Opinion
G061776
07-10-2024
GF CAPITAL, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. LILA STAHL, Defendant and Appellant.
Park LLP, Daniel E. Park, Alisa M. Morgenthaler, Jason H. Woltman, Wil J. Rios, and Samuel F. Izzo for Defendant and Appellant. Plante Huguenin Lebovic Kahn LLP, Michael T. Taurek and Nichole M. Wong for Plaintiff and Respondent.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County, Super. Ct. No. 30-2019-01059680 Peter J. Wilson, Judge. Affirmed. Motion for sanctions denied.
Park LLP, Daniel E. Park, Alisa M. Morgenthaler, Jason H. Woltman, Wil J. Rios, and Samuel F. Izzo for Defendant and Appellant.
Plante Huguenin Lebovic Kahn LLP, Michael T. Taurek and Nichole M. Wong for Plaintiff and Respondent.
OPINION
MOTOIKE, J.
Defendant Lila Stahl appeals after judgment was entered against her and Stephen Whang for over $2.4 million. When GF Capital provided Butterfly Pavillion, LLC (Butterfly) a $2 million short-term bridge loan, which was secured by a deed of trust, Stahl and Whang (collectively, the Guarantors) executed personal guaranty agreements. After Butterfly defaulted on the loan, GF Capital foreclosed on the property and sought to recover the outstanding amount owed under the guaranty agreements. When the Guarantors did not pay, GF Capital filed a complaint against them for breach of personal guaranty. The trial court later granted GF Capital's motion for summary judgment.
Stephen Whang is not a party to this appeal. Therefore, we focus on the facts and issues as they apply to Stahl.
Stahl contends the court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of GF Capital because she established triable issues of material fact as to whether the guaranty agreement was unconscionable and whether GF Capital misrepresented the loan type. She also asserts "the trial court erred in finding GF Capital met its initial burden of proof." She argues GF Capital lacked standing to enforce the guaranty agreement because it transferred its rights under the agreement to Proforma77 Corporation (Proforma77). We reject Stahl's arguments and affirm the judgment. As explained in our discussion below, we deny GF Capital's motion for sanctions against Stahl's counsel in this instance.
FACTS
I.
THE BUTTERFLY PROJECT
In 2016, Butterfly purchased property on Beach Boulevard (the Property) from the Buena Park Successor Agency for $2.45 million. Butterfly entered into a development agreement with the City of Buena Park (the City) "limiting improvement on the Property to a butterfly and nature habitat entertainment/educational facility." The development agreement established a construction completion deadline but included a provision for granting extensions of the deadline for up to one year.
II.
THE LOAN BY GF CAPITAL AND THE PERSONAL GUARANTY AGREEMENTS BY THE GUARANTORS
After recognizing it was not going to meet the construction completion deadline, Butterfly requested a one-year extension, but the City did not immediately grant the request. At the time, Butterfly had two outstanding loans through Danco, Inc., which were secured by recorded deeds of trust on the Property. These principal loan amounts totaled $4.2 million and the outstanding loan balances were over $5.3 million. Butterfly was also delinquent on the property taxes by more than $334,000.
In 2018, a few months prior to the expiration of the construction completion deadline, Butterfly sought a short-term commercial bridge loan from GF Capital. The City recommended GF Capital as a lender. Butterfly and GF Capital negotiated the bridge loan's terms. GF Capital loaned $2 million to Butterfly pursuant to an executed promissory note secured by a recorded third deed of trust on the Property, with the power of sale. The loan principal's maturity date was December 31, 2018.
According to Stahl, GF Capital's president, Scott Lissoy, verbally assured her there would never be a default nor foreclosure on the loan and she relied on these assurances when agreeing to the loan.
Each of the Guarantors executed a personal guaranty agreement that Butterfly would pay all sums due under the promissory note. (We focus on Stahl's personal guaranty agreement.)
The guaranty agreement included certain waivers. Pursuant to the guaranty agreement, Stahl waived: "Any and all defenses, counterclaims and offsets of any kind or nature, arising directly or indirectly from the present or future lack of perfection, sufficiency, validity and/or enforceability of the Agreements or this Guaranty including acts or omissions which may discharge [Butterfly] due to the unenforceability of the Agreements or other guarantees." Under the terms of the guaranty agreement, Stahl also waived "any and all benefits that might otherwise b[e] available to [her] under California Civil Code Sections 2809, 2810, 2819, 2839, 2845, 2849, 2850, 2899 and 3433 . . ., and California Code of Civil Procedure Sections 580a, 580b, 580d and 726 ...." The guaranty agreement further stated Stahl "acknowledges and understands that [GF Capital] may obtain a judgment against [her] for the entire Liabilities or any deficiency balance thereof upon foreclosure of real or personal property without regard to the fair market value of the property, the method of foreclosure or th[e] fact that the Liabilities arise from a purchase money transaction."
III.
BUTTERFLY DEFAULTS ON THE PROMISSORY NOTE
Butterfly defaulted on the promissory note by failing to repay the loan principal and accrued fees by the maturity date. In February 2019, GF Capital recorded a notice of default and election to sell under the deed of trust and served it on Butterfly. Butterfly and the Guarantors failed to cure the default within 90 days. GF Capital recorded a notice of sale in June 2019, and the trustee's sale of the Property was set for July 11, 2019.
IV.
FORBEARANCE AGREEMENT
Days before the scheduled trustee's sale, GF Capital entered into a forbearance agreement with Butterfly and the Guarantors concerning the promissory note and trustee's sale. Pursuant to the terms of the forbearance agreement, GF Capital agreed to forbear moving forward with the foreclosure sale through August 30, 2019. The forbearance agreement provided if the obligations owed under the note were not paid in full by then, GF Capital was free to proceed with the foreclosure sale of the Property without objection or defense by Butterfly. In the forbearance agreement, Butterfly admitted it was in default under the promissory note and its liability as of July 1, 2019 included the full principal of $2 million plus more than $600,000 in accrued fees. Butterfly also admitted "to having no defenses, offsets, crossclaims or adverse claims of any kind with respect to liability for the Undisputed July 1, 2019 Note Debt" and "released all known and unknown claims against [GF Capital] arising out of or related to the Note and transaction contemplated thereof." In the forbearance agreement, Butterfly waived its rights under Civil Code section 1542. The foreclosure sale was continued to September 3, 2019.
Civil Code section 1542 provides: "A general release does not extend to claims that the creditor or releasing party does not know or suspect to exist in his or her favor at the time of executing the release and that, if known by him or her, would have materially affected his or her settlement with the debtor or released party."
V.
FORECLOSURE SALE OF THE PROPERTY
Neither Butterfly nor the Guarantors satisfied the outstanding loan obligation prior to the expiration of the forbearance agreement. On September 3, 2019, the trustee held a nonjudicial foreclosure sale of the Property. Proforma77 was the highest bidder with a bid of $201,000. The following day, the trustee recorded the new deed, and it was delivered to Proforma77.
Neither party provides a citation to the record where the relationship between GF Capital and Proforma77 is explained. The record shows Scott Lissoy is the president of both corporations.
Following the foreclosure sale, GF Capital made a written demand for payment of the outstanding amount owed, after crediting the purchase price for the Property. The Guarantors did not pay the demanded amount nor a portion of it.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
I.
THE BUTTERFLY ACTION
In March 2019, the City and the Buena Park Successor Agency filed a complaint against Butterfly, the Guarantors, and others, alleging several causes of action (the Butterfly Action). After the foreclosure sale, in September 2019, Butterfly filed a cross-complaint against the City, the Buena Park Successor Agency, GF Capital, and Proforma77 for numerous causes of action. Butterfly filed an amended cross-complaint in December 2019, which, in addition to the causes of action against the City and others, alleged four causes of action against GF Capital and Proforma77: (1) wrongful foreclosure, (2) declaratory relief, (3) cancellation of deed, and (4) quiet title. Butterfly also alleged one cause of action for promissory estoppel solely against GF Capital.
II.
GF CAPITAL'S ACTION
In March 2020, GF Capital initiated a separate action by filing a complaint against the Guarantors for breach of their personal guaranty agreements. GF Capital filed a first amended complaint in May 2020 with the same cause of action, seeking as damages the principal owed plus interest and attorney fees. The Guarantors filed an answer, denying each allegation in the first amended complaint. They did not assert the guaranty agreements were unconscionable, resulted from fraud, or that GF Capital lacked standing to bring the action.
III.
GF CAPITAL'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OR SUMMARY ADJUDICATION
In March 2022, GF Capital moved for summary judgment or, in the alternative, summary adjudication on its claim for breach of the personal guaranty agreements. The motion was supported by a request for judicial notice, a separate statement of material facts, and a declaration by Lissoy.
The Guarantors filed an opposition, supported by a separate statement of undisputed material facts, and a declaration by Stahl. The Guarantors asserted there were triable issues of material facts as to: (1) whether the GF Capital contract was illusory, unconscionable, against public policy, and unenforceable; (2) whether there was fraud by GF Capital and the City; (3) whether there was a breach of contract, unjust enrichment, or unclean hands on the part of the City; and (4) whether there was a conspiracy and collusion between GF Capital and the City to defraud the Guarantors. GF Capital filed a reply and objected to portions of Stahl's declaration.
IV.
TRIAL COURT'S RULING
At the hearing on the summary judgment motion, no oral argument was presented. The court granted GF Capital's request for judicial notice and sustained several of GF Capital's objections to Stahl's declaration. Although the court overruled several other objections to Stahl's declaration, it noted the statements objected to were irrelevant because the Guarantors "signed the Forbearance Agreement, which acknowledged the breach and their continued guarantees."
The court granted GF Capital's motion for summary judgment. The court noted the Guarantors did not challenge the evidence presented by GF Capital: They did not dispute "they provided personal guarantees on the loan to Butterfly Pavillion, that Butterfly Pavillion defaulted on the loan, that they had notice of the default, that they did not pay the debt, or that GF Capital was damaged as a result." Thus, the court found GF Capital satisfied its initial burden by presenting evidence of each element of the cause of action for breach of guaranty, thereby shifting the burden to the Guarantors to set forth specific facts showing the existence of a triable issue of material fact. The court found the Guarantors had not meet their burden, as the court rejected their conclusory arguments the guaranty agreements were illusory, unconscionable, against public policy, unenforceable, and fraudulent. The judgment against Stahl in the amount of $2,449,005.48 was entered in July 2022. Stahl timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I.
THE COURT PROPERLY GRANTED SUMMARY JUDGMENT
A. Summary Judgment and Standard of Review
"'A trial court properly grants summary judgment where no triable issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.' [Citation.] The materiality of a disputed fact is measured by the pleadings [citations], which 'set the boundaries of the issues to be resolved at summary judgment.'" (Conroy v. Regents of University of California (2009) 45 Cal.4th 1244, 1250.)
"'[T]he party moving for summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triable issue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to a burden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.' [Citation.] 'A prima facie showing is one that is sufficient to support the position of the party in question.' [Citation.] 'There is a triable issue of material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in accordance with the applicable standard of proof.'" (Beltran v. Hard Rock Hotel Licensing, Inc. (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 865, 877.)
We review de novo an order granting summary judgment. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 860.) "'[W]e examine the facts presented to the trial court and determine their effect as a matter of law.' [Citation.] We review the entire record, 'considering all evidence set forth in the moving and opposition papers except that to which objections have been made and sustained.' [Citation.] Evidence presented in opposition to summary judgment is liberally construed, with any doubts about the evidence resolved in favor of the party opposing the motion." (Regents of University of California v. Superior Court (2018) 4 Cal.5th 607, 618.)
B. GF Capital Met Its Initial Burden of Proof
"A lender is entitled to judgment on a breach of guaranty claim based upon undisputed evidence that (1) there is a valid guaranty, (2) the borrower has defaulted, and (3) the guarantor failed to perform under the guaranty." (Gray1 CPB, LLC v. Kolokotronis (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 480, 486; accord, Torrey Pines Bank v. Superior Court (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 813, 819.)
The record contains undisputed evidence Stahl guaranteed Butterfly's repayment of the $2 million short-term bridge loan to GF Capital, Butterfly defaulted on the loan, Butterfly and the Guarantors received notice of the default, neither Butterfly nor the Guarantors cured the default, the Guarantors acknowledged the debt in the forbearance agreement, and the Guarantors failed to perform under the guaranty by paying the balance owed. In the separate statement of undisputed material facts, Stahl stated it was undisputed "Guarantors are liable to [GF Capital] in the principal sum of $2,449,005.48 ...."
Thus, GF Capital met its initial burden of establishing facts justifying judgment in its favor. The burden thereby shifted to Stahl to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact (Beltran v. Hard Rock Hotel Licensing, Inc., supra, 97 Cal.App.5th at p. 877); a requirement she did not satisfy.
C. Stahl Has Failed to Show Error
Stahl argues she established triable issues of material fact concerning the unconscionability of her guaranty agreement and "regarding GF Capital's fraudulent misrepresentation of the loan type." She also contends: "the trial court hastily granted summary judgment in favor of GF Capital without conducting a thorough assessment of its legal standing to proceed." But Stahl does not identify where she raised these issues in the trial court or what evidence she offered in the trial court to support her arguments; a point made by GF Capital in its respondent's brief. Stahl replies she raised the issues concerning unconscionability and misrepresentation of loan type in the trial court. She admits she did not raise the issue concerning GF Capital's standing in the trial court or present evidence on this issue, but she urges this court to consider the issue nonetheless. As we discuss below, we reject Stahl's appellate claims because she did not raise them below, she fails to support her appellate arguments with citations to the record, or both.
"'Generally, the rules relating to the scope of appellate review apply to appellate review of summary judgments. [Citation.] An argument or theory will . . . not be considered if it is raised for the first time on appeal. [Citation.] Specifically, in reviewing a summary judgment, the appellate court must consider only those facts before the trial court, disregarding any new allegations on appeal. [Citation.] Thus, possible theories that were not fully developed or factually presented to the trial court cannot create a "triable issue" on appeal.' [Citation.] 'A party is not permitted to change his position and adopt a new and different theory on appeal. To permit him to do so would not only be unfair to the trial court, but manifestly unjust to the opposing litigant.'" (DiCola v. White Brothers Performance Products, Inc. (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 666, 676.)
"'"[A]lthough we use a de novo standard of review here, we do not transform into a trial court."' [Citation.] We approach a summary judgment appeal, as with any appeal, with the presumption the appealed judgment is correct. [Citation.] Therefore, '"'[o]n review of a summary judgment, the appellant has the burden of showing error, even if he did not bear the burden in the trial court.'"'" (Meridian Financial Services, Inc. v. Phan (2021) 67 Cal.App.5th 657, 684.)
"To meet this burden on an appeal from a grant of summary judgment, an appellant must 'direct the court to evidence that supports his arguments.' [Citation.] 'Moreover, an appellant is required to not only cite to valid legal authority, but also explain how it applies in his case. [Citation.] It is not the court's duty to attempt to resurrect an appellant's case or comb through the record for evidentiary items to create a disputed issue of material fact.' [Citation.] An appellant who fails to pinpoint the evidence in the record indicating the existence of triable issues of fact will be deemed to have waived any claim the trial court erred in granting summary judgment." (Dinslage v. City and County of San Francisco (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 368, 379.)
1. Unconscionability
Stahl contends she raised triable issues of material fact as to whether her guaranty agreement was unconscionable. To establish the defense of unconscionability, both procedural and substantive unconscionability must be shown. (OTO, L.L.C. v. Kho (2019) 8 Cal.5th 111, 125.) Stahl asserts she presented triable issues of material fact as to both elements. We disagree.
Addressing the procedural unconscionability element in her opening brief, Stahl contends the guaranty agreement itself "clearly raised a triable issue as to whether it constituted a 'contract of adhesion.'" She continues: "The Agreement is a standardized contract drafted solely by GF Capital, the party of superior bargaining strength, and its affiliates and presented for Stahl's acceptance. The circumstances surrounding this transaction emphasize the unequal bargaining power, especially the urgency of Stahl's need for a loan, which GF Capital exploited to secure her compliance with unfavorable contract terms. This power imbalance eliminated any meaningful negotiation or choice, constituting procedural unconscionability." She further asserts her "lack of legal representation and her status as an unsophisticated investor further highlights her disadvantaged position," as well as her lack of "comprehensive knowledge of complex commercial real estate transactions." She also indicates the guaranty agreement was presented to her "as a non-negotiable ultimatum." However, Stahl fails to cite to any evidence in the record to support even one of these assertions. "An appellant must '[s]upport any reference to a matter in the record by a citation to the volume and page number of the record where the matter appears.' (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C).) '"The appellate court is not required to search the record on its own seeking error."'" (Le Mere v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 237, 248.) Thus, when a party fails to support an argument with citations to the record, the reviewing court may deem the argument waived. (Ibid.)
There is a simple explanation as to why Stahl does not cite to the record to show the evidence she presented to the trial court on this issue-she did not make this argument in the trial court. In opposing summary judgment in the trial court, Stahl made conclusory assertions "the contract was illusory, unconscionable, against public policy, and . . . unenforceable," thereby relieving her of her obligation to pay. She did not argue her guaranty agreement was a contract of adhesion or otherwise procedurally unconscionable. In the trial court, Stahl cited no legal authority and made no effort to explain how the guaranty agreement was procedurally unconscionable. Nor did she identify any admissible evidence to support this argument in her separate statement of material facts.
Stahl's appellate argument concerning the guaranty agreement's substantive unconscionability fares only slightly better. "Substantive unconscionability focuses on the actual terms of the agreement and evaluates whether they create overly harsh or one-sided results." (Fisher v. MoneyGram Internat., Inc. (2021) 66 Cal.App.5th 1084, 1104.) On appeal, Stahl asserts the guaranty agreement is substantively unconscionable because it "contains provisions that significantly restrict [her] ability to address legal matters related to the contract and give GF Capital unilateral authority to interpret it." She cites two provisions as examples but does not provide a record citation to the guaranty agreement and where these provisions are therein. In the trial court, she did not argue these provisions in the guaranty agreement were substantively unconscionable.
In her reply brief, Stahl asserts she raised the issue of unconscionability in her summary judgment opposition in the trial court because she "explicitly highlighted the language within the Guaranty Agreement that rendered it both unconscionable and unenforceable." When we look at Stahl's opposition, we do not see she clearly raised the issue below. In the trial court, Stahl did not directly quote the guaranty agreement's provisions. Instead, she quoted language in GF Capital's summary judgment motion concerning the agreement's provisions and asserted the language in GF Capital's "Motion for Summary Judgment rendered the contract . . . illusory, unconscionable, against public policy, and unenforceable ...." .And that is all she did. She cited no legal authority concerning unconscionability and offered no legal argument explaining why the language she quoted rendered the guaranty agreement unconscionable.
In the guaranty agreement, Stahl waived any benefits that might be available to her under Code of Civil Procedure sections 580a, 580b, 580d, and 726. Contrary to Stahl's contention, these waivers were statutorily permissible in her guaranty agreements. (Civ. Code, § 2856; Gramercy Investment Trust v. Lakemont Homes Nevada, Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 903, 911.)
Stahl failed to argue in the trial court that there were triable issues of material fact concerning whether the guaranty agreement was both procedurally and substantively unconscionable. "[W]e are not obligated to consider arguments or theories . . . that were not advanced . . . in the trial court." (DiCola v. White Brothers Performance Products, Inc., supra, 158 Cal.App.4th at p. 676.) Thus, the trial court properly concluded Stahl did not carry her burden of showing a triable issue of material fact as to the agreement's unconscionability.
2. Fraudulent Misrepresentation of Loan Type
Stahl contends the court erred by failing to recognize she "raised a triable issue of material fact regarding GF Capital's fraudulent misrepresentation of the loan type." On appeal, she asserts GF Capital deliberately mischaracterized the loan as a property loan rather than a personal loan and "[t]his misrepresentation significantly influenced [her] decision to commit to a personal guarantee that extended beyond the Project's assets." Stahl does not indicate where she raised this issue below nor the facts she presented below to support it.
Again, Stahl makes an argument on appeal that she did not raise in the trial court. Although her opposition to summary judgment repeatedly used the words "fraud" and "fraudulent," it did no more than that. Stahl's opposition did not cite legal authority to support the argument the guaranty agreement was unenforceable due to fraud or, as she asserts now, a "'fraudulent misrepresentation of loan type.'"
On appeal, Stahl asserts "GF Capital's decision to structure the loan as a property loan raises suspicions that it might have been a personal loan disguised as a property loan, possibly motivated by ulterior motives such as deception or fraud to secure unwarranted benefits." While she made a similar assertion below, it is no more than speculation and does not create a triable issue of material fact. "'An issue of fact can only be created by a conflict of evidence. It is not created by "speculation, conjecture, imagination or guess work."'" (Yuzon v. Collins (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 149, 166.) Accordingly, we reject Stahl's claim and conclude the court properly found she did not make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact as to whether GF Capital committed fraud.
3. Standing
Raising another issue for the first time on appeal, Stahl contends "the trial court hastily granted summary judgment in favor of GF Capital without conducting a thorough assessment of its legal standing to proceed." She asserts GF Capital lacked standing to pursue the deficiency judgment because it assigned the deed of trust and promissory note to Proforma77 just days prior to the foreclosure sale in 2019. In the argument portion of her opening brief, Stahl does not provide a record citation to the assignment of the deed of trust and promissory note to Proforma77, which is the whole basis of her argument. We are not required to search the record for evidence to support her argument, especially a record this voluminous. An argument unsupported by an appropriate citation to the record may be deemed waived. (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246.)
She provides a record citation in the statement of facts in her opening brief, but it is incorrect. She provides a different record citation in her reply brief, but it is also incorrect.
Stahl admits she did not raise this issue in the trial court. In her reply brief, she acknowledges neither party referenced the assignment of the deed of trust in the proceedings below. She urges this court to nevertheless consider her argument because it concerns a pure question of law.
"It is well settled that a party may raise the issue of standing for the first time on appeal." (Steadman v. Osborne (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 950, 954-955.) "Standing is related to the requirement contained in Code of Civil Procedure section 367 that '[e]very action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, except as otherwise provided by statute.' [Citation.] The real party in interest is generally the person who has the right to sue under the substantive law. [Citation.] 'A party who is not the real party in interest lacks standing to sue because the claim belongs to someone else.'" (River's Side at Washington Square Homeowners Assn. v. Superior Court (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1209, 1225.)
GF Capital makes multiple arguments as to why it had standing to pursue the claim under the guaranty agreement: (1) There was no assignment of Stahl's guaranty to Proforma77; (2) Even if there was an assignment, a writing was unnecessary to reassign the guaranty back to GF Capital and the actions of GF Capital and Proforma77 reflect a manifestation of such reassignment; and (3) Stahl will not be subject to further suit by Proforma77 regarding the deficiency. Stahl does not address GF Capital's arguments and provides no substantive argument in response. We are not obligated to develop Stahl's arguments for her, even as to standing. "The absence of cogent legal argument or citation to authority allows this court to treat the contentions as waived." (In re Marriage of Falcone &Fyke (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 814, 830; see also People ex rel. Reisig v. Acuna (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 866, 879 ["'An appellate brief "should contain a legal argument with citation of authorities on the points made. If none is furnished on a particular point, the court may treat it as [forfeited], and pass it without consideration."'"].) We do so here.
II.
GF CAPITAL'S MOTION FOR SANCTIONS
GF Capital moved for sanctions against Stahl on the grounds she violated several rules of appellate procedure in her assembly of the appellate record and in her opening brief. First, GF Capital argues sanctions should be imposed under California Rules of Court, rule 8.276, subdivision (a)(2) because Stahl included in the record thousands of pages of trial court documents that are irrelevant to the appeal's determination. GF Capital's frustration with Stahl's designation of a voluminous appellate record is unmistakable and understandable.
The record in this appeal from a summary judgment motion contains over 7,000 pages. Stahl asserts the large appellate record "is essential for the court to understand the procedural history of the case and for [her] to support her position." She is wrong. Even a cursory review of her record designation reveals she included numerous documents immaterial to the appeal's determination. Stahl included 373 documents in her designation of record. GF Capital's motion for summary judgment was the 299th document in Stahl's designation of record. Only a few of the 298 documents preceding the summary judgment motion were relevant to the appeal. Moreover, Stahl included over 30 documents in the record that were filed in the trial court after the judgment on appeal was entered against her. It is telling that in her appellate briefs, Stahl cites very few documents in the record. If the documents in the voluminous record were "essential" as she contends, she would have cited to more of them in her appellate briefs.
Stahl's conduct of including in the record matters not reasonably material to the appeal's determination is sanctionable conduct under California Rules of Court, rule 8.276(a)(2). Although appropriate, we decline to impose sanctions in this instance. We will, however, not be as forgiving should we find Stahl's appellate counsel engaging in similar conduct in the future.
Second, GF Capital contends sanctions should be imposed based on deficiencies in Stahl's appellate briefs. GF Capital asserts Stahl: (1) failed to support her arguments with citations to the record or legal authority, (2) included irrelevant facts in her brief, and (3) relied on items improperly included in the record. As discussed above, Stahl did not support her appellate arguments with citations to the record. While Stahl included some record citations in her statement of facts, she included only two in the entire argument portion of her brief. "Each and every statement in a brief regarding matters that are in the record on appeal, whether factual or procedural, must be supported by a citation to the record. This rule applies regardless of where the reference occurs in the brief." (Lona v. Citibank, N.A. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 89, 96, fn. 2, citing Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C).) An appellant is also required to cite valid legal authority to support each argument and explain how it applies to the facts in their case. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B); Dinslage v. City and County of San Francisco, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 379.) Committing unreasonable violations of the rules of court is sanctionable conduct. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.276(a)(4).) We have found Stahl's appellate contentions waived because of the deficiencies in her briefs and other reasons. This is an apt and adequate penalty.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondent GF Capital is entitled to costs on appeal.
WE CONCUR: SANCHEZ, ACTING P. J. GOODING, J.