G.
Father argues that the juvenile court abused its discretion in finding that visitation between father and S.G. was detrimental, and in suspending visitation. We disagree.
Any order placing a child in foster care, and ordering reunification services, must provide for visitation between the parent (or guardian) and the child, as frequently as possible, consistent with the well-being of the child. (§ 362.1, subd. (a)(1)(A).) Visitation between a dependent child and his or her parents is an essential component of a reunification plan, even if actual physical custody is not the outcome of the proceedings. (In re Mark L. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 573, 580.) However, no visitation order shall jeopardize the safety of the child. (Ibid.) Notwithstanding these principles, a juvenile court has broad discretion to determine what would best serve and protect the child’s interest, and the court’s determination in this regard will not be reversed absent a clear abuse of discretion. (In re Neil D. (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 219, 225.)
Here, the record reveals the father’s visits during the current review period were inconsistent and problematic, causing S.G. to experience an “emotional roller coaster.” Out of 10 possible visits between October and December 2008, father visited only three times. When he did visit, his lack of awareness of how to interact with S.G., or to redirect her inappropriate, sexualized behavior, required departmental intervention. The social worker also observed that S.G. actually requesting early termination or cancellation of some visits because her father yelled at her during the visits, making her feel uncomfortable with him.
S.G.’s therapist reported that S.G. experienced wide emotional swings respecting father, and expressed sadness and disappointment when father missed a visit, as well as by his actions during visits. These observations were echoed by the foster mother, whose journal entries describing S.G.’s behavior issues were appended to the department’s report for the 12-month review hearing. After visits, S.G.’s troubling behaviors included getting into trouble at school, or abusing pets in the foster home, sexual acting out, and urinating on stuffed animals.
This evidence supports the juvenile court’s finding that visits were detrimental to S. G. Thus, the order suspending visitation was not an abuse of discretion.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
We concur: Richli Acting P. J., King J.